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Abstract.
The concept of the 'Subject' is a central one in both formal linguistics and
psychology. Formal linguistics tends to speak of 'Subject' as a purely grammatical
object which has identity only in relation to that over which it predicates. Psychology
on the other hand tends to consider 'the Subject' as more closely to do with notions of
the 'Self' and meaningful activity. The difference of these views becomes most
profound in the study of first language acquisition.
This area seems to be one in which both perspectives are at a similar
weakness, each displaying the drawbacks of its own mode of analysis. The rigidly
fixed lexicon characteristic of formal linguistics finds the description of change
problematic; psychology, which characteristically eschews 'theory' for empirical
veracity, can sometimes become too impressionistic to comfortably describe a
tendency for systematicity.
The critical review of literature which comprises Chapter 1 takes issue with the
Chomskyan formal linguistic assertion that much linguistic ability, including a
formally defined Subject, must be innate. It is argued and demonstrated here that the
assertion is not a conclusion based on well-founded empirical evidence, but is a
consequence of an adherence to formal principles.
Chapter 2 is rooted in an exposition of the developmental ideas of the early
Soviet Psychologist Lev Vygotsky - especially in critical relationship with Jean Piaget
- whose dialectical forms allow the description of a constantly changing and
developing device. Beginning with a recognition that the 'Subject' of early child
language does not fulfil formal linguistic criteria for Subjecthood, the chapter goes on
through a close interpretation of infant behaviour to explore the changing ways in
which the child relates to the physical world around it, to its social environment, and
to itself. The goal of this chapter is to build an image of the child's growing sense of
Self - and thus to a reconstructed psychological notion of 'Subject'.
The final chapter 3 returns to formal linguistics and demonstrates the
compatibility of the above psychological approach to early cognitive development and
the formal linguistic description of the more principled and systematic changes of later
child language. The formal linguistic concept of 'Subject' is seen to be a development
of the earlier psychological notion.
In conclusion, the thesis is intended to be a dialectical synthesis of
psychological and formal linguistic methods, which is able to overcome inherent
problems of both. The portrait of the development of the 'Subject' category is intended
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0 Introduction.
This thesis began life as a critique of the tacit assumptions of Chomskyan
Formal Linguistics (CFL), as exemplified most explicitly in work like Chomsky 1988.
Initially this critique was to centre on a perceived weakness in CFL in its description
of change. This might be geographical or personal variation, historical change, or the
psychological changes involved in first or second language acquisition. The difference
between the conceptual apparatus of CFL and the apparent changes occurring during
first language acquisition seemed the most profound and so I plunged myself into the
criticism of 'Parameter setting' models of language acquisition, and the broad
theoretical paradigm in which they worked.
Much of the fuel for my critique at this point came from experimental
psychology, and especially from longitudinal studies of the behaviour of very young
children. However, it soon became clear that psychology came with its own tacit
assumptions and weaknesses. It seemed that the psychologists' enthusiasm for
empirical experimentation unencumbered by theoretical speculation was behind two
problems in particular which stood in my way. The first was terminological: because
of the slightly different perspective of each interpretative study, something which
seemed to be a unitary phenomenon might be described by several unrelated terms. In
the second case, experimental psychology seemed to have little to say about the
increasingly systematic nature of the child's developing language, and the apparent
move away from semantics to syntax in linguistically aided thought.
My project became an attempt to synthesise the most useful qualities of both
fields - the empirical veracity of experimental psychology with the systematising
influence of formal linguistics. The ideas of early Soviet psychology were a primary
guide and inspiration (e.g. Vygotsky (1934/1986). See also Phillips (1986); and
Ilyenkov (1974, 1979/1982) for a broader philosophical base).
The concept of the Subject was taken as the objective focus around which this
synthesis could cohere. Descriptions of the Subject seem to show both fields
simultaneously at their strongest and at their weakest; and the respective areas of
expertise are at their most complimentary. For CFL, the Subject is almost purely a
structural entity with no necessary or sufficient semantic properties, and thus is more
naturally a property of languages than of people. How does it get into people's heads?
For psychology, the Subject is more often described in terms of the Self and
meaningful activity. This notion is especially apparent in the behaviour of infants, but
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in adult language the association with the Self seems to be lost, indeed in favour of the
syntactic properties described in CFL. What happens?
Taking the failure of CFL to describe what apparently occurs in first language
acquisition as its starting point (in Chapter 1), this thesis then attempts to build a
systematic psychology of the changing forms of thought during the first years of a
child's life. This is the focus of Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 this formal psychology turns




Nativism in the study of language acquisition.
"Formalisa. Loves deathhow simple!"
(Joyce 1939: 304.3).
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1 Literature review: Nativism in the study of language
acquisition.
The argument for the innateness of abstract linguistic principles and
parameters, like those making up the Universal Grammar (UG) of Chomskyan formal
linguistics, often appeals to the 'paucity of the Primary Linguistic Data'. In sketch, the
argument is that the data provided to the language learner is not sufficiently rich to
provide evidence for many of the abstract properties and structures which appear in the
learner's later language; thus the learner must be equipped in advance (i.e., a priori,
before birth) with the knowledge that certain properties may or may not hold of certain
structures. Universal Grammar represents this innate endowment of knowledge.
First we examine the empirical claim that the linguistic input is poor and
insufficient for the child to learn; second, the notion of 'learning' as defined in formal
linguistics is questioned; finally, the evolution of Chomskyan linguistics is analysed to
illustrate the nature of the formal linguistic notion of 'language'. In each section
seminal works are put under critical scrutiny, in an attempt to appreciate the formal
linguistic position at its most coherent and advanced. The conclusion is that nativism is
not an empirical consideration, but is an assumption dependent almost exclusively on
formal principles.
1.1 The argument from paucity of the stimulus.
1.1.1 Brown & Hanlon (1970); a critical review.
"Derivational Complexity and order of acquisition in child speech" (Brown &
Hanlon (1970): henceforth referred to as BH70) is the paper most often referred to
when motivating the lack of 'Negative Evidence' in the language learner's linguistic
data. Negative evidence - i.e. evidence that something is not the case, that a certain
sentence is not in the language being learned - consists of explicit corrections and other
hints that the child's utterance is unacceptable in some way ('implicit Negative
Evidence'). At least since Gold's (1967) paper on learnability, which is examined
below (1.2), paucity of the stimulus has stood for the lack of sufficient Negative
Evidence, the richness otherwise of the data being granted.
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BH70 used data which had been collected (and is now available on the
CHILDES database, MacWhinney (1991)) from a longitudinal study of three
mother/child dyads in a series of hour-long natural play situations - the parameters
governing the data collection are not described in detail in the paper, but are available
elsewhere (Brown, 1973), the children were Adam (age 2;3;4 - 4;10;23), Eve (age 1;6
- 2;3) and Sarah (age 2;3;5 - 5;1;6). The BH70 study used five files only from each
child, each file standing as representative of a 'stage' of development (as defined in
Brown, 1973), this means that quite a small proportion of the data collected was
actually examined: see tables 1.0(a & b) below.
Table 1.0(a): Files used in BH70.
sample mlu age
Adam Eve Sarah
I 1.75 2;3;4 1;6 2;3;7
II 2.25 2;5;12 l;9 2;7;18
III 2.75 2;11;13 1; 10 3;0;18
IV 3.5 2; 11 ;28 2;0 3;5; 13
V 4 3;6;9 2;2 4;0;14
Table 1.0(b): Proportion of data available used.
Adam Eve Sarah Total
available 55 20 139 214
used 5 5 5 15
% 9.1 25 3.6 7
Much of the early part of the paper is taken up with explaining the then current
ideas of 'cumulative derivational complexity', relating to the number of obligatory and
optional transformations which had been applied to a postulated 'base string' to
provide the attested 'surface string'. The details of this exposition do not concern us
here, save to say that they are very much in keeping with the then prevalent Aspects
model (Chomsky, 1965) of syntactic structure, and that, taken model internally, the
paper's 'predictions' - that derivational complexity and order of acquisition of certain
structures are correlated - are roughly borne out by the data (results tabulated p31,2).
It may also be important to be aware, however, that the Aspects Transformational
model of syntax has long been discredited on formal grounds (the mushrooming
complexity and ad hoc nature of the transformational grammars created by linguists)
and on psychological grounds (for example parsing speeds of sentences did not
directly correlat with 'cumulative derivational complexity') - see Newmeyer (1986) for
a historical overview. Contemporary explanation of the order of acquisition of
complex structures has moved from acquisition of certain transformations to
maturation in relation to certain principles and parameters. Having expressed this
caveat, the descriptive terminology is often simply translatable and the children's
neologisms examined here may be re-described as instantiations of the various
Functional Systems (Determiner, Complementiser and Inflection (INFL)).
The sentence types tested for, with 'Simple, Active, Affirmative Declarative'
(SAAD) as a base, were; Negatives, Questions, 'Truncated predicates' (e.g. We did),
Truncated negatives, Truncated questions, Negative questions and Truncated negative
questions. In other words, the presence of three transformational processes was being
monitored: Negation, Question formation and Truncation or elision. Negatives
appeared in Brown's stage III (MLU1 2.75, age about 34 months for Adam and
Sarah, 22 months for Eve, described as precocious), the other types not occurring till
around stage V (MLU 4). The conclusion made is that structures which involve
'Transformations' like Subject-Auxiliary inversion, tag question formation and so on
are acquired later than ones which don't.
In asking why the children relinquish the 'primitive' forms of speech, BH70
searches for any relation between the children's primary linguistic data (in the shape
of maternal utterances) and their linguistic development. The two hypotheses
entertained were that either there may be some pressure toward the more effective
communication that adult forms allow, or that there may be some approval from the
adult interlocutors contingent on (adult) grammatical forms.
The test for 'contingent approval' was a correlation between the grammaticality
of children's utterances and the approving or disapproving nature of the parental
1 MLU: Mean Length of Utterance. Usually measured in words or morphemes. See Brown
(1973), Fletcher & Garman (1986).
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response. The test for 'communication pressure' was a tabulation of 'sequiturs' and
'non-sequiturs' in response to the children's primitive and well-formed utterances.
Neither test showed a significant result in favour of the presence of Negative Evidence
in the child's Primary Linguistic Data. See Figures 1.1 and 1.2 below (BH70's Tables
1.11, p48;1.10, p44).
The test for 'contingent approval':
Figure 1.1: Relations between syntactic correctness of antecedent child's
utterance and approving or disapproving parental response.
(a) at stage II
Sarah Adam Eve
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
App. 4 9 4 3 6 19
Dis. 4 6 2 0 3 5
(b) at stage V
Sarah Adam Eve
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
App. 23 4 13 6 33 29
Dis. 12 2 7 1 12 15
In this case the sought for correlation was between the grammatical
(in)correctness of a child's utterances and any explicit (dis)approval in the maternal
response. As the tables show, none of the tested examples (from stages II and V) fit
the expected ranking for the presence of approval contingent on grammaticality (i.e.
app/correct and dis/incorrect being the two most common pairings). On the contrary,
the authors discovered that explicit (dis)approval was much more often contingent on
the truth value of the child's utterance2. However, BH70's analysis was subject to
certain restrictions which are worth discussing.
Firstly, all single word utterances were disregarded on the grounds that they
have no syntax. This is not a controversial restriction, but it is noteworthy that
evidence has been gathered indicating that parental feedback not only occurs but has
appreciable effect in the earlier stages of speech (Chapman et al. 1986). Chapman's
study is of the effect of parental feedback on word usage in reference rather than on
the child's word combinations, and thus may have little direct relevance to syntax
acquisition, but it does seem to imply some basis of a negotiation ofmeaning between
the caregiver and the child. We return to Chapman et al. (1986) in 2.5 on the Social
licensing of meanings.
Secondly, only data from stages II and V were used. This is a tiny proportion
of the data3 and there are presumably data from stages I, III, IV and from after stage V
for Adam and Sarah, which may have qualified the analysis we are presented with.
There is nowhere any justification or explanation why precisely these and only these
samples were used, apart from "In order to investigate contingencies at different levels
of child proficiency, we worked with samples II and V" (p47).
Lastly, (dis)approving utterances were limited to such explicit responses as
that's right, correct, very good, yes, or that's wrong, that's not right, no. All other
approving or corrective utterances are excluded. Research since this study (e.g. Hirsh-
Pasek et al. 1984) has verified that explicit agreement or disagreement is generally a
response to the referential nature of the child's utterance, rather than its grammaticality
- in other words is contingent on semantic rather than grammatical considerations.
However, it has also been noted that semantic errors, almost always followed by
explicit 'disapproval', can account for less than 5% of the child's speech (Bohannon
1988). By limiting its analysis to responses which explicitly refer to the child's
utterance, the results of the contingent approval test seem to have a limited relevance.
The study ignores caregiver responses which less explicitly refer to the child's
grammar, or types of response which perhaps correlate with certain of the child's
grammatical errors. Most pointedly, BH70 excludes all caregiver repetitions from
analysis in the whole of the paper, with merely a brief comment (p43) mentioning their
omission. The question of the relevance of this 'implicit' correction is begged.
2 It may be further evidence against parental guidance in language acquisition that despite this
fact we grow up speaking grammatically but not always truthfully.
3 4% of Adam's files, 10% of Eve's and 2% of Sarah's; 3% of the whole data.
The test for 'communication pressure':
Figure 1.2: Sequiturs and non-sequiturs following primitive and well-formed
constructions (%).
Eve Adam Sarah Means
SEQ NS SEQ NS SEQ NS SEQ NS
Y/N p 70 18 48 50 47 53
W.F. 83 13 46 43 52 47
Wh- p 44 37 45 50 38 62
W.F. 45 18 37 52 52 43
Negs p 70 20 00 86 33 56
W.F. 31 49 24 52 41 51
Means p 61 25 31 62 39 57 44 48
W.F. 53 27 36 49 48 47 46 41
Entertaining a pro-communication pressure hypothesis, the expectation would
have been that non-sequiturs would tend to follow primitive speech and sequiturs,
well-formed (W.F.) speech (the samples for this test were taken largely from stages
III, IV and V, when the children were making the transition into a more fully adult
grammar). As we can see from the table above, sequiturs are the modal response to
W.F. speech in only 5/9 cases and then mainly by a very small margin, and non-
sequiturs are the modal response to primitive utterances in only 6/9 cases. This narrow
tendency is made stronger in the means, where <W.F., sequiturs> and <primitive,
non-sequiturs> are the strongest pairings.
Given that there seems to be a narrow tendency indicating communication
pressure, why do the authors conclude that "the results provide no support for the
notion that there is a communication pressure favoring mature constructions" (p45)?
Notably, the tendencies are narrow enough to be statistically insignificant4 and
are somewhat inconsistent (only two tests fit the ideal pairing - Sarah's yes-no and
Wh- questions). The table does seem to show that there is no systematically
differential response to, or even consciousness of the well-formed-ness of the
children's utterances.
However, there are also restrictions on the data used for analysis in this test
which warrant discussion. First, unlike for the contingent approval test, here only
certain types of child utterances were examined - namely 'yes/no' and 'Wh-'
questions5 and negative statements. It seems safe to estimate that these constitute less
than half of the children's utterances (they constitute 121/700 of the maternal
utterances, p39), and I assume the analysis was restricted to these types for
convenience (the section on contingent approval and communication pressure is after
all not a main part of the paper).
Second, 'non-sequiturs' are rather messily defined - including queries and
misunderstandings, but also 'irrelevancies', 'no responses' and responses 'of
doubtful classification' (p43). Some of these may be examples of true 'non-sequiturs',
but as the authors themselves put it "it is not clear that these should all be considered
unsatisfactory responses. In some cases the child was talking fast and scarcely seemed
to expect or leave time for an answer" (p45). These latter cases surely should have
been taken out of consideration. What were taken out of consideration (as before)
were caregiver 'repeats'. This is why some of the sequiturs and non-sequiturs do not
add up to 100% - the repeats can amount to up to 37% of responses (e.g., to Eve's
W.F. Wh- questions). It is possible that with finer grading of maternal response,
which includes examination of repetitions, a different picture would surface.
1.1.2 A review of the debate.
Much of the criticism of this paper (e.g. Hirsh-Pasek et al. (1984), Chapman
et al. (1986), Demetras et al. (1986), Bohannon III & Stanowicz (1988)) has
concentrated on the lack of differentiation of maternal responses, and the exclusion of
4 Working on the means-of-means table only, Chi-square = 0.46, p = 0.49.
5 'Tag' questions (e.g. "... isn't it?") were also included in the analysis, and are in the original
table. However, they accounted for such a small number of data in concrete terms (only Adam and
Sarah used them, and only in a handful of files), and they made so little an impact on the shape of the
results, that they have been removed here to improve clarity.
implicit Commentary, rather than the limited amount of child utterances used as
primary data (Demetras et al. (1986) does mention it): it is possible of course that an
expansion of child utterance types analysed may not lead to a significant change in the
distribution of (non)sequitur responses. In these studies repetitions and other
'Commentary' caregiver responses were added to the examination space. It then
became apparent that such 'implicit' correction did show a differential function
contingent on well-formedness: both in the caregiver response to child utterances, and
in the children's responses to correction.
Hirsh-Pasek et al. (1984) found that, in conversation with two year olds
"virtually all repetitions of the ill-formed sentences included a correction of the child's
error", there was also a difference in the likelihood of repetition as response contingent
on well-formedness: 20% of ill-formed utterances were repeated and only 12% of
well-formed utterances (ill-formedness was defined morpho-syntactically, p84).
Demetras et al. (1986), though ill-formedness was less well defined and exact figures
were not given, found strong correlations between well-formed child utterances and
'Move On' or 'Exact Repetition' responses, and between ill-formed child utterances
and 'Clarification Question' or 'Extended Repetition' responses. Most notably, in the
data examined in Bohannon III & Stanowicz (1988), over 90% of 'Exact Repetitions'
followed well-formed child utterances, and over 70% of 'Recast Repetitions' followed
ill-formed utterances (well-formedness being considered separately along semantic,
syntactic and phonological lines). Also, caregivers would provide correct exemplars of
semantic (88%), syntactic (35%) and phonological errors (36% of the time). In sum,
Commentary responses do seem to be clearly correlated with primitive utterances.
Further argument is provided by evidence of the child's differential behaviour
in response to correction. In their analysis of lexical development, Chapman et al.
(1986) found that, over a period of six months, two types of lexical correction
(correction with joint labelling, e.g. 'that's not a car, that's a truck', and correction
with explanation, e.g. 'that's a truck, see how you can put things in it') improve the
extension of lexical items in production and comprehension much more than
acceptance of the over-extended term. With more direct relevance, Bohannon III et al.
(1988) found that children were 8 times more likely to imitate a corrective repetition
than a non-corrective caregiver response (25.6% as against 3.6%). Correlations were
also found between caregiver use of repetitive corrections and speed of language
development (Bohannon III et al. (1988) citing Bates et al. (1982), Nelson et al.
(1984)) and between 'linguistic precocity' at 2 years and the mothers' avoidance of
'Clarification Question' responses after well-formed child utterances (Demetras et al
(1986)). The child does seem to respond differentially to caregiver Commentary.
Despite the apparent regularity of implicit (dis)approval contingent on well-
formedness and the child's apparent ability to respond differentially, criticism is made
(e.g. Morgan & Travis (1989), Gordon (1990)) that the actual proportion of utterances
receiving comment is too low to provide sufficient impetus for change. For instance in
the Bohannon data only 30-40% of the children's utterances receive comment (p687).
Such critics point out that the linguistic data the child receives will be 'noisy' in that
the child will be receiving conflicting responses to its ungrammatical utterances (i.e.
they will be labelled as ungrammatical irregularly), and this conflict may confuse the
learner sufficiently that learning cannot occur. However, work in Developmental
Psychology seems to show that "concepts may be learned and hypotheses accurately
confirmed with less than 25% of the trials using feedback"6 and thus to imply that the
language learner may be robust enough to learn from such noisy data.
Defence of BH70 tends to be along the lines of formal learnability theory and
refers more often to Gold, which will be reviewed in 1.2. Morgan & Travis (1989)
(henceforth MT89) is one paper which defends BH70 on more linguistic terms. It's
main argument was that the caregivers (in the same database as in the original paper -
with the children Adam, Eve and Sarah) did not systematically provide corrections for
specific types of errors.
MT89 suffers from similar drawbacks to BH70. In particular, the very small
proportion of the data actually submitted to analysis and the inadequate categorisation
make an analysis which is at best inconclusive. To give these researchers their due, the
Brown database is large (over 200 samples, each covering up to an hour of dialogue)
and a fully comprehensive utterance-by-utterance annotation and analysis would be a
substantial project in itself. However, on the drawbacks of MT89 the following points
can be made:
The researchers were looking for two types of error in the children's language:
over-regularisation (in the past tense, plurals and the possessive); and missing or
incorrect Auxiliaries in Wh- questions. Most of the database samples (174 out of 214,
about 4/5) contained use of past tense, plural or possessive NPs and (in later samples)
Wh- questions. Note that the types of errors to be looked for are decided a priori (as
the kinds of error for the correction of which explicit Negative Evidence is most
required). The 6 types of maternal response were also defined beforehand (No
Response, Expansion, Imitation, Clarification Question, Confirmation Question,
Move On).
6 Bohannon III et al. (1988:224) cites studies by Levine (1959, 1963) and Estes (1959).
However, error occurrence was apparently quite rare - over-regularisation
(OR), for instance, was "... not highly frequent: often, only one token appeared in a
sample" (p537). After samples containing OR errors had been identified , only those
files in which a maternal response of Expansion or Clarification Question followed an
OR error (i.e. errors not including missing Aux. in Wh- questions) were further
analysed. Referring to MT89 Table 3 (p543, Figure 1.3 below), we see that there are
in total only 50 instances of such an event. This means that at most (i.e. assuming that
each file had only one instance of an OR error) less than 1/4 (50 out of 214) of the
samples were fully analysed7.
7 Probably even fewer were analysed. For instance we know that only 10 of Eve's samples
were considered as being within the appropriate language span (ages 1; 10 - 2;3). Also it is clear that
less than 10% of Sarah's speech was submitted to analysis (i.e. 13 out of 139 files) even though 116
files showed the relevant linguistic behaviour. So a maximum of 41 out of 214 files were analysed:
less than 20% of the data.
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Expansion 5 2 2 9 77 86
Clar. Quest. 2 5 2 9 48 57
Conf. Quest. 5 0 3 8 12 20
Imitation 2 1 0 3 5 8
Move on 13 3 25 41 844 885
No response 30 6 49
Eve
85 567 652
Expansion 7 4 1 12 58 70
Clar. Quest. 4 2 1 7 20 27
Conf. Quest. 0 1 0 1 10 11
Imitation 0 1 0 1 1 2
Move on 9 2 3 14 131 145
No response 5 4 8
Sarah
17 27 44
Expansion 4 0 0 4 15 19
Clar. Quest. 8 1 0 9 19 28
Conf. Quest. 1 0 0 1 6 7
Imitation 5 0 0 5 2 7
Move on 36 2 2 40 148 188
No response 17 4 1 22 79 101
The third stage of analysis consisted of tabulating the maternal responses
which fit into the definitions of Expansion, Exact Imitation, Partial Imitation,
Clarification Question and Confirmation Question, and tabulating each preceding child
utterance along the definitions of Well Formed, Ungrammatical ("missing or
misordered morpheme", note that this excludes OR errors, but includes Wh- errors),
Lexical errors, Fragments and Unintelligible. The results are reported in MT89 Table 2
(Figure 1.4 below). We are not told the nature of the remaining maternal responses (or
indeed how many there were) or to what were they responses .
8 "Corrective responses [i.e. Commentary on the child's utterances] are shown in italics."
Figure 1.4: Antecedents of selected parental responses.
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Status of preceding child utterance
Well- Ill-formed
formed
Parental Gram. Ungram. Lex. Frag. Unint. Total
response
Adam
Expansion 79 174 7 6 1 188
Exact Imit. 147 21 14 4 2 41
Partial Imit. 82 43 18 6 11 78
Clar. Quest. 84 80 29 13 18 140
Conf. Quest. 188 143 24
Eve
5 6 178
Expansion 191 321 12 2 34 369
Exact Imit. 187 16 5 1 3 25
Partial Imit. 71 48 10 3 14 75
Clar. Quest. 118 92 7 10 32 141
Conf. Quest. 187 177 11
Sarah
1 19 208
Expansion 41 24 3 2 1 30
Exact Imit. 74 6 10 2 0 18
Partial Imit. 58 11 6 2 1 20
Clar. Quest. 63 28 18 5 6 57
Conf. Quest. 95 22 11 1 1 35
Even after this three-fold reduction of the search space, and contrary to the
conclusions ofMT89, Figure 1.4 does show significant results. MT89's interpretation
of the table (p541) is limited to observations that (a) Expansions addressed to Adam
and to Eve occurred most often after Ungrammatical utterances; and (b) all other
response types for Adam and Eve, and all response types for Sarah, "occurred more
often after grammatical utterances" (than after Ungrammatical utterances). The
implication is that, apart from Expansions in the specific cases of Adam's and Eve's
caregivers, none of these types of response can be considered corrective.
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However, on closer inspection of these results, it seems not to be the case that
caregiver response types significantly correlate with Grammatical utterances. The table
below (Figure 1.4a), shows the significance of each correlation of response and
preceding utterance9: especially significant correlations are picked out in bold; italics
mark what seem to be convergences in corrective tactics across caregivers.
Figure 1.4a: Post-hoc cell contributions.
Parental Child Status of preceding child utterance
response
Gram. Ungram Lex. Frag. Unint. Total
Expans. Adam -7.58 7.4 -3.93 -.98 -3.2 3.72
Eve -9.22 6.29 -1.7 -2.3 -1.17 4.51
Sarah -2.24 3.08 -1.84 .11 -.37 1.3
Ex. Imit. A 11.3 -5.97 .8 -.13 -1.37 -5.54
E 16.53 -7.5 .27 -.56 -2.41 -8.09
S 3.78 -2.83 .76 -.02 -1.36 -2.19
Part. Imit. A kO 00 -2.71 1.92 .81 2.95 -.48
E .19 -1.98 3.03 1.2 1.6 -.1
S 1.79 -.85 -.51 .16 -.33 -1.04
Clar. Qn. A -3.95 -1.58 2.87 2.7 4.29 1.94
E -.97 -2.15 -.21 4.67 4.05 .47
S -4.76 .83 1.67 1.14 2.68 2.76
Conf. Qn. A 1.71 .7 -.78 -1.93 -1.9 -.84
E -.33 1.27 -.12 -1.84 -1.57 .16
S 2 -.28 -.4 -1.37 -.99 -1.16
' Post-hoc cell contributions from a Chi-square test. Significance is achieved at 1.96 for
p<0.05. Positive numbers indicate the correlation occurs more than expected, negative numbers, less
than expected.
It appears that Expansions correlate highly significantly with Ungrammatical
utterances in all three children, as do Exact Imitations with Grammatical utterances.
Again in all three children Clarification Questions correlate significantly with
Unintelligible utterances. This remarkable regularity only breaks down in the
responses to Fragmentary utterances and utterances containing Lexical errors: here,
perhaps, the caregivers split up to their own combinations of corrective tactics -
notably Sarah's caregivers' Partial Imitations and Confirmation Questions do not seem
to show any very significant correctivity. However, it seems rash to base strong
conclusions on such a small sample of the available data.
The 'No Response' category in MT89 (as in Figure 1.3) is problematic in a
similar way to the 'unsatisfactory responses' in BH70 (see above). They are defined
in MT89 as occurring if "one or more child utterances immediately followed the
utterance containing the error and if nothing in the subsequent adult conversational
turn was explicitly related to the error-containing utterance." Faced with multiple
utterances and (possibly) multiple errors, the caregiver will presumably limit their
response to the most recent utterance, whether or not it was error-containing. If we
remove the 'No Response' category from consideration we find (for example in
Figure 1.3; again leaving aside Sarah's results) that corrective responses are
significantly above the watershed 25% for learnable regularity. This is especially the
case in the OR errors; the later occurring missing Auxiliaries in Wh-questions do not
show the same regularity of response.
1.1.3 Summary
BH70 and its defence in MT89 are characteristic of arguments from the paucity
of the stimulus and the presence of Negative Evidence in the child's linguistic data.
This brief survey of the debate has shown that the results are far from conclusive and
in fact are often suggestive of the presence of a caregiver Commentary on 111-
formedness which can be responded to by the child. The weakness of the empirical
argument suggests that the foundation of the position is elsewhere, and indeed BH70
and MT89, along with many other similar proponents, introduce the ideas of formal
learnability theory to provide the context for the debate. It is to this context that we
now turn.
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1.2 The formal argument for constraints on the learner.
1.2.1 Gold (1967).
Gold's (1967) paper "Language identification in the limit" in the mathematics
journal "Information and Control" may have been one of the earliest places where the
argument for nativism from the 'paucity of the data' was formally and rigorously
made. Gold modelled an Artificial Intelligence's (AI) learning of formal languages of
increasing complexity, considering different methods of data presentation and of
'naming relation' (Gold's term for the learning algorithm. The AI was a purely formal
device, not an implementation - i.e. some form of Turing machine). Learning was
defined as 'identification' which was said to occur when the learner had guessed the
'name' or the grammar of its target language, after which learning ceased (p449). The
output of the model, as shown below, was that language learnability was contingent
on method of data presentation - that is, the class of learnable languages was
contingent on the learnability model (see Figure 1.5, Gold's Table 1, p452).
Figure 1.5: Dividing lines between learnability and non-learnability of
languages.
Learnabilitv model Class of languages







text finite cardinality languages
'Text' was defined as "a sequence of strings x], x2, ... from [the language] L
such that every string of L occurs at least once in the text" (p450). It is left implicit
here that only strings from L are present in the text (made explicit later, p453). Text
presentation is shown to allow learnability of only finite cardinality languages, i.e.
languages which contain a finite number of strings. To enable higher order languages
to be learnable via simple text presentation, it would be necessary to constrain a priori
the search space available to the AI. A constrained search space would compel the AI
to make more elaborate hypotheses about, for instance, the internal structure of the
strings of a language. These constraints can be represented formally by stipulating that
certain structures are 'impossible', or that a particular structural apparatus only must
be used.
Presentation by informant "can tell the learner whether any string is an element
of L, and does so at each time t for some string yt" and this method of presentation
allows languages of up to primitive recursive complexity to be learnable. This class of
languages was said to include languages of a formal complexity comparable to human
languages.
'Anomalous Text' presentation was regarded by Gold as being "of no practical
interest" as it included ordering of the text. It was assumed at the time that the data
available to the language learner was a virtually random selection of strings from the
target language. The paper only noted in passing that such ordering of the text can lead
to greater 'learnability power'.
Gold's formal rigour is matched by his caution in extending these results to
human language learning and his conclusion is a triple disjunction. Either,
(a) the class of possible human languages is restricted,
(b) the child receives Negative Evidence, or
(c) there is some other restriction on the class of texts which can occur,
such as on the order of presentation of strings.
The debate (within formal linguistics) over innate linguistic faculties has
occurred largely within the first two arms of this disjunction, and they have been
understood in a particularly precise way. The restriction of the class of human
languages may be understood in a variety of ways depending on how the 'agent' of
restriction is understood. There may be some property of the external world which
conditions the learner away from making certain linguistic hypotheses; some property
of the learner's body (e.g. of the oral cavity) or of the medium (e.g. sound or gesture)
may restrict choice; there may be some general properties of the brain which encourage
certain kinds of reasoning or learning above others. In the position reviewed here,
structural restrictions on a formal device (an AI) are translated directly into discrete
properties of the brain: (a) above is translated into 'there is an innate linguistic faculty
in the brain, which has a specific formal symbolic structure.' This translation is
reviewed in detail in 1.3 below.
'Negative evidence' is analogous to informant presentation of the data, which
contains information that particular strings are not part of the target language.
Although Gold recognises that explicit correction is rare, the disjunction allows for
correction "in a way we do not recognise": for example, "the child may learn that a
certain string is unacceptable by the fact that it never occurs in a certain context"
(p453-4). This mode of informant presentation is recalled by Chomsky's later
suggestion that " ... a not unreasonable acquisition system can be devised with the
operative principle that if certain structures or rules fail to be exemplified in relatively
simple expressions, where they would be expected to be found, then a (possibly
marked) option is selected excluding them in the grammar ..." (Chomsky 1981:9).
Gold's implicit nativism is made explicit in Chomsky's phrase "where they would be
expected to be found" which presupposes the activity of some cognitive mechanism
which is sensitive to and expectant a priori of "certain structures or rules".
Notwithstanding these suggestions, Negative Evidence is generally understood to be
explicit correction, as in BH70 and MT89 in 1.1 - so that the alternative to (a) becomes
(b) the child receives explicit linguistic correction.
The third arm of the disjunction refers implicitly to Anomalous text
presentation and has not been significantly followed up inside formal learnability
theory. However, it is interesting that certain contemporary procedural/connectionist
models of language learning are using developmental neural networks which
effectively cause the input text to be ordered in a way which facilitates learning. For
example, Elman's work (e.g., Elman 1992), which simulates a developing memory
capacity in the learner which allows at first only short, then incrementally longer
strings to be analysed by the network. This limited memory in effect constrains the
search space available to the learner and complex abstract structures which would
otherwise be unlearnable are generated. Gold's point is that if text is presented in a
sympathetic way, learner-internal constraints on hypotheses are not necessary -
Leading Text is perhaps a more evocative term than Anomalous Text. This notion of
assisted development is one which is current in the psycholinguistic literature: Child
Directed Speech (in a more sexist age known as 'Motherese') is more clearly
pronounced, more grammatical, much less complex and much more semantically
limited (i.e. to topics familiar to the learner) than adult speech (see Snow 1986). The
potential for assisted development and the whole question of a 'negotiation of
meaning' will be examined in detail in later chapters.
However, alternatives (a) and (b) are really the horns of the problem, and
indeed much of what might be called 'ordered text' in formal work, will in human
language learning refer to constraints either within the learner (e.g. memory
restrictions) or within the 'text' itself (e.g. the form of Child Directed Speech). The
question is how much of the rate (speed or slowness) of language acquisition is due to
external factors and how much due to biological preparation.
Gold's paper stated explicitly and developed much of what was implicit in the
Aspects model of linguistic theory and language learning (Chomsky 1965).
Chomsky's remarks on language learning at that time are limited to impressions and
brief histories of rationalist and empiricist approaches to the problem of acquisition of
knowledge (see Aarsleff (1982) for a critique of Chomsky's reading of this history).
Although not argued for rigorously, ideas on an innate language acquisition system,
separate to the rest of human cognition and on the poverty and corruption of the data
available to the learner are aired suggestively throughout the first chapter10.
As well as serving as a clear statement of the problem, Gold's paper seems to
delineate the useful bounds of learnability theory and to make explicit some of the
theory's grounding assumptions - for example, its definitions of 'language' and
'learning'. In contrast to more recent work on formal learnability (e.g. Osherson, Stob
and Weinstein 1986, henceforth 086), Gold does not assert that his apparatus is non-
trivially analogous to a psychological model. 086 defines learning in roughly the same
terms as does Gold 1967, after which they write:
"Language acquisition by children is an example of learning in the intended
sense. Children are the learners; a natural language is the thing to be learned; the
corpus of sentences available to the child is the relevant environment [ = data
presentation, by text or informant]; grammars serve as hypotheses [ = naming
relation]. Language acquisition is complete when the child's shifting hypotheses about
10 There are repeated references to an innate human "language-acquisition device", "language-
acquisition system" or "faculte de langage", which seems to be functionally discrete in the
"mind/brain" (although Chomsky is cautious on this discreteness, adding a slight and frankly token
disclaimer in n32 p56). On the data available to the learner, Chomsky writes,"... primary linguistic
data ... consists of a finite amount of information about sentences, which, furthermore, must be rather
limited in scope, considering the time limitations that are in effect, and fairly degenerate in quality"
(p31). "It seems clear that... the primary linguistic data ... may ... be deficient in various respects"
(p200 nl4). Chomsky also downplays the deviation between an "idealized 'instantaneous' model"
(p36) of language acquisition and "an actual theory of language learning" (nl9 p32).
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the ambient language stabilise to an accurate grammar [ = identification in the limit]"
(p7). Each of these analogies embodies serious assumptions about the nature of
language and learning ([1], [2] and [3] below).
1.2.2 Some assumptions of formal Learnability theory.
[1] (a) language = a thing to be learnt,
[2] (b) the child's environment = a corpus of sentences,
[3] (c) (i) the learning process = a series of grammatical hypotheses,
(ii) success of learning = identification in the limit.
086 is at pains to expand some of the notions involved and doesn't merely
assert the psychological isomorphism. In examining the analogies 1 - 3 above, it may
be worthwhile to see if the expansions made to the learnability model in 086 are
qualitative.
1.2.2.1 Languages
The initial, formal definition of a language is the same in Gold 1967 (p448) as
in 086 (p 12), i.e. that " ... a sentence is taken to be a finite string of symbols drawn
from some fixed finite alphabet. A language is then construed as a subset of the set of
all possible sentences" (086 pl2). We have three sets in operation (see Figure 1.6).
Figure 1.6: sets in 086.
A; the "fixed finite alphabet",
S (or XA); the "set of all possible sentences" (set of all possible finite ordered
subsets of A),
L (XS or XXA); the set of all possible languages (set of all possible subsets of
S).
with 5 as a sentence (finite, ordered subset of A, or element of S) and
L as a language (subset of S, or element of L).
It is explicit here that all possible (past, present and future) human languages
are drawn from some "fixed, finite alphabet". The content of the set A is not made
explicit, but the symbols which are its members are apparently words, either of actual
languages or possibly of some abstract language like Fodor's Mentalese (see Fodor
1975). In 086, this set is the set of the "biologically possible" symbols (p34) - and
remember the psychological isomorphism is explicit. This strong biological
determinism is never asserted (outside of parentheses) and the reader gets the
impression that either (a) the question of biological determinism in linguistics has been
settled beyond reasonable doubt, or (b) it just isn't important. Of course neither is
tme. The relevance of molecular biology to language and other higher order behaviour
patterns is highly controversial11.
Nativism, and later a stronger biological determinism, seems often to be both
prior and posterior to the body of Chomskyan Formal linguistics. In his earlier work
Chomsky draws on, or constructs, a 'rationalist' foundation for his work; later (e.g.
Chomsky 1986, Piatelli-Palmarini 1980) he, along with Fodor, asserts that a
biologically determined Universal Grammar is a consequence of the findings of
Chomskyan Formal Linguistics. The development of Chomsky's position is analysed
in 1.3. For now it will suffice to note that the existence of such a set as A above is a
formal stipulation, a premise, rather than an empirical observation.
1.2.2.2 Environments.
As we have seen, Gold 1967 leaves open the question of how information is
presented to the learner, i.e. the presence of 'Negative Evidence.' This is not the case
in 086. Not only is the environment explicitly a text (pi3), but there are also no
ordering restrictions on the presentation of strings (pl4). Three "recent" studies of
language acquisition are cited in motivation of this - Brown & Hanlon (1970),
Lenneberg (1967) and Newport, Gleitman & Gleitman (1977) - the first of which is
dealt with above (l.l)12.
1 1 See for example Dawkins (1989), Rose et al. (1984) among others for an introduction to the
debate.
1 2 OSW tell us that "Learning theory can be perceived as an attempt to provide the inferential
link between the results of acquisitional studies and theories of comparative grammar. It undertakes to
translate empirical findings about language acquisition into information about the kinds of languages
accessible to young children" (p35). That this is mere pretension can be ascertained by looking at their
bibliography, in which less than a tenth (6/61) of the entries are concerned with "empirical findings",
and apart from a brief reference to the "recent studies" there is virtually no recourse to empirical
findings in the text. The remainder of the references, apart from a dozen or so works on formal
The notion of Sentence in 086 is "rich" in that "derivational histories,
meanings and even bits of context are parts of sentences" (pl2, note the implication
that "bits of context" are drawn from a "fixed finite alphabet"), also "evidential states"
(basically, the text so far, pi4) can include "such non-linguistic inputs as the physical
affection afforded the child that day or the amount of incident sunlight" (all of which is
drawn from the finite alphabet A: p35). The authors may have not noticed the
possibility that this extra-linguistic input may comment in some way upon the
linguistic input, but nevertheless within learnability theory none of the context, non-
linguistic input or sunlight can mark un-grammatical strings as such. Despite the "rich"
definition , then, 086's text is not a qualitative development of Gold's.
O86 does note the non-reactivity of the text (reactivity being an ability in the
text to react to learner behaviour) and this is held in contrast to the obvious reactivity
of child/caregiver dialogue (pi 18). It is admitted that this is "a significant theoretical
gap in the development of learning theory".
1.2.2.3 Learning.
Learnability theorists have asserted that learning consists of a number of
hypotheses on the structure or form of the texts with which the learner is provided
(and language learning seems to be only a special case - see 086 p20 and Chomsky
1980 cited there). That this number of hypotheses is not a series can be determined by
the fact that Negative Evidence is not available to the learner and so the text must be
non-reactive: each hypothesis is independent of the last and dependent only on the
"evidential state" of the text. Hence 086 can describe the "learning function" - here, as
in Gold 1967, a learner is "a system that embodies a learning function" (086 pl5) - as
a mapping between "evidential states" and "conjectures" (i.e. grammars). Thus,
learning is conceived as a static relation between sets rather than as a process of
development or investigation. The content of these two sets (SEQ: the set of all
possible evidential states; and F: the set of all possible conjectures; pi5) is necessarily
drawn from A13. If we are to take 086's psychological isomorphism seriously, A
linguistics or philosophy of language (Chomsky, Popper, Wittgenstein, Fodor, Pinker, Putnam), is
entirely works of computer science (40/61 entries).
13 An "evidential state" is the set of strings received by the learner by some time t and as such
is a subset of S. The set of all possible evidential states will be the set of all possible subsets of S.
A "conjecture" is a language (learning equals identification). The set of all possible
conjectures equals the set of all possible languages, L. In fact, it seems that both of these sets are
equal to L - a fact which may have consequences if the learning function is redefined as a mapping
from L onto itself. This possibility is tangential to my argument however.
must be available to the child a priori. This "biologically possible" alphabet (which
includes "bits of context", "incident sunlight", etc.) is in effect biologically specified.
Fodor also hints at such an alphabet (1975, 1980) as a vocabulary in which
conjectures can be formed. Fodor does not attack procedure as such and he describes
learning as a series of inductive inferences - expressed in the innate Language of
Thought, and guided by innate structural constraints - rather than as a mapping
between sets. The Language of Thought is analogous to 086's set A; and in 086's
rich notion of sentence, structural components ("derivational histories") are also
innately specified by set A.
Both of these theses seem to draw most heavily on formal logic and set theory
for their conclusions, and in them it seems that the sometimes distant relationship
between concrete source and abstracted form is either not fully appreciated or
conveniently forgotten. Certainly in Piatelli-Palmarini (1980; henceforth PP80)
Chomsky and Fodor argue for nativism in defence of their formal assumptions. This
is most explicit in Chapter 12 (The inductivist fallacy; p 255-275) where Chomsky
defends inferences based on purely formal assumptions, claiming that the
investigator's "compulsion to withdraw" is merely "psychological" (p270). Evidence
against formal assumptions is apparently not recognised. More importantly, Fodor
makes an explicit comparison between nativism and the search for simplicity in a
formal description: on the mathematician's use of the simplest possible equation to
represent a set of Cartesian co-ordinates he says, "You can call that simplicity, or an a
priori ordering of the functions, or nativism. This leads to the same point as before:
you can't carry out an induction, it is a logical impossibility to make a
nondemonstrative inference without having an a priori ordering of hypotheses. This
general point about nativism is so self-evident that it is superfluous to discuss it; the
only question is; how specific are the innate constraints?" (p260; emphasis in
original).
This confusion of scientific practice and biological behaviour conceals the
crucial difference between the investigating scientist (e.g. the linguist) and the
developing biological unit (e.g. the child learning language). It is a difference which is
allowed to remain hidden by Piaget's conception of the child as a little scientist. The
linguist's representation and the child's intemalisation of linguistic structure are both
acts of abstraction, abstracting components which are considered important from the
immediate data. For Fodor, formalisation is a transparent process involving no
interpretation on the part of the linguist: "... imagine that the conceptual system of an
organism ... is formalised as a logic. In other words, imagine that we know what its
conceptual system looks like: we know what the elements are, we know about its
semantics, and we know what combinatorial mechanisms are available" (pi56). The
notion that the components which are considered important by the linguist are the same
as those considered important by the language learner is almost explicit.
However, as Fodor puts it, what one considers important depends on an a
priori ordering of hypotheses. In Chomskyan Formal Linguistics, hypotheses are
ordered by the criterion of formal simplicity, which is in turn dependent on decisions
made concerning the object of study and how it is to be formally represented. What the
child learning language considers important is surely part of the problem of language
acquisition. In 1.3 we sketch the Chomskyan conception of the object of study; in
sections 2 and 3 we consider the language learner.
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1.3 The development of Chomskyan Formal Linguistics.
It has on occasion been claimed that Chomskyan linguistics is not 'generative'
(in Chomsky's sense; see below) or not 'formal linguistics' (e.g. Gazdar et al. (1985),
Pullum (1991:47-55)). This charge has generally been made on the grounds that
details of formalisation have been increasingly taken for granted or left implicit in
Chomskyan descriptive structures. In this thesis there is a distinction made between a
formal structure and a formalised structure. A formal structure is one which is
concerned primarily with abstract or ideal forms and their inter-relations, rather than
with the content of these forms; a formalised structure is one in which a primary
concern is to taxonomise forms and explicitly detail their interrelations. Chomskyan
linguistics may often not be formalised (a defence may be that such study is not
concerned with the 'implementation' of some of its points of theory; or see
Chomsky's (1990) reply to Pullum), but it is surely formal in the sense that it has its
primary concern with the forms which a linguistic system can take - not with the
content of utterances, but with the structure of sentences. Investigation and
argumentation is typically in the form of an exploration of the formal capabilities of a
logical system.
1.3.1 The paradigm.
1.3.1.1 Aspects of the theory of syntax.
Chomsky (1965) takes up a Cartesian idealisation of language in the duality of
Competence and Performance. As with Saussure (1916), he emphasises the structural,
law driven nature of Competence/Langue, which renders it appropriate for scientific
study, and the random, ephemeral and secondary nature of Performanct/Parole. The
analogy between Chomsky's and Saussure's taxonomies is explicit (p4) but not
whole. There are perhaps two main differences.
The first difference with Saussure is a withdrawal from the social. Although it
often seems a token gesture, Saussure does define Langue as a social convention. In
emphasising the arbitrary nature of the sign, he posits Langue as a conventional
system of rules; in opposition to this, and in illustration of the system's vulnerability
to change, Parole is presented as a collection of accidents of speech and interaction,
rooted solely in the individual. Competence, on the other hand, is the linguistic
knowledge of "an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-
community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by ... grammatically
irrelevant conditions ..." (p3); Performance is "the actual use of language in concrete
situations" in terms of "such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory
limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or
characteristic) in applying [the speaker-listener's] knowledge of the language" also "
false starts, deviations from rules, changes of course in mid-course, and so on" (pp
3&4).
Attention is much more focused on the individual and this links in with much
of Chomsky's psychological rhetoric. However, the dualism of Chomsky's system is
less not more psychologically based than that of Saussure's. Saussure's speaker-
listeners are real individuals subject to their language as to a binding contract.
Chomsky's speaker-listener is alone in space-time - the speech-community is peopled
by copies of himself14 - in fact he is so abstracted from the concrete that he becomes
no more than a vehicle which Competence can inhabit. Competence in other words is
"the grammar" of the language in question15. The individual has been divorced from
society even in Performance: an inventory of limitations of an error-prone piece of
equipment.
In a second departure, Chomsky takes issue with Langue as a "systematic
inventory of items" and, with Competence, "return[s] ... to the Humboldtian
conception" of "a system of generative processes" (p4). However, a structured system
is merely a way ofmaking explicit what is already implicit in a systematic inventory:
indeed, the advantages of structures over lists is Saussure's advance, not Chomsky's
(see Saussure's (1879) analysis of Proto-Indo-European laryngeals, discussed in
Anderson (1985)). Other than a psychological veracity which Chomsky seems to be
hinting at, this difference is vacuous, or at best merely formal.
But if the reader refuses to take appeals to psychological veracity at face value,
it becomes clear that the Chomskyan model of language is devoid of any creative
mental activity in a Cartesian or Humboldtian sense. There even seems to be little
evidence of any linguistic "Behavior" in the speaker-listener - in the sense of American
Behavioural Structuralists like BF Skinner (e.g. Skinner 1957).
In Chomsky (1965) the ideal speaker-listener is male.
Chomsky's use of the definite article is very much a conscious and significant one.
For example, when Chomsky characterises Competence as a "system of
generative processes" it is later made clear that "generative" is meant only in the
deductive logical sense of postulates entailing other postulates (p9); similarly with his
use of the word 'creative'. Chomsky is actually describing an explicit logic, the
production rules of which are 'creative' in that they can '(in Humboldt's words)
"make infinite use of finite means" - a phrase which Chomsky uses to refer to "the
technical devices for expressing a system of recursive processes" (p8). For Chomsky,
"creative" seems to mean "containing recursive production rules".
Competence is a "mental reality underlying actual behavior" (p4), but, as I
have argued, this 'mental reality' is a formal logic. Thus, the "mentalism" with which
Chomsky wishes to replace behaviourism (pi93 and Chomsky 1959) amounts to little
more than methodological adjustment - that more elements of performance can be
allowed as evidence (although Chomsky seems to think introspection is not part of
Performance); and that formal description can take place at a more abstract level,
without the necessity for less abstract levels to be completed in priority.
In practice language as an object of study has become a functionally separate
part of the human mind, in the sense that the linguist can study linguistic Competence
without reference to other components of behaviour. In his Chapter 1.8 it is clear that
this autonomy extends to language acquisition, although Chomsky has a defensive
caveat at this point (p56 n32). This claim to autonomy is strengthened by frequent
reference to the presence of an innate "linguistic theory" (p25), "schema" (p27),
"language acquisition device", "faculte de langage", etc.
1.3.1.2 Lectures on Government and Binding.
In Lectures on Government and Binding (1981, henceforth LGB), a founding
text for what was to become Government-Binding (GB) theory in all its forms,
Chomsky withdraws further from language as a social reality. The descriptive apparata
constructed in LGB are describing grammar, not language. In particular "Core
Grammar", which is contrasted with a "Periphery" of "marked" constructions such as
"borrowings, historical residues, inventions and so on, which we can hardly expect to
... incorporate within a principled theory of UG" (p8).
Having been divested of its diachronic half in the Cours, and its social nature
in Aspects, the object of study is further limited to those features of grammar deemed
sufficiently pure. Thus Core Grammar is further abstracted from "language" or
linguistic Performance. For example, not only do sentences containing too much
"borrowing, residue, or invention" not have to be covered, but sentences which are
"not idiomatic English [due to] accidental gap[s] reflecting properties that are not part
of Core Grammar [are] thus assume [d] to be fully grammatical at the relevant level of
abstraction" (pi9). In principle, therefore, there needs to be little direct correlation
between Core Grammar and any human language.
Thus Chomskyan linguistics becomes the study of grammar and not language.
A motivating assertion is made (p4) that language is derivative of grammar, and "at a
higher level of abstraction from actual neural mechanisms", implying that grammar is
neurally represented in a more concrete manner than actual linguistic behaviour. There
are no studies in neural or brain sciences cited to back up this statement. Language is
certainly derivative of "actual neural mechanisms", but the grammar which is
constructed by linguists is equally certainly derivative of observed linguistic data.
There is another reference to neural structures (p339) which suggests that "the theory
of core grammar ... does have some of the properties of the systems studied in the
more fundamental natural sciences, and that for some reason neural structures at least
in this domain instantiate a perhaps surprisingly simple and unified system of
principles."
It is telling that LGB draws comparisons with particle physics as there too the
data available to the scientist greatly underdetermine some of the postulated structures.
It seems that a large motivation behind much development of the theory is toward
formal simplicity and 'elegance'. Much of what LGB says about the theory of Core
Grammar can be said of the more fundamental natural sciences - for example that Core
Grammar is "a system that goes well beyond empirical generalisation and that satisfies
intellectual or even esthetic standards" (pi4).
With formal coherence and concision as such a strong motivation, other factors
become less important, and indeed LGB is surprisingly relaxed on the question of
language acquisition. Apart from occasional assertions of biological determination16 it
seems to be left open whether UG is innate at all, all that is important is that it is in
place before language learning begins. Although "the idealisation to instantaneous
acquisition" is still assumed, there is a stipulation that the primitives of UG be
"concepts that can plausibly be assumed to provide a preliminary, pre-linguistic
analysis of a reasonable selection of presented data" (plO) such as "precedes", "is
16 Only two were found: that UG is "an element of shared biological endowment" (p8) and that
the faculty of language is "surely" a biological system (pi4).
voiced" and perhaps "agent-of-action", which are concepts plausibly developed in
early play - and this is the direction I shall be exploring in Chs 2 & 3.
This could be interpreted as a relaxation of the biological determinism of
Chomskyan linguistics, but there is evidence that it is more significant of a decrease in
importance of language acquisition in general. There are several references to the
'limited, underdetermining evidence' available to the language learner being a major
motivation of UG's innateness, but in LGB's outline of the three types of evidence
actually available it appears that "[tjhere is good reason to suppose that direct Negative
Evidence ["corrections by speech community"] is not necessary for language
acquisition"17 (p8/9; emphasis added). Direct Negative Evidence is not necessary
because of the presence of innate constraints, which had been postulated because
direct Negative Evidence was assumed not to be available.
So the biological determinism of Aspects is now accompanied by a
deterministic idealism (that the formal constructs have 'more significant reality' than
actual linguistic behaviour). It appears from other texts (e.g. Piatelli-Palmarini 1980 )
that a biological determinism is the only plausible realisation available in an age of
materialism, for the rationalist ideals of LGB's theory.
1.3.1.3 Knowledge of Language.
Knowledge.
By Knowledge of Language (Chomsky 1986, henceforth KoL), the "poverty
of the stimulus" argument, characterised here as "Plato's problem", has become the
major if not the explicit sole motivation for a biologically determined UG. In pointing
out (p25nl3) that "the questions of innateness and species-specificity are distinct",
KoL implies that the species-specificity of language does not entail its innateness and
that therefore linguistic invariance cannot be used to motivate biological endowment.
That generality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for innateness had
already been pointed out to Chomsky (e.g. Cellerier 1980: 86). However, for most
purposes in the text the terms do seem to be used interchangeably.
"Plato's Problem" goes through two incarnations in the preface (pxtv):-
17 Wexler & Culicover (1980), Baker (1979) and Lasnik (1979) are cited here.
[1] "how can we know so much given that we have such limited
evidence?" and
[2] "The problem, then, is to determine the innate endowment that serves
to bridge the gap between experience and knowledge attained."
The second may be the question as put forward by the 'rationalists' in Aspects',
it is translated into its linguistic application:-
[3] "... to ascertain the nature of the biological endowment that constitutes the
human 'language faculty,' the innate component of the mind/brain that yields
knowledge of language when presented with linguistic experience ..." (pxxvi).
Figure 1.7: Translations.
pxxv [2]. pxxvi [3].
the innate endowment =
experience
knowledge
the biological endowment that constitutes the




But [3] is not a trivial translation of [2] (see Figure 1.7): that such things as
"the human 'language faculty'", "knowledge of language" or "linguistic experience"
exist as functionally separate entities is a presupposition which is not defended or even
explicitly asserted in KoL. It is perhaps a falsifiable claim, however, and KoL is
willing to subject its conclusions to the scrutiny of the brain sciences: in choosing
between competing linguistic theories "one might contain certain principles and
possibilities of variation that can be readily explained in terms of brain mechanisms,
and the other not" (p39). On the other hand, the fact that brain science does not point
to the biological analogues of Chomskyan linguistic principles is perhaps evidence that
brain science is not sufficiently 'advanced' to enable it to do so. Slightly later there is a
comment that
"the conclusion [that "the language faculty appears to be a computational
system that is rich and narrowly constrained in structure and rigid in its essential
operations, nothing at all like a complex of dispositions or a system of habits and
analogies"] is in many ways a rather surprising one. One might not have expected that
a complex biological system like the language faculty would have evolved in this
fashion ..." (p43/4).
This is very much an echo and a reassertion of LGB's deterministic idealism
(see 1.3.1.3) and as in LGB there are virtually no references to brain science in the
bibliography, and certainly no studies of the physiology of cognition.
Language
Possibly because this book is aimed at the educated layperson as well as the
scholar it is more explicit in its definition of 'Language'. 'Language' is now re-defined
in terms of 'E-language', 'I-language'.
KoL points out that much previous work had left somewhat ambiguous what
exactly was the object of study, or what was it that a grammar was attempting to
describe. The programmatic works examined above often made this same point and
this same call for explication, but in practice the extension of the term 'grammar' was
often either ambiguous or vague between description of the structural properties of an
attested language and a hypothesis about the speaker-listener's actual cognitive
equipment. In KoL this programmatic call for explication shifts from conflict between
different types of event (e.g. a real speaker's performance & an ideal speaker's
competence) to that between different types of language.
• E-Language.
"Externalised language" is described as being an analogue of the object of
study of earlier "structural and descriptive linguistics" (pi9) and compared with
Saussure's Langue and Bloomfield's "totality of utterances that can be made in a
speech community" - the "actual and potential speech events" (p20). This is not
equivalent to Parole or Performance, however, as the speech community is idealised
and regarded as homogeneous. E-language stands ambiguously as an ideal object
somewhere between the actual language of a homogeneous community, and a
grammar which might describe this language.
Thus there are two entities implicit in the text: an E-language (the linguistic
behaviour of an ideal homogeneous community) and an E-grammar (a grammar
defining the E-language; this second is never explicitly mentioned and is an
interpretation on the part of the present author). An E-grammar might be the kind of
traditional descriptive grammar used for teaching or philological study (e.g. Quirk et
al. (1985), Wade (1992)), and an E-language the language described. There are
potentially infinitely many E-grammars for each E-language and none of these has
claim to be the E-grammar, as all are extensionally identical - extension being the only
qualifying criterion.
Figure 1.8: Chain of abstraction towards E-language.
E-language
A is abstracted from
(set of) E-grammar(s)
A is abstracted from
Concrete language
There is a chain of abstraction here, illustrated in Fig. 1.8, between E-
language, E-grammar, and (an) actual language. An E-grammar, like that in Quirk et
al. (1985), is abstracted from the concrete collection of behaviours that comprise
Performance of an actual linguistic community (which in the case of English can be
almost globally extensive, see Gramley & Patzold (1992)). However, the relation is
not reciprocal, and the E-grammar does not generate (in the Chomskyan sense) the full
range of behaviours apparent in the actual language. The language 'generated by' (or
abstracted from) the E-grammar is a further step removed from attested data.
"Languages in this sense [i.e. E-languages] are not real-world objects but are artificial,
somewhat arbitrary, and perhaps not very interesting constructs" (p26). For
Chomsky, there must be more evaluative criteria on E-grammar than mere co-
extension with (a significant portion of) the attested data.
• I-Language.
"Internalised language" is the '"notion of structure' in the mind of the speaker"
(p21, citing Otto Jesperson), in other words, a development of the concepts
Competence, Core grammar and Periphery. Theories of I-language (which we'll call I-
grammars) can be subjected to "questions of truth and falsity": a 'true' I-grammar is
one which actually inheres in the mind-brain of the speaker-listener, such that "one
task of the brain sciences, then, is to discover the mechanisms that are the physical
realisation of [the I-language]" (p22). Whereas E-language has a problematic reality, I-
language is simply a formal description of the biologically extant 'human language
faculty' and is thus a more promising object of study.
The speaker referred to is not the ideal speaker-listener of Aspects, and "in
principle, evidence concerning the nature of the I-language and initial state could come
from many different sources apart from judgements concerning the form and meaning
of expressions: perceptual expressions, the study of acquisition and deficit, or of
partially invented languages such as Creoles, or of literary usage or of language
change, neurology, biochemistry and so on" (p36/7). In practice, however, and this
includes the practice in KoL itself and the overwhelming practice of GB/KoL-based
linguistics in the seven years since its publication, introspective judgements
concerning the form and meaning of expressions are virtually the only source of
evidence18
I-language is thus promoted as being closer to physical reality than other
postulated forms of language (e.g. E-language). Not only are statements about I-
language testable (in principle), but the notions themselves are more meaningful. I-
grammar is presented as the actual formal structures and processes in the mind of the
speaker-listener; I-language is some analogue of the innate language of thought
without corruption from procedural errors or cultural interference. In practice,
however, the Chomskyan linguist works from the same set of data as does the earlier
philologist, and I-grammar appears to be merely a particular E-grammar which is
abstracted from the concrete collection of E-grammars (see Fig. 1.9). As evidence
from the brain sciences is un-available at the moment, the only criteria for this
abstraction seem to be those contingent on the mode of representation - e.g. of formal
simplicity.
1 8 Examples of formally oriented research that has been done on language acquisition (e.g.
Valian 1990, 1991) will be examined in the relevant chapters.
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Figure 1.8: Chain of abstraction towards I-language.
I-language
A is abstracted from
I-grammar
A is abstracted from
(set of) E-grammar(s)
A is abstracted from
Concrete language
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1.3.2 Primary Linguistic Data
Figure 1.9: Primary linguistic data.
[la] The man is tall.
[lb] Is the man tall?
[2a] The man [who is here] is tall.
[2b] Is the man [who here] is tall?
[2c] Is the man [who is here] tall?
[3a] I wonder whoi [the men expected [ei] to see them],
[3b] [The meni expected [ei] to see them],
[3c] Johni is too stubborn [ei] to talk to Bill.
[3d] Johnj is too stubborn [e[] to talk to [ej].
[4a] Gordon gave a present to Halcyon.
[4b] Gordon gave Halcyon a present.
[5a] Gordon sent a present to Halcyon.
[5b] Gordon sent Halcyon a present.
[6a] Gordon said something horrible to Halcyon.
[6b] * Gordon said Halcyon something horrible.
[7a] Gordon donated his letters to the library.
[7b] * Gordon donated the library his letters.
Sentences like the above are offered (Chomsky (1980: 39), KoL p8, Atkinson
(1986: 98); labelling added) as illustrative of the structure-dependence of linguistic
rules - for example, the relations between discontinuous constituents are determined in
terms of abstract structural entities like 'head-of-phrase'. Children "unerringly" use
such complex structurally dependent rules rather than computationally simpler ones
which may have similar extension, despite being without "instruction or direct
evidence" (KoL p7).
For example, on the evidence of sentences [1] above, a rule of 'question
formation' might be expected which fronts the leftmost modal verb (a paraphrase of
PP80 p39). This would result however in utterances such as the ungrammatical [2b]
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which are not attested. Thus, the argument runs, there must be a priori constraints
which force the learner to phrase rules in structural terms - for instance that the fronted
modal should immediately follow the first noun phrase of the declarative (again,
following PP80 p39), resulting in utterances like the attested [2c],
The same argument - that the learner is not constrained by confirmatory or
Negative Evidence in the primary linguistic data - is put forward to require an a priori
structural vocabulary which can describe the discontinuous relations evident in the
sentences [3].
However, these examples [1 to 3] seem only to be relevant to later stages of
language acquisition, namely stages after the acquisition of the functional categories
(Determiner, Complementiser and INFL phrases) which occurs during a period of up
to 6 months, commencing after word order and the lexical categories have been
acquired - taken to be on average at around 24 to 30 months (Radford 1990)19. It is
possible that the learner's hypotheses at these later stages are constrained by structures
acquired earlier20.
Atkinson's examples [4 to 7] are more interesting. The argument here is that
[i] the ditransitive sentences in [4] and [5] are part of the learner's Primary
Linguistic Data, used and understood by the child and
[ib: assumption] (given that Negative Evidence of the sort in sentences [6b]
and [7b] is absent)
[ii] the relation can be generalised by "a transformation (dative movement)"
(p99) such as in Figure 1.10 below.
Figure 1.10: Dative movement.
NP V NP to NP
1 2 3 4 5 => 1 2 5 + 30 0
1" See also Slobin (1966) on the acquisition of word order before Case in Russian and O'Grady
et al. (1989) on the period over which aspects of INFL are acquired. Acquisition of word ordering and
separate lexical categories may seem to imply an acquisition of Phrase Structure, but this is not a
strong implication.
20 Chomsky's 1980 example (sentences [1 and 2]) is particularly clumsy as it seems to be
forgetful of the bidirectional nature of a 'question formation' relation, in other words one would expect
acquisition of such a rule to be accompanied by a 'declarative formation' rule at around the same time
(if not earlier as much of the learner's task incorporates understanding questions). Putnam (1980)
points this out. As any such rule would be structural, one would not necessarily expect the simpler
'question formation' rule to be chosen - one would presumably rather expect (on the criterion of
'simplicity') a single reversible rule. This is a minor point, however.
[iii] "Demonstrably the child does not make this generalisation", and therefore
[iv: conclusion] constraint is needed to legislate against it. "This constraint is
then built into the language learner as part of the solution of the logical problem of
language acquisition."
Each of these four steps can be contested. The conclusion depends on the
enthymemic assumption at [ib], which I have contested elsewhere, and Atkinson
himself has attested child utterances of the form of [6b]21 thus negating [iii], but
nonetheless the argument is of interest.
Transformational syntax is perhaps adequate to describe the syntactic relation
between the prepositional and dative formations of ditransitive verb phrases, but it also
draws attention to the implicit directionality in Atkinson's argument (similar to that of
Chomsky 1980, pointed out in n.8). Perhaps the most implicit assumption of this text
is that the [b] forms are derived from the prior [a] forms - the relation is an arrow of
implication, not a bi-directional 'equals' sign.
The linguistic performance of children does not imply this priority, however.
If we look at the developing language of Allison Bloom (16 months - 34 months;
Bloom 1973, Bates & MacWhinney 1991, Uemlianin 1992), for example, the
opposite priority is implied. There is only one attested utterance which could be
interpreted as ditransitive (the more cautious Bloom says there is "no instance of
dative" (p24)), reproduced with context below (Allison is 22 months old at this
point)
21 Atkinson (pl06) explains that we should not expect utterances like "I said mummy night-
night" , and then admits, "but I have attested [this utterance] and I would be extremely surprised to be
unique in this respect."
Figure 1.11: Allison Bloom's ditransitive verb.
*MOT: here, I-'11 pour some juice
for you.
*MOT: there.
%act: <lw> pours juice, gives it
to Allison
*ALI: pour Mommy juice.
%act: starting to drink juice
*MOT: pour Mommy juice?
%act: <aft> pours self juice
<aft> drinks
*ALI: xxx.
%act: <bef> drinks then puts cup down beside her;
looks in front of her
<lw> reaching for cookie box
*ALI: more juice.
There are two alternatives to the interpretation of Allison's "pour Mommy
juice":-
(i) That it is a description of what has just occurred, with 'Mommy' as the
Agent of the utterance (i.e. 'Mommy poured the juice'). If this is so, it is the only
example of an Agent intervening between Verb and Object (there are non-adult word
orderings, but the active noun phrase is always external) and hence unlikely.
(ii) That "Mommy juice" is a single noun phrase with "Mommy" as genitive
determiner ('Mommy's juice'). This is possible, but although Allison does use
compound noun-phrases of this sort, intra-NP relations are not yet differentiated
between what might be called possessive, locative, accusative and dative and this
seems to be characteristic of English before fluent use of prepositions (see 2.5.2 & 3.1
on Locatives).
Due to this indeterminacy, it is difficult to ascribe the same structure to
Allison's utterances as to the sentences [4] to [7] above. The important thing for the
present is that utterances with the form of dative ditransitives (like Fig. 1.11) are in
operation significantly before prepositional ditransitives (use of grammatical
prepositions is only beginning toward the end of the Bloom 1973 data). If evidence
from the learner's own performance were relevant to linguistic competence we might
expect the above generalisation to be reversed: -
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Figure 1.12: 'Prepositional transformation'.
NP V NP NP
1 2 3 4 => 1 2 4 to/for+ 3
Thus [b] => [a]; among the entailments of this logical statement there is not {
*[b] => *[a] } and the learner is not led to accept sentences like [6b] and [7b].
Extraneous constraints are not required.
1.4 Summary: Principles and Parameters.
Criticism of BH70 in 1.1 seems to erode the case against Negative Evidence in
the learner's linguistic input. Examples of linguistic performance like that of Allison
Bloom's ditransitive construction above raise the possibility that 'text ordering' or
"anomalous text presentation" is a plausible model of language learnability. On a brief
examination of actual first language learning in children, it is apparent that we may be
able to expand the possibilities of learnability from the environment.
It is apparent that the assertion of the innateness of Universal Grammar (UG)
does not rest on empirical analysis. If this is so then UG cannot be described as a
faculty of the mind/brain and its very nature is altered radically. UG is most accurately
described as a "theory" or a grammar of I-grammars of particular languages. UG thus
acts in two directions: it is an expression of common structural properties of various
extant I-grammars; and it is a guide for further research into new I-grammars. As in
the construction of I-grammars, the major criteria for construction of components of
UG (generally referred to as Principles and Parameters) seem to be those contingent
on the formalism.
Nonetheless, UG expresses a group of postulates that do require explanation.
Among these are: (a) there is a significant number of structural phenomena which
inheres (at some level of abstraction) universally in human languages; and (b) these
structures (among others) must develop either prior to, or as part of, language
acquisition. The body of this thesis addresses the second of these, in attempting to
provide a psychological foundation for the acquisition of the Subject category in
English.
2
Syncretic thought and early child language.
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"(in the Nichtian glossery
which purveys aprioric roots for aposteriorious tongues
this is nat language at any sinse of the world ...)"
(Joyce 1939: 83.10-12).
2 Syncretic thought and early child language.
44
2.1 Introduction: The Extended Projection Principle.
If the acquired categories of UG are not innate, their acquisition requires some
other explanation. The question to be answered is, "How are the principles of UG
acquired, and how are the parameters22 set?" The Extended Projection Principle
(Chomsky (1986: 116), Haegeman (1991: 59-60)) requires that "sentences must have
Subject positions ... at all syntactic levels" (Haegeman (1991; 315)). This is
formalised in Haegeman (p59) in the unfortunately anglocentric form of Fig. 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Extended Projection Principle.
S --> NP - AUX - VP.
If the Subject category is extant at all levels of linguistic description then the
Subject category is a linguistic primitive. The presence of this primitive in the learner's
cognitive system, i.e. its development and/or acquisition, must be explained.
2.2 The presence of 'Subject' in early child language.
2.2.1 'Subject' and 'sentence' in child language.
The terms of formal linguistics have largely been developed in the description
of the structures of 'adult' language, and more especially the language of text.
Practical experiment in much formal linguistics is limited to the linguist's own
introspection which, though still technically 'Performance', is the generation of speech
2 2 Parameters in UG are variables across languages, governing the particular manifestation of
certain properties, for example word order.
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outside of use, i.e. the generation of (spoken) text. Many of these terms have cross-
linguistic applicability but this applicability can not always be assumed: there is
evidence against the presence of a Complementiser system in Japanese (Fukui (1986)
cited in Radford (1990)); many languages are without adpositions or adjectives and
many languages vary in the domain of nominal and verbal lexical items (see Givon
(1979)). The application of this terminology to child language is equally non-trivial
and in this section we attempt to find 'Subject' and 'Sentence' in early child language.
My prototype for 'subject' in this study is to be that profiled in Keenan (1976,
henceforth K76), much of which I take to be relatively uncontroversial. As Keenan
was aiming for a language independent definition of 'Sentence' and 'Subject' of
sentence, his descriptions are often structurally vague. Also, his definition was stated
in terms of tendencies and preference rules rather than necessary and sufficient
conditions. However, as a starting point I shall try and find the properties outlined in
K76 in the utterances of Allison Bloom (Bloom 1973, MacWhinney 1991; and see
Fig. 2.2). Allison's speech will only be noted here, to be placed in critical relation to
the notion of Subject defined in K76; her linguistic performance will be examined in
detail in Chapter 3.















2.2.1.1 The 'basic sentence'.
Although K76 is language independent, several substantive claims are made
about the 'basic sentence'. 'Basic' is used here in an attempt to define a set of
'primitive' (or 'most basic') sentences from which other sentence types could be
derived (presumably by operations such as 'question formation' or 'negation',
although Transformational rules are never explicitly referred to). Thus a first
requirement is that a "b-sentence" must not depend on or contain another or more basic
sentence. These sentences will tend to be the most syntactically 'simple' of a particular
language and therefore to be declarative, affirmative and probably active. For the same
reason they will tend to be the most syntactically versatile, in the sense of being the
easiest to modify verbally and sententially (p309). As a lower limit on the allowable
basis of sentences, the b-sentence must not be "too context dependent" for its meaning
(p308), so pronouns, 'missing' arguments and presupposition are to be avoided.
It is difficult to see how some of these requirements would relate to Allison's
utterances: certainly utterances often stand independent of one another, but whether
utterances are declarative or interrogative is often a matter of non-trivial interpretation.
Allison's utterances appear to be too basic for K76, depending crucially on the non-
linguistic context for interpretation. The single-word, or 'holophrastic' utterances23
which predominate in the early files not only presuppose that reference is to be
recovered from context (in the case of internally directed speech this presupposition is
perhaps trivial) but that the addressee will highlight the same aspects of the lexicalised
event or object as has the speaker. For examples, from 'Ali 1': down is used to
accompany: Allison's own descent from a chair; herself accidentally knocking a doll
down; and asking 'mommy' to pull her down; cookie is used in asking for, offering or
identifying cookies.
Allison's later multiword utterances are also too context dependent to be called
sentences. Arguments of predicates are regularly not lexicalised, and often predicates
themselves are left unlexicalised if they are salient from the context. For example from
-3 A holophrase, after Griffiths (1986: 280), is defined as "an utterance that is about as long as
a (short) adult word - and is, indeed, often modelled on an adult word - but which is used in ways
comparable to a whole adult sentence. That is, it is used to perform 'illocutionary acts' such as
requesting and greeting". In this thesis the term is used with the slightly broader definition as a unit
with similar phonological form to an adult word, but with a function either unspecified or
subjectively constructed by the child.
'Ali 3' "mommy shower" and "mommy floor" seem to be declarative and imperative
utterances respectively.
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However, there does seem to be some kind of structure in Allison's multiword
utterances, which is to be examined briefly before we look for the 'subject'.
Before 20 months it is difficult, if not impossible, to talk of any syntactic
structure in Allison's Performance, as the vast majority of her utterances (280/322 in
'Ali 1', 288/300 in 'Ali 2') are holophrastic. Moreover, the holophrastic utterances
cannot be readily categorised in terms of Noun, Verb, and Preposition. Although there
is a formal resemblance - that is, adult forms and child forms may share a similar
phonetic form - the resemblance does not seem to extend to the use or meaning of the
terms. Henceforth, in characterisation of this formal similarity and functional
dissimilarity, adult forms will be capitalised (e.g. Verb) and child forms will be inside
scare quotes (e.g. 'verb'). Thus, in the earlier file especially, 'verbs' (i.e. those words
which bear phonological resemblance to adult Verbs) are virtually non-existent, the
linguistic function of accompanying the speaker's action is invariably fulfilled by
Prepositions. As implied by the term 'holophrastic', the lexical functions (Nominal,
Verbal, Prepositional,...) are only partially differentiated in early speech.
The multiword utterances, however, right from the beginning, seem to show a
strongly regular word order - there being certain words which invariably occur
utterance initially and some which almost equally invariably ocur utterances finally
(there is only one counter example to these in the first three samples)24. A tentative
Phrase Structure grammar can be hypothesised, formalising but not generalising
beyond the attested data, as in Figure 2.3.




~4 For example, from 'Ali 1' to 'Ali 3' more and mommy are always utterance initial. The
'prepositions', which appear in multi-word utterances slightly later, and at first only with babble, are
virtually always utterances final (there is only one counter example to this: "down mommy" (in 'Ali
2') which accompanies Allison's descent into Mommy's lap - Allison implicit as 'Agent/Experiencer',
Mommy explicit as 'Goal').
Init —>
—>
more, mama ['Alii'] e.g. "more baby"
baby, mommy ['Ali 3'] e.g. "mommy shower'
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Fin —> down ['Alii'] e.g. "uhoh down"
—> on ['Ali 3'] e.g. "coat on"
X —> Init, Fin, babble, all other vocabulary.
This word order regularity is plausibly due to imitation of the caregiver's
speech. The words which become 'pivots' {more, mommy, down) are among the
most common words of Allison's holophrastic vocabulary, and the constructions
among the most common of the caregiver's utterances. An early sensitivity to word
order appears to be somewhat general in language acquisition (see Schieffelin (1981)
on Kaluli, Slobin (1966) on Russian). It is worth pointing out that while Allison's
multiword utterances are limited to two words, the only structural relations necessary
are before/after (or +/- BEFORE) - i.e. that more will occur before the word it
qualifies and that down will (generally) occur after it.
Although the grammar can be simplified by condensing rules (as in Figure
2.4), the proposed rule would license structures unattested in the data (i.e. Allison's
linguistic performance). Namely the string [Init X Fin],
Figure 2.4.
Utt --> (Init) X (Fin).
There are further problems with this rule beyond that of non-attestation. The
first is purely formal: when a grammar can generate strings of over two elements the
simple before/after relation is no longer sufficient and more structure is necessary to
relate all the elements to each other. The temptation is to introduce predication of some
kind, which again is not attested in Allison's performance. Predication is an important
psychological development which is to be described rather than assumed. Second, a
claim that Allison's basic sentence structure is [Init X Fin] allows the hypothesis that
non-lexicalised participants in events are explicitly represented in the structure by
'empty categories'. For instance in the analyses of the attested "baby down" (from
chair) and (baby) "down [to] mommy" in Figure 2.5. As with predication, there is no
evidence for an 'empty category' in Allison's performance. On both counts it is clear
that postulating only those abstract structures which are licensed by all and only the
attested data can prevent the generation of abstract categories (predication, empty
categories) which are purely ideal. These ideal categories become problematic when
they are not recognised as such and seem to require explanation in terms of
psychology or (more usually) biology.




Allison's utterances may have a naturalness and wholeness which can tempt us
to call them 'sentences', but on the above definition this cannot be correct. It is not
until 'Ali 5' that Allison uses adult decontextualising vocabulary such as tense and
pronouns. Before this the reference of most utterances cannot be understood without
access to the state of affairs in the play situation at the time. Early combinatorial speech
is apparently of the form of strings of holophrases (Garman 1979, Peters 1986, Ch 3
of this thesis) and its dependence on non-linguistic context is reflected in the fact that
any event participant (including 'verbs') may be left unlexicalised (see Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.6.
accompanying Allison's descent from a chair,
'mommy was in the shower'.
'mommy come down to the floor',
accompanying Allison's descent from a chair,
pointing to a cookie.
'Ali 2' "baby down"
'Ali 3' "mommy shower"
"mommy floor"
'Ali 4' "baby down chair"
"there cookie"
2.2.1.2 The 'basic Subject'.
The definition of 'basic Subject' (i.e. Subject of a basic sentence) given in K76
consists of around 30 "properties which Subjects characteristically possess" (p311).
In a wide cross-linguistic survey, parts of speech traditionally or 'pretheoretically'
described as "Subject", were examined for properties - syntactic, semantic or
pragmatic - which they might have in common. In other words, the initial
(unspecified) definition was of the "I don't know what it is but I know it when I see
it" variety - parts of speech were selected on the grounds that they seemed to be right,
and their properties were added to the set {Subject Properties List (SPL, p312)}.
Consequently there are properties which are purely language specific (and which are
seen here as of peripheral importance) through properties of varying ubiquity, to
properties of virtual universality. Counter-examples are presented to most of the
proposed properties, and the set (or any subset thereof) is not a list of necessary
and/or sufficient conditions for 'Subjecthood' in a language. K76 is using "a weaker
notion of definition" (p312), in that "an NP in a b-sentence ... is a subject of that
sentence to the extent that it has the properties in [SPL]". The notion 'Subject' "does
not represent a single dimension of linguistic reality", it is a "cluster concept", or a
"multi-factor concept". The compiled Subject Properties List is presented under four
categories (autonomy, case marking, semantic role and immediate dominance), which
seem to be placed in order of implicative import (p324). We'll go through them in the
same order.
Autonomy.
The autonomy required of a Subject noun phrase (NP) is defined along three
dimensions:
(a) the NP must have "independent existence" with respect to the action, event
or state of affairs described in the predicate, for example in the sentence "Joanna was
painting a picture" the picture need never exist, but the existence of Joanna is strongly
presupposed.
(b) the NP should be among the most "indispensable" for the grammaticality of
the sentence (this is admittedly local to accusative languages and a certain reading of
'pro-drop' constructions25).
(c) the NP must show "autonomous reference", i.e. its reference "must be
determinable by the addressee at the moment of utterance". This can possibly be seen
as a grammaticisation of (a), and it means that the Subject NP should not be
anaphoric, and referentially dependent on later (or often in non-Subject initial
languages, earlier) NPs. There are several consequences and related properties to
which K76 seems to attach importance as there are six pages of them, which I shall
pass over here as they generally concern the more advanced syntax not found at all in
Allison's language, such as control of reflexives.
In Allison's holophrastic speech, it is an act of rich interpretation to posit any
kind of linguistic Subject/Predicate (or Topic/Comment) split. Perhaps we might say
that Allison's utterances during this period are all de facto Comments, in that they
express attention on an aspect of the present situation, but the specification of what
that aspect is (i.e. the Topic) is only non-linguistically present. Thus meanings are
often unstable to the extent that reference is not independent of time and location of
utterance. In early combinatorial speech, NPs we might want to call Subject, on the
grounds of Semantic role for instance (see below), are almost always absent from
utterances. Examples are given in Figure 2.7 (the implicit 'Agents' in all cases below
were Allison herself). The Subject is literally not present.
Figure 2.7.
From 'Ali 3': "sit down"
"lie down"
25 'Pro-drop' constructions are those where the Subject has been elided: in Chomskyan formal
linguistic terms it has been replaced by the 'empty category' 'pro'. Typically this is limited to certain
languages or certain constructions:
English imperatives:
[pro] put the kettle on.
Spanish:
jo tengo dolor de cabeza.
[pro] tengo dolor de cabeza.
(I) have (an) ache of (the) head.
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From 'Ali 4': "comb hair"
"eat apple juice"
Case marking.
The unmarked NPs in intransitive sentences tend to be b-subjects, as will be
those NPs which change their case marking under causativisation and nominalisation.
These properties are of course only relevant to case marking languages, and the
language of Allison (before 'Ali 4' at least) has little or no inflectional marking of any
kind; that which exists is best described as 'borrowing' (i.e. unanalysed rote learning)
from the adult language. For examples: "gone" ('Ali 1'+), "running", "coming",
"wiping" ('Ali 3'), "cookies", "toys", other '+ing' ('Ali 4'). 'Ali 4' is the first file in
which inflectional marking appears to be at all productive. Subject-verb agreement and
genitive case marking is only just beginning in 'Ali 5'. Allison's language prior to this
stage can be said to be a non-case marking language.
Semantic role.
B-subjects "normally express" Agent of action, Addressee of imperatives, or
Causer NP in causative sentences, if any are present in the sentence, and generally
"the semantic role of the referent of a b-subject is predictable from the form of the
main verb" (for instance, passive verbs would imply that the subject's reference was
to the 'Patient' or 'Experiencer' of the action). These properties are tendencies and
K76 notes enough counter-examples to claim that none of these properties are
sufficient conditions for b-Subjecthood.
However, these properties are precisely those which are most consistently
treated in similar manner in Allison's speech. The NP which is most systematically
and for the longest time absent from her utterances is that which plays the active role in
the situation described, whether that be 'Agent' or 'Causer'. It may be significant, that
the most prominent cluster of features of Allison's "Subject", those which bear on
situational or semantic considerations, become almost irrelevant in the feature set of
the adult Subject.
Immediate dominance.
"The b-subject is immediately dominated by the root node S." This again is
made as a weak claim, making clear that even without the qualification of freer word
order and VSO languages, immediate dominance by the root is neither a necessary nor
a sufficient condition for b-Subjecthood.
As has been illustrated, Allison does not use sentences in Keenan's sense of
the word. The very existence of a 'root node' immediately dominating one or other
word is unnecessary until she starts using utterances of 3 words or more in 'Ali 4'
(age 22 months) at which point recognisably adult syntax is beginning. But even in
'Ali 4' the argument of immediate dominance is a particularly weak one (40/307
utterances are formally similar to adult sentences; 75/307 are similar to adult Verb
Phrases, the active participants ofwhich are not lexicalised).
It seems that Allison's "Subjects" are not Subjects in what we have taken to be
a widely accepted sense of the word. That they are not 'Adult Subjects' was apparent
already, but it is important to be emphatic that they are not Subjects at all and behave
by other rules. From some of the argument above we may be tempted to say that
children's early prototypes of Adult Subjects are 'Agents' and go on from there.
Participant roles are so notoriously ill-defined however, even though 'Agent' (and to a
lesser extent 'Patient') seems to be among the most acceptable in use, that use of the
term in other than a lay sense is problematic26.
In summary, the presence of a Subject category in child language is not evident
in the data. As with predication and the empty category, the development of the
Subject is to be described rather than assumed. Describing the child's 'subjects' under
the vague term 'Agent' allows this development to go un-examined. To define
precisely how Subject develops, and what are its earlier forms, it is necessary to look
closely at the child's pre-linguistic behaviour.
26 There seem to be indefinitely many participant roles documented: Source, Goal, Experiencer,
... See Dowty (1989) and Ladusaw & Dowty (1988) for proposed alternatives.
2.3 Formal introduction to syncretism.
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This sub-section is intended to ground some of the concepts I will be using in
the sections ahead. The particular forms of thought evidenced by the infant's and the
child's practical and vocal behaviour require quite specific descriptive terms. Thus it is
not adequate to use terms like concept with an assumed, i.e. everyday, meaning. In
this sub-section terms like concept, Syncretism and Complex are defined away from
their setting in developmental psychology later in the thesis; here they are explored in a
more general sense, with reference to everyday language. Also this sub-section
attempts to exhibit more explicitly the manner in which I am using terms like Abstract
and Concrete, Objective and Subjective. For further reference see for examples:
Ilyenkov (1974, 1982), Voloshinov (1973), Vygotsky (1986), Zeleny (1980). No
familiarity with the work of these writers is assumed.
In attempting to define syncretism in thought I found it most rewarding to
define the idea negatively, as it were. Exploring ideas around Syncretic thought, it
seemed to me that this primitive form of thought was more qualified by the features it
lacked, in comparison with more developed forms (more 'adult', more 'social', more
'rational'), than by which special features it possessed. Perhaps this is not surprising
as (in this thesis) Syncretic thought stands as some of the earliest cognitive behaviour
in the child, and could be expected to provide a foundation for potential development.
The growth and subsequent paralysis of Syncretic thought may be an adequate vehicle
for describing the development of formal categories (and by implication Universal
Grammar) without innate higher cognitive functions.
I take four types of 'concept' (here meant in the broadest sense of 'form of
thought'; see Fig. 2.8) moving away in stages from objectivity and formal rigour
towards the Syncretic complex. In this first section the types are only defined
formally, or abstractly, in terms of their more important features - in later sections
certain of them (especially the complex and the pseudo-concept) will be described
more concretely in the context of the linguistic situation.
Figure 2.8: Forms of thought.




2.3.1 The scientific concept.
The scientific concept (henceforth Concept, in this section) is FIXED in that
neither the extension nor the intension of the Concept is free to drift on the forces of
tradition (cf. the pseudo-concept, below). Nor, really, can these facets of the Concept
be altered by the individual scientist (or group of scientists), for instance on a stylistic
whim. The fixity of this type of Concept can be expressed by the fact that its content
(either intensional or extensional) can only be changed by some kind of consented or
imposed shift in the methods of description and analysis themselves (an example in
chemistry may be Mendeleev's introduction of the periodic table, which fundamentally
altered the concepts of the chemical elements). Further, this change tends to be of a
certain type, making the concepts more concrete (i.e. expressing the relation of a larger
set of abstracted features) - an example here may be the change in Newtonian
mechanical concepts triggered by Einstein's work - Newtonian concepts were enriched
rather than simply negated. Change only occurs as the result of CONSCIOUS,
RATIONAL, and fully SOCIAL intervention.
This characterisation of the Concept is to an extent a caricature. Rather, it is an
idealisation of the more central features of a certain mode of thought. Discussion of the
historically specific and ideological features of scientific thought would be out of place
here, though they obviously affect its content.
In two senses, the Concept is (again an idealisation of 'tends towards')
OBJECTIVE. As implied above, the Concept is experienced as an object external to
the individual scientist, or even, to the extent that a Concept resists tradition, to the
society in which it exists. The Concept tends toward objectivity - independence of
historical locale and the sensually perceived - to the extent that it relies (for it's
existence as a 'scientific' concept) on its opposition to physical reality rather than to
personal interpretation, authorised or otherwise. I am imagining uncontroversial
natural-science concepts as being prototypical here ('Gold', 'Mass', etc.). The
Concept approximates toward the objective reality) by the concreting over history of
particular abstracted properties of the phenomena labelled therein.
There are several stages of ABSTRACTION involved here, between
phenomena perceived (by the scientists, or by their equipment), and the Concept as it
stands, such that there is a large distance between the two. A common and recurrent
controversy in linguistics and elsewhere is on the ways empirical data may or may not
challenge a theory (interchangeable with Concept here). It seems that properties of the
phenomenon deemed 'accidental' are irrelevant to the Concept. A great deal of
scientific debate may concern whether particular phenomena are 'accidental' or not,
and an essential part of the character of the Concept is this CONSCIOUS,
RATIONAL design. The conscious separation of necessary from accidental properties
is a mode of approximation toward the object.
The conscious and rational application of the scientist (or scientific team) is the
primary motor for change in the Concept, i.e. change is objectively triggered.
Opposition to new realities (or equivalently, a subtler opposition to already known
reality, made observable by more subtle analytical technology for example) uncovers
hitherto unappreciated properties of the 'set of phenomena'. Note that this
methodology would tend to promote further concretisation of the Concept, exposure
of earlier errors, or possibly a redescription of old properties in terms of new
properties.
All 'initiated' users have equal access to this kind of concept, it has no
psychological or personal content. In these terms the scientific concept has an entirely
SOCIAL existence. The objective style of prose favoured in natural science journals
implies not only the objectivity of the reports, but also a certain lack of claim to
personal ownership, which we could contrast to the personal voice of the novelist.
2.3.2 The pseudo-concept.
The pseudo-concept is an entity which behaves in many ways like a (scientific)
concept, but lacks certain of the concept's central features. As with the Concept, the
pseudo-concept is a SOCIAL entity. An example may be the dictionary definition of a
word, or social fixation ofmeaning in any (un)written lexicon. All initiated users (e.g.
members of a certain social set) have equal access to and (lack of) authority over the
pseudo-concept. Pseudo-concepts are more likely to bear the marks of their makers
than scientific concepts but once these ideas are released into social discourse they
very much become less property of their author than an integral part of the culture
(e.g. Hamlet, Don Quixote). In this case there is a great deal of sense in speaking of
them as social rather than private27.
More typical examples of pseudo-concepts might be 'table', 'knife', the
socially accepted lay idea of 'gold'. These concepts are surely not trivial to define, in
terms of 'semantic features', 'necessary and sufficient conditions' or whatever, but
there is a sense in which they belong to the speech community as a whole and are
independent of the individual's actions. However, pseudo-concepts are NOT
CONSCIOUS or RATIONAL creations, nor are they so modified by scientists,
lawyers or lexicographers and are purely 'conventional' in the Saussurean sense.
Conscious intervention in the language to preserve this kind of meaning generally
serves to differentiate certain socio-economic groups. The inventions of street slang
are an example28.
Convention and tradition are the motivating forces acting both for constancy
and change in the pseudo-concept. Thus this form of concept is somewhat LESS
FIXED than the scientific concept. For purposes of separation I would like to be a
little inaccurate here and say that the pseudo-concept is FIXED within its milieu - that
the changes wrought in the substance of the pseudo-concept act at a slow enough pace
to follow changes in the community, or at least, that the changes will not be felt within
individual speakers (e.g. older generation speakers who stick to their word meanings
and become a little out of touch with the younger generations. Histories of the terms
'gay' and 'queer' across several generations in the second half of this century).
Change of meaning is not directed, being unconscious, and is more likely to be
the consequence of metaphor (lunar and lunatic in English), irony ('ask' -> 'ax' in
Black vernacular), changes in forms of life influencing changes in important properties
of the concept, etc., than by a truly rational approximation to a concrete reality (though
these may often overlap).
27 This happens not only over the centuries as with 'Hamlet' or 'Iago', but can happen
surprisingly quickly. For example, the word "Quark" in Joyce (1939) is employed as the archaism for
'croak' in the line "Three Quarks for Muster Mark" (p383). This was the source for Murray Gell-
Mann's term 'Quark' to refer to the three postulated sub-atomic particles, a quarter of a century later.
Very quickly, then, the term can become divorced from it's 'owner'.
28 This linguistic invention can effect syntactic forms, too. Madonna's use of post-sentential
not ("Thanks to Lexington Labs for maximum security. Not." Madonna (1992: Acknowledgements))
and the precious constructions of Daphne Du Maurier's (1938) Rebecca both signal the authors as part
of some particular sub-culture.
The pseudo-concept does not approximate objectivity with the drive of the
scientific concept. As for its fixity however, I would like to emphasise its separation
from the notion and say that it is OBJECTIVE within a local social milieu. Legal
categories are perhaps a good example of this - the pseudo-concept 'mother' is made
to be highly objective within a society which puts importance upon such a relation
(e.g. Western Capitalist society).
The nature of the ABSTRACTION involved in construction of a pseudo-
concept is less principled than in that of the scientific concept. 'Accidental' properties
of a phenomenon will tend not to be included in the pseudo-concept (they will tend to
be separately lexicalised if required - 'ball', 'red ball'), but the often metaphorical
nature of language change shows that non-essential properties which are nonetheless
strongly associated with the phenomenon can drift in and out of membership of the
pseudo-concept.
Abstraction differs in two ways from that of scientific concepts; the properties
abstracted toward a concrete centre will be more locally contingent, and the boundary
between central and excluded properties is not entirely intraversible.
2.3.3 The notion.
The notion is another step away from the properly social toward forms of
thought of the individual in society. If a pseudo- concept is described as a 'dictionary
definition' of a word, then a notion may be described as the individual's own
definition. Many of the features of the notion will vary with the extent to which the
individual is socialised, or perhaps, to the extent to which opposition to nature is
socialised within the society. Thus there are grades of variation between the highly
socialised pseudo-concept on the one hand and the purely subjective complex (as the
individual will be conscious of differences in extension at least, between their own
notions, and those of their peer group(s)).
Ilyenkov (1982: 39-62) characterised the notion as an abstraction from the
sensually perceived phenomena or as "verbally expressed contemplation" (p43). The
notion attains independence of the individual subject only to the extent to which that
subject is socialised, though it will only tend toward the limited objectivity of the
pseudo-concept. Emphasising the way in which personal contact and debate has
impact on this form of thought, we should call it INTERSUBJECTIVE rather than
limitedly objective.
In individual and social terms local historical effects are much more prevalent
on the notion than on the rationally fixed scientific concept or the traditionally fixed
pseudo-concept. In a relatively atomised (or unsocialised) individual, accidental and
arbitrary sensual elements (i.e. personal historical elements) will have a more central
position in the notion's make-up - it may sometimes be difficult to separate an
individual's prejudices and personally developed connotations from the meaning
proper. In a more socialised individual, prejudice and connotations may be reduced or
marked as such away from the kernel of meaning. More generally, the unconsciously
socialised individual will unconsciously adopt many of the 'prejudices and
connotations' at large in society.
However socialised the subject, the notion is always CONTINGENT rather
than fixed. Debate or peer group pressure might exert one kind of pressure for change
on the individual's notions. A person's everyday experience can often put old
prejudices in a new light and produce a kind of cognitive dissonance which may
inhibit or confirm certain elements of the notion's meaning.
So, the boundary between essential and accidental elements of a notion is even
less clear than that between those of the pseudo- concept. The abstraction from the
sensually perceived is an activity which is not entirely mitigated by socialisation - it is
quite plausible to consider an individual whose socialised pseudo-concept oriented
notions are in conflict with elements of the notion based more firmly on personal
experience. For example the anti-racist racist: who sincerely appreciates the concept of
'black person' as fully human and requiring full democratic rights, but who still holds
deeply felt prejudices about crime, smell, rhythm, and just doesn't feel comfortable
with black people in the room. Thus the notion is not entirely abstract from its
constituent phenomena.
For our purposes however, this description of the notion is limited to the
'adult' subject - where constancy (promoted by peer groups and language and by the
pressure for 'identity') is the rule rather than the exception.
2.3.4 The syncretic complex.
In exploring the pre-social complex, we are exploring the mode of thought of
the completely atomised individual - if such a thing can exist and still retain internal
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cohesion (see 2.4 on the development of Subjective Space-time). Lowering our
idealisations a little we can perhaps see this mode as being relevant to the very young
child or the individual who for some reason has not become socialised to any
significant extent (wild children, autists). With no peer group or outside authority, the
complex is a direct reflection of individual sensual experience - note that 'individual
sensual experience' presupposes a rudimentary internal cohesion which in turn
presupposes some appreciation ofmemory, self/other and subjective space-time.
In developing a complex, there is no outside pressure to categorise, any
categorisation that does occur, any grouping of experiences, occurs on purely
accidental and subjective grounds. The thinking subject receives no external
motivation to establish essential and accidental properties of the perceived data and the
blurring between the two characteristics of the notion is exacerbated here. Each
phenomenon enters a complex whole, with each of its (perceived) properties given
equal rank inside the complex. In other words there is no abstraction apart from in the
purely perceptual sense (perceptual data themselves being abstractions from the
object); this is how the complex can be described as Syncretic - as a synthetic complex
of concrete phenomena.
Formal and concrete illustration may help illustrate this. For example, an
arbitrary complex A derives from four situations M, N, O, P, each with the following
perceptually salient features :-
Figure 2.9.
and so on. Note that not all the features of putative exemplar of a complex
need be already present in the complex's extension. Any connection however tenuous
can promote inclusion, if the subject is so inclined. This can be seen in a concrete





M; {o,p,q} A; {o,p,q}
N; {p,r,s} A; {o,p,q,r,s}
O; {q,r,t} A; {o,p,q,r,s,t}
P; {n,s,u} A; {n,o,p,q,r,s,t,u}
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word ("Bow-wow") by a child towards the end of his first year (Werner (1926), cited
in Vygotsky (1986: 127)). This example among others is analysed in detail in 2.5.
Figure 2.10: "Bow-wow"
In principle there is no reason for this instability in extension to stop; there
may be practical considerations, however, which might promote compression and
abstraction. Indeed it is interesting that syncretism is unstable in terms of its extension
and that the very formal characteristics of the Syncretic complex are equally unstable.
As the content of a complex increases and becomes more cluttered, more common or
more strongly reinforced (by peers or caregivers, for example) features will attain
more salience than those which are rare or deemed unimportant by others. A category
comparable to the 'prototype', 'family resemblance' or 'preference rule' arrangements
(Jackendoff 1984) emerges. It seems that abstraction is not something which is done









2.4 Substantive introduction to syncretism.
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2.4.1 Neural behaviour and learning.
Having introduced Syncretism formally via an elimination of features from
formal concepts, we arrived at a characterisation of syncretism as a kind of subjective
and unstable categorisation of phenomena. To develop a picture of how this mode of
thought is instantiated in the child it will be fitting to examine how Syncretic thought is
synthesised ontogenetically from even more primitive modes of interaction with an
external world. Syncretism is not innate, it is not the starting block, but it is a
necessary milestone on the road to socialised thinking.
The functional and psychological foundation for Syncretic thinking will be laid
in terms of Piagetian Schematic structures and the processes of Accommodation and
Assimilation (Piaget 1953, 1955). The development of these forms is a continuous
process and the transition into more advanced Syncretic forms is gradual rather than
piecemeal. Although notions of 'stages of development' are somewhat antithetical to
this approach, they can be useful in providing landmarks in exposition, and such is
their use in this thesis. The Piagetian processes themselves are not to be taken as
innate but are to be grounded in a reading of neural processes.
The description of cognitive development is often perceived as a dilemma
between on the one hand postulation of innate abstract structures and on the other hand
postulation of tabula rasa: that the neo-nate is born with no internal structure at all.
This latter position is often held to be inadequate in describing the species specificity
of much of human cognitive ability. The third course, which is programmatically
plotted in this sub-section, is to describe the development of higher order cognitive
behaviours from simpler biological (i.e. neural) functions which can uncontroversially
be postulated as innate. The question becomes: What can be explicitly identified as
biologically given and what can be inferred from that?
A pre-emptive caveat here is that I may be in danger of having a naive trust in
the methods and results of the 'hard sciences', as perhaps may Chomsky with respect
to those of high energy physics. However, the methods and results of neural biology
are often and easily reproduced and speculative generalisation is equally simply
tested29. Caveat notwithstanding, there are certain properties of neural behaviour
which can be used as analogues for primitive cognitive processes. These are explored
below.
Many of the studies cited here (Kandel & Schwartz (1981), Lynch et al.
(1984), Scientific American 241/3 (1979)) are not studies of the human brain in
particular. It is to be noted however, that the basic functional properties of neural
matter are similar in the most divergent organisms: the differences are consequent on
the volume of sensory, motor, and inter-neurons, and the complexity of their inter¬
connection (see Kandel (1979)). This raises an interesting question regarding the
species specificity of language and whether it has to do with factors not purely
neurological: it is important to realise that biological specificity is not restricted to the
structure of the brain.
It seems significant in this regard that the human foetus is born 'premature'
with respect to its higher primate cousins, that is . In animals, the much more limited
potential for learning may be because much of the neural structure has 'stabilised'
leaving room only for some gross environmental adjustment and some basic learning.
An example may be the extent to which myelination and neural cell death (by means of
which the final structure of connections is arrived at) is carried out before birth (see
Skillen (1993) on the role of myelination in the human infant). Note that this is a
quantitative difference not a qualitative one and that some apes may thus be capable of
learning limited linguistic communication systems.
The following elementary neural behaviours are found in the invertebrate snail
Aplysia (Kandel 1979). Aplysia is an organism of extremely limited neural population,
the central nervous system of which can easily be mapped (to the neuron, in fact) and
investigated. Although it certainly beggars the imagination to compare such a creature
to the human, it seems to be the case, as mentioned above, that neurons are of
essentially the same character in a very wide range of animals. Differences are
generally provided by profusions of processes (dendrites (input) and axons (output)),
presence of inter-neurons (which connect between neurons rather than between
nervous system and sensory or motor device), and sheer neural population size.
Three types of elementary response to stimuli have been characterised as types
of 'learning'. The biochemical and structural details can be found in for example
Hawkins & Kandel (1984) (and citations therein) and do not concern us here. These
29 Unlike speculation in quantum chromo-dynamics, for example, which may therefore be of a
qualitatively different nature.
basic functions have become known as Habituation, Sensitisation and Classical
conditioning.
Habituation refers to the decline in neural response to a stimulus "the
consequences of which are neither noxious nor rewarding" (p387). The higher
invertebrate Aplysia will withdraw its gill & siphon apparata when the siphon is given
strong tactile stimulus. On repeated and inconsequential stimuli the response decreases
(in this case the actual output of the sensory neuron) and eventually the stimulus is
effectively ignored. Habituation is not associative in that there is no association being
made between external elements, this process is a response to a (repreated) single
stimulus.
Sensitisation like Habituation is not properly associative. Biochemically it
is more complex than Habituation, though its effect is almost exactly opposite. In
Aplysia: if for example, the tail is given a strong noxious stimulus (the 'sensitising'
stimulus; a.k.a. unconditioned stimulus (UCS)), a following stimulus to the siphon
(the conditioned stimulus (CS)) will produce an enhanced response. Axons from the
sensitising sensory neuron are synapsing onto axons of other 'defensively oriented'
sensory neurons, thus magnifying their subsequent output. This is non-associative in
that no reciprocal sensitisation occurs and there is no sense of a link being made
between two parts of reality, or even of the nervous system itself. A sensitising
stimulus would produce something like a general mood of apprehension.
Classical Conditioning is a special case or an elaboration of sensitisation
caused by a recurrent temporal pairing of two linked stimuli (i.e. the UCS and CS
above). When a weak CS is followed (about .5s) with pronounced regularity by a
strong UCS the response is greatly enhanced - much more so than is a sensitised
response. This enhancement soon extinguishes, however, if the regularity of the
temporal pairing is lost. Enhancement also deteriorates if UCS precedes CS, so the
elaboration of Sensitisation is not yet qualitative and though this learning function is
technically associative, the association is of a limited, uni-directional kind. This
associative learning can be interpreted as an internalisation of some regularity in the
environment.
Higher order learning functions such as Generalisation and Second Order
Conditioning can be described as further elaborations of the above functions,
especially once the role of inter-neurons is appreciated (much of Aplysia's central
nervous system (CNS) is monosynaptic - sensory neurons synapsing directly on
motor neurons).
Generalisation: There may be "some overlap in the sensory neurons and
interneurons excited by different stimuli" (p392). That is, stimuli local to the CS may
have an effect functionally similar to the CS itself - if several stimuli (sensory neurons)
synapse on the same interneuron, only one of which being a CS, the interneuron's
output may be enhanced whichever of its inputs are fired. To put it another way,
stimulus of the interneuron itself becomes the CS.
Second Order Conditioning: regularities between occurrence of CSi and
another stimulus (CS2) may produce further conditioning - CS 1 becomes a sensitising
stimulus for CS2. This kind of conditioning crucially depends on layers of facilitator
neurons (interneurons which enhance neural response generally - like internal
sensitising stimuli) and other intemeurons which provide a pathway between the loci
of the communicating peripheral stimuli. This form of learning is too complex to occur
in Aplysia. As with Classical Conditioning, each occurrence of regularity strengthens
the response, but unlike Classical Conditioning, the association here is not
unidirectional - neither peripheral CS need be a sensitising stimulus in itself, as the
sensitisation is done by the facilitating interneurons. With these second order learning
functions we begin to see true association between local or distally related sensory
phenomena.
Much of the enhancement or reduction of signal is permanent or semi¬
permanent in effect. The permanence of the changes is qualitatively greater when they
are occurring within the immediately post-natal cell-death period of neural
development. In the pre-natal period neural material and connections are vastly over¬
produced, such that up to 80% will die in this post natal period. Major determinants of
this cell-death are amounts of stimulus received and of "trophic material available" to
receive the neuron's own signals (Cowan (1979), Skillen (1993)). Very early
learning, then, may have a marked and permanent effect not only directly in terms of
the associations which are internalised, but indirectly in terms of the potential for later
association created or ruled out by selective cell-death (neurons do not grow back after
birth).
These are the properties -»i neural matter, independent of the host organism.
The elementary neural behaviour o 3 man central nervous system is constrained
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difference allows epigenetic development in a neural population of a higher order of
magnitude. So, to instantiate these neural behaviours into the human:-
(a) The layer of sensory and motor neurons. In the human brain (as in that of
most higher mammals) there is an accompaniment of large numbers of interneurons,
even at this level, quite outnumbering the peripheral nerve cells proper. Their function
seems to be to systematise in various ways the sensory inputs (and the motor outputs)
and to smooth interfaces and local co-ordination (see Hauta & Fiertag 1979): hence
they seem correctly to be part of this layer.
(b) A small number of elementary 'learning functions' or processes, such as
Habituation, Sensitisation and Classical Conditioning. These may be reflex (e.g.
monosynaptic) or local (e.g. a retinal cell may provide sensitising stimulus to adjacent
cells).. Much of the interneural operation in layer (a) will be of this elementary kind.
These elementary functions are intended to be taken as a kind of taxonomy of neural
processes or techniques general to the brain.
(c) Layers of intemeurons creating a regime of second order learning functions
such as Generalisation, Second Order Conditioning (or Association) as well as a kind
of second order Habituation/Sensitisation occurring between intemeurons.
These layers are almost literally superimposed on each other in the brain's
construction: much of the sensory and motor system is found in the lower brain, while
higher order processes are in the cerebral cortex, which develops last ontogenetically
as well as phylogenetically. It should be noted however that Sensori-motor faculties
are not quite as discretely distributed as the mapping of the brain into sensory 'lobes'
can often imply (see Hauta & Fiertag (1979) on lobic interpenetration).
Translated into a functional or psychological terminology we have a number of
isolated sensory and motor systems mediated by a field of connective possibility.
These isolated systems can be translated as Piaget's Primary Schemata - elementary
local abilities such as vision, hearing, local touch sense and local motor ability . The
helplessness and physical disorientation of the neo-nate is evidence of the separation
of these Schemata: lack of balance and proprioceptive skills indicates that basic
regularity and co-ordination between parts of the infant's body are not 'hard wired'
but must be learned. It is also quite some time (in days or weeks) before the infant
responds directionally to sounds or tactile stimulus (Piaget (1953)).
Accommodation and Assimilation are associative functions mapping to
clusters of the neural learning functions of layers (b) and (c) (and possible others of
the same kind). They are properties of Schemata, not individuals, and the
'environments' over which these functions have their domain are external and internal
with respect to the particular Schema in which they operate. The external environments
of secondary and 'tertiary' Schemata are generally other inter-relating Schemata,
primary Schemata will have both other Schemata and the 'outside' phenomenal or
sensual world as external environments. Accommodation and Assimilation are
properly to be spoken of as concrete processes: there is no explicit force to unify or
categorise phenomena as there is in the building of Syncretic complexes.
Accommodation and Assimilation are functions over the immediately appreciated
phenomena only - external and/or internal.
The internal environment is the internal structure of the Schema itself. I
characterise this as an 'environment' to emphasise both the 'mirroring' function of the
Schema, and its somewhat 'organic' nature. The structure will change over time as the
Schema grows, agglomerates with others and decomposes; and the 'historical'
specifics of this structure will have an active effect on how new data are
Accommodated and Assimilated.
Piaget describes the Schema as a "practical concept" (Piaget 1956); a Schema
may also be seen as a behaviour pattern or as a concrete internalisation of associated
external stimuli. Accommodation is the immediate reflection of sensation within the
Schema - the initial stage of internalisation, and possibly the creation of a
'phenomenon'. Assimilation is the internal procedure or effect of the Schema's
Accommodations to its external environment. Accommodation will always occur when
the Schema is active; Assimilation generally effects reinforcement or entropy, possible
associations with other Schema(ta) and so on.
Much of the description and exploration is beginning to take on a rather formal
character. In future sections, we'll be talking less in terms of neural structures, rarely
referring even to the biologically based first and second order learning functions
(Habituation, Sensitisation, Conditioning, Association, ...), preferring the abstracted
forms of Assimilation, Accommodation, and relations between Schema. Part of the
claim of this section has been that only biological processes (e.g., of the brain) can be
biologically endowed. Higher order processes (e.g., of the mind) are best described in
more abstract formal terms, and it may not be simple to provide direct biological
mappings of 'Assimilation', 'Accommodation' and 'Schema'. However, a pathway
for the transition between biological and cognitive functions has been provided.
2.4.2 The Initial State Device.
The 'Initial State Device' (ISD; a.k.a. neonate, infant) consists of some innate
reflexes (or Primary Schemata after Piaget) and the associative functions. The first
stage in its development (much of the first month) exhibits behaviour consonant with
'practising' or 'tuning' these reflexes - sucking, prehension, hearing and vision.
Evidence of activation of Schema in vision and hearing is at first only available
'negatively': the infant may stop doing something else when presented with something
in the visual or aural field (Piaget 1953 p63, 77). Each reflex seems to operate alone
and it is some 6 weeks or so after birth when "Second stage" Schemata are evidenced
behaviourally (see below). This functional isolation within the ISD has several
suggestive implications.
In the canonical Von Neumann digital computer architecture, a capacitor
produces a central 'clock pulse' which regulates activity throughout the whole machine
- local elementary functions are carried out one at a time on each pulse. As well as
keeping digital processes out of each other's way and allowing predictable input &
output times, this clock pulse provides a central rhythm about which the machine can
cohere. The space-time that the Von Neumann Central Processing System inhabits is a
unitary one. Such a central clock has not been found in the organic brain. The timing
of neural operations is entirely local and heterogeneous: speed of operation not only
varies between types of neuron, but also between parts internal to the neuron
(dendrites, axons, areas within the body). Until the Schemata begin to communicate
systematically there is no reason to impose a cohering central rhythm30. Each isolated
Schema will have a rhythm of its own.
Thus, the notion of time in the Device (really a system of devices at this point)
is interesting. Piaget proposes local "practical durations" (Piaget 1956 p322), each a
property of a particular Schema, Piaget's stress being on the practicality rather than the
locality. Even the sense of 'duration' only comes when a reflex is able to consistently
dissociate Accommodation and Assimilation in its action (e.g. into phenomena and
effication). The Device's internalisations of objective time are only indirect: as a
number of rhythms or (slightly later) durations. These internalisations are not
'subjective' in that there is yet no evidence for a single 'subject' imposing or creating
order.
30 Apart from the circadian rhythms of sleep and hunger, which seem to effect the body quite
holistically. Significantly, these behaviours are also somewhat arhythmic in the infant human.
The same course of argument applied to space produces a similar result. The
evidence is that prehensile and gustatory reflexes are local and that even proprioception
is an "acquired adaptation" (Piaget 1953) - the hand will grasp when touched, only to
release its object soon afterwards; there is little or no co-ordination between parts of
the body in motion. Appreciation of objective space is also then local and practical in
the sense that each Schema or reflex has its own internalisation of 'space' based on its
own extension and behaviour. Piaget replaces the term 'space' with 'group' to express
the idea that internalisation at this stage expresses a clustering of surface phenomena
and it implies no awareness or appreciation of three dimensional extensibility outside
the Device.
Objective space becomes a number of local groups. Description of 'group-
space' as two dimensional (modelling the skin surface, for example) is possible
though questionable on two counts: first it is unclear in what sense it would helpful or
meaningful to postulate that a Schema does indeed represent the skin surface in two
dimensions; second, until the Schema are communicating one Schema's (xj, yj)
would not be related to another Schema's (x2, y2)-
The Initial State Device, then, inhabits a number of practical time-spaces,
which do not constitute a universe. Nor do they yet entail any particular external
reality.
2.4.3 The suckling infant.
Sucking is an example of the activity of this Initial State Device and as it is
present from birth it can be said to be truly innate. The reflex is purely impulsive at
first, apparently triggered by any object brushing the lips, and coordination of sucking
and swallowing in breast or bottle feeding is generally present on the first day - though
not always successful initially (Piaget 1953 p25). No other co-ordinated behaviour is
present in the neo-nate, such as holding objects in the mouth while sucking, or
searching however primitively for the desired or escaped object. The activity of the
suck reflex is totally isolated from other reflexes and developing Schemata, until this
coordination with swallowing. Within the first few days of life forms of behaviour are
developing around the suck/swallow Schema.
The infant may on occasion appear to exhibit search behaviour: for example,
searching for a missing teat and becoming upset at its lack of success. However the
make-up of this 'search' is significantly different from the search procedure of the
developed child or adult. The infant will repeat its suck/swallow Schema and "his lips
open and close as if to receive a real nipple, but without having an object" (Piaget
1953 p26), each execution of which separated by some apparently urgent head
movement. This head movement is evocative of the search, but on further observation
seems to be quite undirected. Each burst of movement is unique and unconnected
with previous and subsequent bursts - even when, for instance, the infant's cheek
brushes against the teat during one adjustment, the head will not necessarily
subsequently turn in that direction. This head movement possibly internalises an
association with some head movement and the presence of the teat in the mouth, but
no further, perhaps it merely constitutes non-relevant activity which can shake the
mind clear as it were, to restart the suck/swallow (or some other) Schema. In Piaget's
diary accounts, it is around 3 weeks before even a limitedly directional response is
evident in this Schema ( and 3 weeks is a long time if we consider that feeding is
perhaps one of the major activities of the neo-nate). There is as yet no assistance from
vision or the more remote gustative Schemata.
This procedure and its subsequent development is fully compatible with an
active pattern-matching account of infant cognition. The suck/swallow/nutrition
association is plausibly one of the strongest sources of stimulation and hence
connection strengthening in the initial state device. In the absence of consciousness of
an objective external world, stimulation of one half of this association is expected to
lead to stimulation of the other half, and so far the modal response to failure is anxiety,
symptom of cognitive dissonance. In other words, the association is internalised
before the objective causal relation.
The later directionality in responses to failure can actually be boiled down to
"turn in the direction of the cheek that was stimulated" and there may be an
internalisation of the general success when this is tried. If the turn Schema fails once
there is no evidence ofmemory or a limiting of the search space and the infant is back
to square one with increased anxiety. What is important about the turn Schema is that
it illustrates the relations growing between reflexes, building Schemata. Here, local
but functionally separate reflexes - suck/swallow and cheek sensation - are becoming
connected due to some form of classical or 2nd order conditioning. In Accommodation
to the elusive nipple, cheek sensation is being Assimilated to the suck/swallow
Schema. But still this is not a search for something external to the Device.
This Assimilation also illustrates the expansion of the local time-spaces:
Schemata like suck/swallow have virtually no temporal depth at all and 'expectation'
and 'memory' have meaning only as names of moments during its activation, a
function of the properties of the neural mechanics. After Assimilation of cheek
sensation a bond is established between two heterogeneous time-spaces, necessitating
some higher order time-space which can include them both. On a neural level,
biochemical processes will drift into rhythm to the extent that they are strongly
connected.
The development of suck/swallow into a Schema is very rapid and it is
important not to get ahead of oneself in the general story. As the Initial State Device is
a heterogeneously composed entity, different areas of cognition will develop at
different rates, depending on their level of activity and for various reasons it is
plausible that suck/swallow be 'ahead of its time' at these initial stages (see below on
play). However, these associations between reflexes around the month end should not
be seen as moving towards an appreciation of causality and external space-time. In the
infant's time-space multiverse, it is very difficult to find anything relating to our
conception of 'object' or 'event'. The peripheral phenomena which associate into
Schemata are atomic: separate and treated uniquely in themselves. There is no general
associative web, which might internalise a sense of externality, of being in the world.
There is equally no thing apart from these peripheral phenomena, anything which
might be construed as a 'self. The Initial State Device has neither outside nor inside,
only the membranous layer between both.
2.4.4 The Social Environment.
It is not implausible that a factor in the rapidity of development of the
suck/swallow Schema is caregiver assistance. The infant, helpless in these first days,
is at almost all times accompanied and assisted or at least within sight & earshot of a
Primary Caregiver (PC)31. The Initial State Device is not forced to seek, find and
manipulate its own sources of nutrition. The Caregiver provides sufficient assistance
such that only tasks within the Device's competence are required of it to perform. The
3 1 I use the term caregiver to avoid as much as possible assumption of historically specific
modes of child rearing. Terms such as 'mother' or 'parent' are obviously leading in terms of sex and
biological relationship between caregiver and infant. Though I am more or less forced to use a
singular noun, I am not assuming even that the caregiver is a single person, merely a single abstract
role that an unspecified number of concrete individuals may perform. Examples of such concretely
multiple caregivers may be the extended families of some working class child rearing situations, or
the peer group child rearing techniques of Samoan children (Ochs 1988).
The Primary Caregiver is an abstract individual, present from birth and the person most in
harmony with the infant.
infant does not struggle and gasp long in cognitive dissonance before the teat is
provided, even placed into the mouth32.
From a very early age the infant inhabits a Social Environment, by which is
meant a section of experience within, but functionally different to, the purely physical
environment. This Social Environment has its own properties of interpersonal
dynamics which characterise people as a special kind of object, it also provides a
'Commentary' on the associated physical environment. Social Commentary is
significant in two ways: it can facilitate and accelerate the infant's cognitive and
physical development; and it can consolidate the associations that are being made in
such a way as to allow a profundity of appreciation, which may not develop in more
contingent development.
There are particular moments of intervention when Social Commentary
becomes especially effective and these are examined below as they arise. Obviously,
as the Social Environment is basically supported by the physical environment, its
operation must be congruent with the child's own changing Weltanschauung. This
operation will be quite different in the time-spaces of the neo-natal Initial State Device,
and the subjective universe of the 9 month old Language Acquisition Device.
The Social Environment of the Initial State Device amounts to the basic sensual
reflections, and associated phenomena, of the objective presence of the PC. Indeed, at
the earliest stages it may be very difficult to differentiate the internal stimuli
corresponding to caregiver presence from the innate or associated responses they
incur. An objective characterisation of the PC would be couched in terms of feeding,
care and familiarity from the neonatal period onward and it is the behavioural cognates
of these we should look for in search of evidence of a Social Environment present to
the infant. In other words, evidence of internalisation of the objective association
between feeding, etc. and PC presence.
There are various perceptual clues available to the Initial State Device relevant
to PC presence: smell; sound (e.g. of the Primary Caregiver's voice); Trevarthen
(1979: 333) cites evidence arguing for innate mechanisms aiding face recognition. If
these have become associated with the contentedness and alertness resulting from
feeding, care and attention inside the Initial State Device it is possible that some variety
of 2nd order conditioning occur, enabling PC presence itself to be a stimulus
triggering contentedness, alertness, and so on. Trevarthen (1987) notes various
3 2 The Assumption of a healthily operative social environment is another abstraction from the
variations of concrete reality. The mental dysfunctions which result from even everyday abuse or
neglect (for example, autism, phobias) are a subject for further research.
studies (pi84-5) which hint at such conditioning, noting "... a great sensitivity of the
infant's inner cerebral state of arousal or excitement to human attention" (pi84) and
that "consciousness within a maternal [sic.: read Primary Caregiver] maintenance and
holding" (pi85) is correlated to attitudes of motivation and learning in the infant.
On one level this is nothing more than a rigorous confirmation of the common-
sense prejudice that if you're nice to your baby, your baby will be happy. On another
level, we might say that PC presence, or the cluster of stimuli that are its
internalisation, comes to be a sensitising stimulus (just as we might say that the lack of
such a cluster becomes inhibitory). PC presence stimuli are associated with virtually
all types of cognitive activity from very soon after birth (Trevarthen (1987) goes
further to mention pre-natal communication33): feeding, care and especially play,
when the child is systematically challenged by its social and physical environments.
Henceforth this cluster of stimuli (note that this could include the smells and sounds,
say, of several people) will be referred to as PC presence; and PC presence will be
referred to as a 2nd order sensitising stimulus - 2nd order because there can be no
assumption of any hard wired sensitising operation as occurs in Aplysia (see above),
but that this sensitisation is a form of connection/association between inter-neurons.
So this generalised sensitising stimulus is the primary characteristic of the
Initial State Device's Social Environment. It is interesting to contrast its generality and
unity with the heterogeneity and isolation of the time-spaces of the physical
environment34. Given the amount of time the infant spends in different activities in
close PC presence, this is not surprising.
Several of Trevarthen's articles (e.gs 1979, 1987, 1990) follow the
development of this Social Environment over the first few months of life. Much of this
work is based on experimental observation of mother/infant dyads. Audiovisual
recording allows analysis of such subtle details as relative timing of gestures, or of
small actions which may otherwise go unperceived or unremembered. In other words,
a rigorous Piagetian methodology enhanced by the use of modern technology, and
Trevarthen himself makes this analogy (1979; p322, 331). However, Trevarthen's
richness of interpretation is a departure from Piaget's minimalism of hypothesis and
there is a consequent exaggeration of claims made for the Initial State Device.
'Pre-natal communication' seems to have little relevance to cognitive and affective
development - the young are socialised perfectly well by biologically unrelated and by non-female
PCs.
34 Indeed, one could almost say that the Social Environment is prior to the physical
environment in the infant's development.
'Prespeech' (1979), 'Innate intersubjectivity' (1987, 1990) and 'Protoconversation'
(1979; a term shared with Halliday (1975)) are all terms describing interpreted infant
behaviour within the first months of life.
Necessarily, given the infant's helplessness, activity in the first period is
limited mainly to interaction with a caregiver, i.e. within the Social Environment,
rather than with purely physical objects perceived as such. Much of this play has an
obvious function of expanding and strengthening the infant's physical abilities and its
attunement with the physical world - 'tig' or 'come here' games, 'walking' games,
various grasping and attention games. Trevarthen focuses on the purely social or
interpersonal aspects of infant play with the Primary Caregiver35.
Two quite startling features of this early interaction are indeed passed over by
Piaget, possibly due to his less technological observation apparatus, probably due to
his bias away from socialisation proper in favour of a solo 'young scientist' model of
cognitive development (see Vygotsky's criticism of Piaget in Vygotsky 1986). These
are the facility of facial imitation, especially of emotive expression, and the
'Protoconversation' conducted in 'Prespeech'. Both of these begin to occur around 6-
8 weeks.
Trevarthen seems to be anticipating later events in the behaviour of the Initial
State Device and thus, at a certain level, denying the reality of change. This continues
when Trevarthen asserts that these behaviours are not only early developers, but are
innate. It is important, for clarity of exposition if for nothing else, that entities which
are postulated to be biologically given, i.e. innate, must be (a) actually present at or
around birth36 and, more importantly, (b) accessible to a description in purely
biological terms. It is equally important not to anticipate in terminology the
development one is attempting to describe. Facial imitation and Protoconversation can
both be broken down into behaviours which require less hard-wiring.
On facial 'imitation': there are two relevant processes which we can fairly
uncontroversially describe as innate. Some primitive expression of emotion seems to
be innate - Darwin's celebrated (1872) work showed facial expression similarities
between human and various higher mammals (Trevarthen 1979 cites various cross-
cultural studies showing evidence for a "pan-human 'vocabulary' of human signs.").
Trevarthen uses "mother" throughout (see note 3).
36 In other words, I do not take entites which are the product of development, even if that
development may be purely 'biological' to be strictly innate.
Presumably there is some hardwired mechanism associating certain gross brainstates
with facial muscle activity37. Also, there does seem to be some innate reflex which
attracts the neo-nates attention to face-like patterns (Trevarthen 1979 p333 cites a range
of studies) - though I think this could only be described as 'face recognition' in the
same sense as the herring gull chick's tendency to peck at anything with a red spot on
it could be described as 'beak recognition'.
Infants under one month of age "mimic expressions of adults"38. It must be
stressed again that much of this time will be spent actively in the company of the PC.
Also, one can imagine that, in the infants life outside the laboratory and especially
around the times when the PC is getting tired, frustrated or angry, the infant will learn
to make rather accurate associations between the PC's expressions and its own internal
emotional states. 'Imitation' may be a secondary product of a more indirect chain of










'Prespeech' (e.g. Trevarthen 1979 p327) seems to be a similar rich
interpretation of the infant's behaviour - not only does the term itself imply that the
endpoint of development is already present in some way, but inferences about non-
behavioural states based on these ends of development are also made. For example,
Note that this animal hangover only really has effect on primitive humans (children,
mentally handicapped, social naifs). Like use of contraceptives and our 'drive to procreate', this
biologically determined factor of our behaviour is routinely over-ridden in advanced society - from
poker-faces in poker, through tics and fidgets of the repressed, to the formal anger of the actor.
Trevarthen 1979 p331.
"infants appear to express rudiments of intention to speak " (p327, emphasis added).
The behaviours observed are lip and tongue movements which "differ from adult
speech and are usually not voiced"; they "exist at birth" but become "much more
distinct by the second and third months" which is the period during which most of
Trevarthen's filming was done. The movements appear to occur at times of face-to-
face communication (especially during episodes of excitement) with a Primary
Caregiver. It seems just as adequate to interpret this activity as a special case of 'facial
imitation'. Another thing to note about this period is that the infant is not a calm and
still body as a rule, especially when active. The 'motor restlessness' that Piaget (1956)
comments upon is general. This oral activity may happen to be functionally preparing
the infant for speech but it is not necessarily part of some pre-existing speech-Schema
already.
2.4.5 Assimilation between Schemata.
From around 3 months changes are noted in the infant's behaviour (e.g.
Trevarthen 1987 pi88 - "Gradually the mother falls from almost the only attractive
event in experience ..."). The increasing strength of the child's body is accompanied
by an extension of the scope of its restlessness - which up to now had been limited to
'wriggling', lip movements and facial 'imitation'. The child will now begin to move
around a little of its own, always under the watch of the PC, and this broader activity
will enable important new associations about the Device's physical environment
(external and internal).
Associations in the internal environment will be primarily in the sense of
proprioception. The Sensori-motor reflexes will now be much more active and
challenged and it is this period which establishes associations amounting to senses of
balance, orientation and a 'self-awareness of the body' (i.e. knowing where your arms
are without having to look)39. A second associative development is that between
prehension and things seen. Much of this will indeed be encouraged by proprioceptive
development - the presence of the child's own body parts in its own visual field - but
also accidental collision with foreign objects will inspire association between certain
interruptions of the visual field and tactile shock.
39 It may be interesting to look at how prison babies may be affected by their lack of
opportunities in this period - cockroach infested playrooms confining the child mainly to its cot; (See
Guardian reports Mar/Apr 1992).
Reflexes and Schemata are being associated together and new Schemata are
being formed. In terms of the physical environment(s) the infant inhabits, the local
time-spaces are grouping in larger units, and as proprioception develops time-spaces
may incorporate non-contiguous parts of the child's body (e.g. the time-space for a
crawling Schema may incorporate limb extremities and a constructed 'centre-of-
gravity'). Schemata may also begin to cross modalities: the new grasping Schemata
will associate sensations from visual and prehensile input, where earlier grasping
actions were apparently insensible to visual stimuli and only responsive to local tactile
stimuli: for example the hand would grasp when palm was touched (Piaget 1953 Ch.
1).
The tendency here is obviously toward an internalisation of space-time which
incorporates together the child's whole body as well as associating across all
modalities. This is a long way off, however. There have been no behavioural changes
implying a move away from the activity specificity of the Schemata, so there is no
cause for Schemata which are not associating strongly to overcome their heterogeneity
- the child's environment is still fragmented.
One important development is that of something we might call 'Attention'. At
the earliest period of development (Piaget's Stages I & II) Schemata are largely
reflexes, that is their state of activity is automatic or continuous - given excitation in
sufficient part of the Schema the rest will activate. Consequently the state of the
internal environment (e.g. hunger, body temperature) has a strong influence on
behaviour. In this slightly later period of development, reflexes are less dominant as a
determinant of activity - the child's internal environment is more stable and its
regulation is not such a constant stimulus. Attention may be used to describe the
resolution of 'competition' between several Schemata which may all be compatible
with the Device's current state. Some Schemata may of course be activated
concurrently, but for those which may not it seems simplest to propose that the
Schema most fitting with the Device's present state will be the one activated. Notice
that this model of Attention neither presupposes nor requires Intention or
Consciousness of any meaningful kind40, in fact no level of awareness higher than the
Schemata themselves. Attention does not require a Self.
Much cognitive dissonance may be caused at this stage by these conflicting
Schemata, where later this dissonance may result in anxiety, here it is just as likely to
result in abrupt breaks in Attention (still a fragile and undirected thing). Another
40 The unit may even be asleep.
consequence of the general expansion of Schemata is that earlier perceived regularities
may now suddenly become irregular, alternatively, irregularities which were beyond
comprehension are making new associations difficult. Although an Associative
mechanism may have little trouble with irregularities (they just won't be associated
together), a group of events which demonstrate regularity on an irregular or apparently
random basis may be a source of anxiety - associations constantly being built and
destroyed.
An instance of this unpredictable regularity might occur with the newly
forming associations between prehension and sight. Specifically, some interruptions
of the visual field will regularly accompany tactile shock and some won't, in other
words the appreciation of distance, of something being 'out of reach' will begin here
(Piaget 1955). This appreciation can build 'naturally' as it does with animals, through
interaction with the physical world, but the human infant's Social Environment
increasingly has a Commentary function.
It is noteworthy that while the physical environment is a fragmentary collection
of 'locations', the Social Environment is the one uniting influence. PC presence has
been identified as a generalised sensitising stimulus (see above) - activity may be
physically no different, but it is primarily within this enabling environment that
cognitive growth occurs. Thus, the Social Environment acts as a 'flag', delimiting a
portion of the physical environment as available for constructive 'Play'. This function
is initially merely enabling, we shall see that as the Physical Environment becomes
more complex, the Play Area increasingly becomes a simplified bubble of reality in
which the infant is guided to make inferences.
2.4.6 Subjective Space-time.
The merging and growth of reflexes and Schemata is a process of quantitative
change, leading eventually to qualitative differences in the relations of Schemata to
each other and in the coherence of the phenomenal 'world' which the child inhabits.
Previously, individual time-spaces were more-or-less completely separate and
unassociated. Local reflexes like suck/swallow, grasp, etc. would expand their
localities through experience - for example the directional adjustments, reminiscent (to
an observer) of a 'search', when a milk teat touches the infant's cheek. As the infant
moves away from immediate and constant PC care (up to midway through the first
year), localities are associated which may earlier not have been involved in salient or
comparable Schemata. For example, experience of balance and crawling about will
associate distal body parts and construct virtual locations like Centre of Gravity. A
location in terms of the time-spaces is not necessarily a single bounded area, nor even
a 'real place' at all (c.f. phantom limbs, and so on, Sacks (1985), for the subjective
reality of 'locations').
While inhabiting the time-spaces, 'activity' as a concept is almost subsumed
under the automatic life process of the locations. The action of the grasp reflex is
similar in its automaticity to the retraction of Aplysia's gills; and even slightly more
developed Schemata like suck/swallow are triggered and moderated almost entirely by
Schema internal processes. "Behaviour" is probably a better term than 'activity'.
This picture becomes harder to maintain when Schemata begin to associate
across modalities: for example vision and prehension, more generally directional
focusing and attention attracted by sound or touch. The 'distance' between modalities
is of a higher order than that between areas of the body - in an external sense and also
in an internal/neural sense in that the modes come into the brain from different
'entrances' and can only communicate through quite substantial intervening layers of
interneurons (Nauta & Feirtag 1979).Internalisation of cross-modal regularity may
require quite a lengthy chain of connection. The possibility of 'accidental' or 'weak'
associations being made is much greater than with associations within a single mode.
A corollary to this may be the generation of Schemata which are equipped to
liaise between other Schemata, or which themselves provide stimuli for Schemata. For
example, the process of focusing attention outlined above may cohere into an attention
Schema; this kind of Schema develops associations between other Schemata. As an
effect of this the time-spaces in which Schemata operate become associated.
Association between Schemata, which by now may be disparately located, cross-
modal, or inter-Schematic, is the precursor to the association and eventual synthesis of
time-spaces. This homogenising tendency allows us to describe the collection of
Schemata as belonging to some unified whole.
Though the infant may inhabit a single space-time, as long as the Schemata are
still separate and organised around situated behaviours, then this space-time is
contingent on activity, and is only generalised to the extent that whole body activity is
general. The advance of general proprioceptive awareness in the second half of the
year helps to concrete this unitary nature. Piaget (1955) calls this "Subjective space
and time". Subjective Space-time is properly not described as Egocentric.
Egocentricity implies a structuring or prioritising of data with regard primarily to a
Self. There is no evidence that a Self has developed at this stage. Subjectivity implies
that the structuring and prioritising of data is primarily due to properties of the subject
- the organism as a whole - rather than of the object(s) with which it deals (i.e. the
physical world itself).
The internalisation of Subjective Space-time is constantly reproduced by the
communication between Schemata that increasingly occurs. Subjective Space-time can
be thought of as a network (an intranet?) in which each Schemata has an address
(actually a cluster of addresses). We return to the general implications of this mode of
cognitive organisation; first we examine the particular case of vocal behaviour.
2.4.7 Early vocal behaviour.
It is during the second half of the first year that vocal behaviour begins to take
on some of the properties of speech. Vocal behaviour evident even in the neonate
seems to embody two separate functions - the social and the biological. Individual
tokens of vocal behaviour may increasingly show different mixtures of these functions
but it is important to show that the two root causes are quite specific. Only by doing
this can we really determine the contributions of society and biology to cognitive
development.
In the neonatal period all vocal behaviour is reflexive and/or vegetative. That
is, the behaviour is (i) a vocal component of some reflexive expression of affect - for
example crying or 'fussing' noises or; (ii) an 'accidental' feature of some action
involved in eating or respiration - for example burp, swallow, spit, gasp noises41.
Such behaviours are characterised as being biologically caused (i.e. embodying
biological function) - shared in common with animals and having no social content.
Interestingly, Stark (1979) notes that "From 12 weeks of age, the frequency of
crying drops markedly and in most infants primitive vegetative sounds begin to
disappear" (p26), implying that later socially oriented or induced behaviour replaces
those more biologically based, rather than merely supplementing them. Biologically
based behaviours may thus lose their very identity through this replacement - not only
do biologically based vocal behaviours disappear, but most of the neonate's innate
behavioural vocabulary in general is quite short lived. Normal adults do not
41 Phonological descriptions will not concern us greatly here, apart from broad trends of
development: for example increasing complexity of the signal, or approximation to the PC language.
See Stark (1979) for details.
communicate happiness by giggling, for example (it is significant in itself that an adult
will more often communicate than express an affective state).
Stark notes cooing and laughter behaviours making an appearance a little later
(cooing first noted after around 8 weeks, laughter around 16 weeks). These 'comfort'
sounds are located in "comfortable states usually in response to smiling and talking on
the part of the mother" (p24). Trevarthen's article published at the same time (1979)
claims that "Neonates coo weekly [sic], often when alone. When coos become clear
and strong in the second month, adults find them pleasing" (p325). These are two
interpretations of the same observation: namely that a number of weak vocal
articulations become more pronounced and coherent in the third month of life.
However, their implicative forces are quite different, embodying different assumptions
about development in general.
Stark's article concentrates on the phonetic changes in vocal behaviour, social
and biological forces of changes are kept distinct in her exposition and she seems
primarily concerned with the latter - the stress is on measurement of physical changes
in the vocal tract. The above quote is one of only three references to social 'moments'
in the child's vocal development (also p29, 30 on babble in imitation and play). Her
focus on describing innovations in vocal behaviour and her technique of explaining
these innovations as facilitated by material innovations in the vocal tract allows an
implicitly constant function of Piagetian Motor Restlessness to drive the change. This
effectively avoids requirements of intention on the part of the infant. This focus also
allows Stark to avoid having to build functional vocabularies of the child's behaviours
at different stages of development, and speculating as to how these stages relate.
In contrast, there is a strand in Trevarthen's work which seems to conflate
social and biological moments, with a tendency to look for proto-forms of later
behaviour in that of the infant or neo-nate - and ultimately to postulate their innateness
(in the sense of being present at birth, or in the stronger sense of being "formed before
birth" (1979: 326)).
When cooing is weak it is an indistinct part of the neonate's vocal motor
restlessness and receives associations, confirmation, whatever, only as part of this
biological, animal program. When cooing is part of the Play Area it becomes
functionally different: it is possible that cooing noises are innately correlated with
internal states of satisfaction but now they express this state to others - they are
extemalisations. This is not yet communication, it is an external correlate of an internal
state of affairs. The behaviour then becomes part of the Social Environment, largely
through the intervention of Caregivers, and the forces which act upon the coo Schema
are different: earlier biological regularities give way to confirmations and associations
from the Social Environment.
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More social motivation of vocal behaviour begins during the period of coherent
Subjective Space-time. This period, during which the infant begins to explore the
objective world (the initial period of distal time-spaces is one of internal cohesion), is
also a period in which play with the Caregiver is more oriented toward objects. During
this second four months contact between infant and Caregiver is mediated by objects -
the physical environment of the child is being enlarged. Just as important, contact
between the infant and objects is mediated by the caregiver: already nature is being
mediated by society, and exploration of the new physical environment takes place
within the commentary space of the Play Area.
Vocal behaviour up to around 9 months consists largely of vocal play and
'babble'. These two behaviours correspond to (a) vocal play: an exploration, via
motor restlessness, of the growing vocal apparatus, concentrating on variety and
shorter utterances; and (b) babble: imitation of the apparent ubiquity of speech sounds.
These babble utterances tend to be longer but less rich; examples might be
/@d@d@/42, /adada/. Phonological details need not concern us, other than to point
out that there is a general trend toward the production of salient sound patterns of the
Social Environment.
Vocal behaviour, especially babble, is fast becoming a constant
accompaniment to activity. Babble is present even when the infant is engrossed in
solitary activity, suggesting that a tripartite association may be developing between
Speech, Society and (Directed) Activity. However, there is no evidence that Speech is
yet communicative or referential, or even cognised as a separate behaviour (other than
in the motor restlessness of vocal play). Communicative intent and reference is
importantly imposed by the Caregiver. Vocal behaviour is still part of the concrete
internalisation of situated behaviour that is the Schema.
2.4.8 The Vocable.
While vocal behaviour is not intentionally meaningful in itself at this stage in
the child's development (up to the end of the first year), neither is it entirely
homogeneous or random in its application. Sounds are experienced as part of the
42 '@' should be taken to represent the Schwa vowel.
child's environments and tend to be associated with the situations with which they
appear most regularly. Through internalisation sounds become a part of certain
Schemata - though there is no reason why one sound should not be in more than one
Schema or why one Schema should not contain more than one sound. The sounds
internalised will be those heard or produced with regularity, but not necessarily with
intention. Non-human sounds may be internalised, especially at early stages. The
sounds are not likely to be phonologically accurate at this point: as child behaviour
suggests (e.g. Stark 1986) - the child only gradually moves toward the sounds
specific to the Social Environment from a vague exploration of its vocal capacities. But
as always with intemalisation, it is strongest for the most salient sounds of a situation.
Biological or animal motivation, from the physical environment, is present at
birth and comes in the form of vocal components of innate behaviours, for example
affective expressions, or of 'accidental' sonorant effects of other behaviours. Gasps
and burps associated with eating are an example. 'Imitation' in the sense defined
above may also occur, so that the infant may produce as well as appreciate many
sounds. Sounds associated with play and other such situations will be internalised in
the same manner. Naturally occurring sound and socially produced sound (i.e.
language) are both at this stage internalised in the same way. That is, the association
internalised is that of a physical regularity - between occurrence of a sound and of
some physical state of affairs.
Motivation from the Social Environment begins slightly later, around two to
three months, when the child is beginning to move around away from the mother and
the Play Area gets a little more complicated. The greater involvement of language in
these games (on the part of the Caregiver) is only a quantitative step from earlier
experience, which placed speech with other sounds in the physical environment.
However, this period also often sees speech begin to act under the Commentary
function of the Social Environment.
Initial developments of this kind are Trevarthen's "Protoconversation" (e.g.
Trevarthen 1987: 186f and citations therein), which consist of purely musical
exchanges encapsulating the idea of turn-taking in dialogue or in a game. "The
mother's speech takes the form of short (500-700 msec.) one- to three- syllable
utterances, with clear, rather breathy voicing and marked intonation. It appears as if
she uses falling-rising (U-shaped) prosody to invite infant response, and falling tone
to acknowledge or 'sympathise with' an infant utterance" (pl87). Consciously or not,
the Caregiver (Trevarthen's "mother") is helping the child to identify two types of
behaviour by associating them with distinct vocal sequences. Although the child is
apparently taking part in a question and answer dialogue, there is no semantic content
to the infant's utterances and there is no linguistic communication. The child is
however beginning to internalise and imitate behaviours present in the Social
Environment.
A further important step from around three months is the Caregiver's practice
of singing nursery rhymes and lullabies to the child. If one can historicise away from
the very Eurocentric and 'happy nuclear family' image of nursery rhymes, these
games show a very particular function which is mirrored by similar games in various
cultures (see Jahoda & Lewis 1986). The situation generally consists of highly
differentiated language, focusing on very little activity. "Mother's songs are typically
made up of simple verses, usually of four lines, lasting 10-15 seconds. They follow a
beat interval centred on moderato and ranging from about 750 msec (andante) to about
450 msec (allegro). Lines of the song have regular changes of pitch that raise and
lower the expectation of a listener/actor. The ending may be a dramatic climax with
mock aggressive or mock surprise tone" (Trevarthen 1987: 189). An example is the
iambic tetrameter in Figure 2.12.
Figure 2.12: The iambic tetrameter.
. Round and round the gar- . -den,
. like a ate- -ddy bear.
. one step two . step,
a tick- -ly un- -der there !
The highly emphasised rhythm and music of the language, and especially the
fact that language itself is often the focus of activity, as in the nursery rhymes, brings
speech further into the Commentary space of the Social Environment. Speech is being
highlighted as an important feature of activity, and as an activity important and
playable in itself.
It is in this period, and after, that vocal play begins in earnest. Vocal clusters
produced from 16 to 30 weeks (Stark 1979, 1986) are longer, more complex (i.e.
composed of more segments) and of more varied articulation than previous
biologically based utterances. It is interesting that, as this socially motivated vocal play
develops, vegetative sounds like crying, gasps and burps begin to disappear. The
implication is that the phonetic properties of these utterances drifts towards the
phonetic properties highlighted, or 'licensed', by the Social Environment: and so the
child's phonological vocabulary begins to drift toward that of its native culture (see
also Carter 1979: 89f).
As Subjective Space-time coheres in the period after 4 months, the associations
between sounds and situations become more particular: specific situations will develop
specific vocal associations. But while the child's cognition is Schematic, vocal
behaviour is contingent on activation of Schemata; in other words, Schemata begin to
show vocal properties. Vocal properties of some Schemata may be internalisations
from the neo-natal period: for instance, developments from vegetative sounds. Others
may be 'taken' from the Social Environment in the sense that those vocal clusters
which are regular contributions to a situation on the part of an interlocutor may tend to
associate with the Schema more strongly than with the speaker. In this case they will
be internalised as a property of the Schema (rather than of the speaker). Thenceforth,
the sounds may occur as a response to the presence of the Schema, as an indicator, or
as a stimulus for activation of the Schema.
That these vocal clusters are 'taken' rather than 'given' emphasises that,
although the source of these vocalisations may be the Social Environment, the
particular sounds internalised by the child can be quite idiosyncratically chosen. In
other words, the fragment of sound selected and internalised by the child, although a
regular property of the Schema, may not be the fragment of sound considered by the
adult interlocutor to be most apt to the situation. This is merely a special case of the
child's general process of subjective and concrete internalisation. The adult and the
child inhabit fundamentally different phenomenological worlds: the adult may perceive
an objective situation, the child is inside a subjective Schema. Thus a vocal string of
some specificity may become a component of a subjective Schema. Henceforth I'll use
the term Vocable to refer to these vocal components of Schemata (after Werner &
Kaplan 1963, Carter 1979).
Vocables show more stability and regularity (in terms of correlation with a
situational context) than babble, but don't yet show any explicit communicative
intention (Carter 1979, Dore et al. 1976). Carter's diary study (of a child named
David) identifies 8 Vocable Schemata each located around a consonantal focus: in
Figure 2.13 (Carter's Table 1) certain segments are strongly associated with certain
types of behaviour.
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Figure 2.13: Simplified description of David's eight communicative
Schemata in the period 12 to 16 months43.
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In the case, for example, of the [m]-based cluster, an 'anticipation of feeding'
based Vocable (p90) has been generalised to associate with Schemata falling under the
rubric 'Request Object' (RO). This generalisation is not a process of abstraction from
individual elements, but is a process of 'concretion' isomorphic with the process of
Schema building. An important element of the RO Vocable's construction may be an
association of Schemata sharing a functionally similar 'anticipation of desired object'
component (or something similar). This association is reinforced by the presence of
related features of reach gestures and [m]-based vocal clusters. In the first stage of
association, Schemata with any of these features will be associated (the more strongly
the more features); in the second stage of concretion, associated Schemata will begin
to assume new features more central to the RO Vocable. Carter notes "a definitive
correspondence ... exerted by the sound of an adult word over its initial functional
correspondence (upon incorporation of an imitative fragment of this word)" (p86-7).
So accidental features of a situation (the sound of a word) are still being used to
internalise that situation (in the sense of place it within a cluster of Schemata).
An important development here is the appearance of superordinate structures
(i.e. the Vocables) 'above' the individual subjective Schemata. These superordinate
structures are actually associations of features attributed to the individual Schemata;
but their association tends to concrete them together and to dissociate the cluster
somewhat from the Schema. This occurs in much the same way as Localities
associated, cohered and dissociated from reflexes (see 2.4.6 above). This particular
example of Vocables shows the beginnings of the dissociation of language, but the
process is quite general.
2.4.9 Play.
Perhaps a more decisive influence on the dissociation of Schemata is the
child's experience of play in this period. The important functions of play have been
pointed out at several points (2.4.5, 2.4.8). Towards year end, hide-seek games
encourage the child's developing sense of permanency (Piaget 1955).
Initially the neo-nate shows no expectancy of object permanence, for example
there are no attempts to search for disappeared objects. At first, removal of an object
(e.g. a teat which the child had been sucking) results in the child repeating its 'part' in
the situation (e.g. repeating sucking actions). This could most simply be interpreted as
an effort to recover the situation by reactivating the Schema, with the expectation that
the rest of the Schema should also be reactivated (see 2.4.3 on the atomic nature of
reflexes and early Schemata). There is no comprehension that the infant's behaviour
must interact with external objects. If the situation is not recovered and the Schema
cannot be reactivated, anxiety ensues, but there are no more complex or externally
aware attempts at recovery.
Later (2 months) a child will stare at the place an object was last seen, the place
it disappeared from, again in 'expectation' of its return; and when the child becomes
more mobile it can crawl over and examine the location. This latter step is the first
instance of procedures similar to those of the search and, indeed, search procedures
will tend to develop as an association grows between certain explorative behaviours
and recovery of Schema. Search develops before a consciousness of the search, just
as attention developed before intention. This step toward the search is tentative and
rather fragile - contingent on success - and it is by no means certain that search
behaviour proper, let alone an idea of the permanence of objects, will develop if the
child is left alone to discover it for itself. The Social Environment is very important
here.
Hide-seek games, in the socially licensed Play Area, provide a simplified and
highly regular environment in which to find out about and develop one's own ideas of
object permanence. The Caregiver makes sure that the child's attention has been
secured, that the disappearance of the object is clearly announced, and that its recovery
(by either the child or the Caregiver) is highly salient - and occurs before the child has
lost interest. The idea enforced is that the permanence of objects is something very
regular, and something of which to be conscious. As powerfully as the appearance of
Vocable Schemata (2.4.8), this consciousness may begin the decomposition of the
subjective Schema.
2.4.10 Complexes.
Although the Subjective Space-time which has developed is strongly coherent,
the Schemata within it are transient and are almost immediately being decomposed
from two directions.
Firstly: each time a Schema is played, it will be appreciated slightly differently
- adding information and making the internalisation yet more concrete. This
enrichment of the Schema's internal structure will tend to create foci of concretion
which will mirror certain objective qualities of the child's experience. The commentary
of the Social Environment reinforces this tendency, and guides it in a socially licensed
direction. Focus of attention on certain objects, events and relations during play, and
especially during the establishment of permanence, promote examination and
investigation of the object itself. For example, the figure of a toy played with in
give/take games may begin to attain a measure of identity within the Schema. It seems
plausible that properties of the toy will tend to associate more strongly with other of its
own properties than with other properties of the play situation. This tendency will be
enhanced by the activity of the Social Environment, which will generally label
instances of functionally similar items with the same word. This the Socially licensed
word becomes an anchor around which internalisations can cohere.
Secondly: Schemata competing for attention will associate if this conflict is
regular. For example, this may involve similar Localities being stimulated and drawing
the Schemata into conflict (see 2.4.6 & the emergence of a coherent whole-body
locality). As the first wave of concretion progresses, this conflict will tend to involve
Schema-internal foci of concretion more often than other internal portions of
Schemata. The foci of concretion within each conflicting Schema are beginning to
associate together. For example, figures of a toy in different Schemata may 'remind'
the infant of one another, as toy events may stimulate several Schemata. In the same
way figures of Caregiver(s) begin to cohere. These new agglomerations are termed
Complexes after Vygotsky (1986).
These processes are illustrated diagramatically in Figure 2.14 below (from
Uemlianin 1994).
The first wave of concretion allows the second, and by around 9 months of
age associations between Schema-internal foci are strong enough to challenge the
integrity of the Schemata. The organisation of cognition around situated behaviour is
beginning to cohabit with an incipient organisation around independently existing
Complexes. However, the decomposition of Schemata seems to be piecemeal,
contingent on particular experience (i.e. there is not a switch between logical forms),
and Complexive cognition can by no means replace Schematic cognition immediately.
This period, from around 9 months to year end is noted as one of special
anxiety in the developmental psychology literature. Particularly interesting is the return
to a reliance on the Primary Caregiver's function as a sensitising stimulus.
"Psychoanalysts (Klein, Mahler) note a separation of the infant's more individuated
self from the mother, which brings a risk of anxious depression or a fear of isolation.
There begins a 'fierce' attachment to the mother, good attachments leading to confident
learning about the world (Spitz, Bowlby, Ainsworth)" (Trevarthen 1987: 193). For
the moment I'll take this growth of a sense of separation from the Caregiver as a
development in the child's Complexive cognition, rather than a development of a sense
of self especially, as Trevarthen does. One can imagine that the Primary Caregiver(s)
presence would be a very early focus of concretion inside Schemata, and one which
would associate with similar foci in many Schemata, providing a rich and clear
Complex. Again, the 'Self may be a special case of Complexive cognition. We'll
return to it below.





Complexes of associated elements, which 'precipitate out' from the collection
of Schemata in Subjective Space-time, dominate the child's cognitive behaviour for the
next period, including that of the acquisition of lexical items and early grammar.
Unlike the Schema, the Complex is independent of situation and in this sense
approaches the Notions of adult language (see 2.3). However, it must be stressed that
Complexes are pre-linguistic and are thus guided by the Social Environment to a much
lesser degree. The content of the Complex is subjectively and concretely assembled,
and this has significant consequences for its domain of extension.
Complexes will tend to internalise the most salient components of the child's
experience. These components will be those most encountered in many situations; they
will often be the most 'objective' or external to the child (i.e. easy to investigate);
possibly the most 'socialised' (i.e. labelled as interesting by the caregiver(s)).
The Syncretic nature of the Complex's construction is a move away from the
more immediate and concrete mode of construction of the Schema. The move from an
organisation based on properties of the child's own behaviour towards one based
around properties of some salient feature in the environment - however subjectively
appreciated - is a move toward more objective thought. An example from Vygotsky
(1986) may help illustrate. Vygotsky's famous block experiments were an attempt to
show aspects of the child's thinking, and their development, in a concentrated form; as
an accompaniment to naturalistic study.
The subject45 is shown a collection of wooden blocks of different sizes,
shapes and colours. Each is labelled on the underside with a nonsense syllable - for
example lag on large and tall blocks; cev on small flat ones. The subject is given a
wooden block from the pile, is shown and read the name, and is asked to collect
together the blocks which are of the same type. After the subject has done so, they are
shown and read the name of one of the 'wrongly' selected blocks and asked to
continue trying {op. cit. pl03f).
44 It is not entirely clear, from a reading of Vygotsky (1986), what relation Vygotskyan
Complexes are intended to bear to the emotional Complexes of Sigmund Freud, and in this thesis no
relation shall be assumed. Although Vygotsky's work is apparently purely cognitive, Piaget and
Freud are strongly associated in his critical chapters (ppl2-58). A Marxist critique of Freudian
psychology, developing the theoretical foundations of Vygotsky and Voloshinov (1927) would be an
ideal sister study to the present work.
45 "More than three hundred" subjects were examined, including "children, adolescents and
adults, including some with pathological disturbances of intellectual and linguistic activities"
(Vygotsky 1986: 195).
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The experiment, though quite simple, models several different stages of the
child's response - "the initial attack on the problem; the handling of the sample;
response to correction; and finding the solution" - all of which can be studied with
some clarity of definition. The Social Environment is also represented in the gradual
introduction of clues. Vygotsky and his associates found that the ways young children
brought together sets of blocks reflected Schematic and (in slightly more developed
children) Complexive ways of thinking.
The Schematic methods of the younger children focus on properties of the
activity of collecting the objects. Selection may be apparently at random, or perhaps
based on "the spatial position of the experimental objects, i.e., by a purely Syncretic
organisation of the child's visual field ... or [on] their being brought into some other
more complex relation by the child's immediate perception" (pill). After a transitional
period, when the child chooses items based on elements included in groups already
formed in the above manner, selection moves more solidly onto a basis on properties
of the objects themselves, i.e., into Complexive thinking.
Early Complexes "may be based on any bond the child notices between the
sample object and some other blocks ... the child may add one block to the nuclear
object because it is of the same colour, another because it is similar to the nucleus in
shape or in size, or in any other attribute that happens to strike him. Any bond
between the nucleus and another object suffices to make the child include that object in
the group ... The bond between the nucleus and the other object need not be a
common trait, such as the same colour or shape; a similarity, a contrast, or proximity
in space may also establish the bond" (pi 13-4). At the early stage of these
'Associative' Complexes new objects are merely reminiscences of the nucleus, more
recent additions making no impact on its content46. This is not an abstraction of certain
46 'Nucleus' here should be taken to mean prior in a simply historical sense. In fact, 'prior' or
'primary' may be a better term.
The English translation of Vygotsky (1986), by Eugenia Hanfmann and Gertrude Vakar in
1962, has been criticised for its oversimplification and loss of subtlety of Vygotsky's ideas.
Hanfmann & Vakar intended to produce a more compact work than the Russian original, retaining
Vygotsky's actual proposals, but editing out much of the complexity of his argumentation and losing
his relationship with the cultural problems of the day. As Phillips (1986) puts it, "adjustments and
contractions by the translators have undoubtedly made for a more direct approach; but they have, at the
same time, prevented the reader from following the true - and sometimes deviating - trend of
Vygotsky's thought" (p32).
For example, the Russian title "Myshljenie i rech' " is more accurately translated as
"Thinking and speech" and reflects the concern with activity in Vygotsky's work. The more passive
"Thought and Language" is a translation of "Mysf i jazyk", the title of an earlier work by Potjebnja
(Potjebnja 1913) with which Vygotsky had been in debate.
properties from a set, however: 'tokens' of the Complex may be reminiscent of the
nucleus in any way. Neither is it an abstraction over time - the child is comparing each
new experience with the original highly salient example. The child is still close enough
to Schematic thinking that the manner of appreciation of an object (e.g. naming by the
Social Environment versus discovery for itself) can affect its salience and thus the
degree to which it is remembered beyond the particular encounter.
More developed Complexive thinking allows the reminding tokens themselves
to have an imprint on the Complex, as each object encountered becomes as salient as
the nuclear object. This is a further move toward the object, away from the child's
own activity. In the example of a 'Chain' Complex (pi 16): " ... if the experimental
sample is a yellow triangle, the child might pick out a few triangular blocks until his
attention is caught by the blue colour of a block he has just added; he switches to
collecting blue blocks of any shape - angular, circular, semicircular. This in turn is
sufficient to change the criterion again; oblivious of colour the child begins to choose
rounded blocks. The decisive attribute keeps changing during the entire process. There
is no consistency in the type of bonds or in the manner in which a link in the chain is
joined with the one that precedes and the one that follows it. The original sample has
no central significance. Each link, once included in a chain Complex, is as important
as the first and may become the magnet for a series of other objects."
These experiments abstract away from the child's natural activity and its Social
Environment, but it is clear that the child's mode of thinking is drifting towards a kind
of taxonomy of independent items. Before the child begins to use language to
accompany its thinking it is difficult to locate any of these items other than the kinds of
object Complexes identified in experiments like those above; for example, Complexes
which may internalise relations between objects or types of event.
Complexes may bear a superficial resemblance to the Family Resemblances of
Wittgenstein (1953: %66-72) and Vygotsky (1934/1986) addresses this similarity in
passing (pl05). The essential difference seems to be that Wittgenstein's Family
Resemblances are a critique of pseudo-concepts as they exist in society, as objects of
contemplation. Keenan's universal definition of Subject (2.2) is of this type, where
elements of an already existing group of objects are examined for their inter-relations.
The similarities between family members are objective and accessible to verification.
Vygotsky's Complexes are in the first place describing different objects - not
pseudo-concepts which have a social existence but Complexes which are unique in the
mind of the child (or the unsocialised adult). Thus the links between members are not
objective and socially accessible, but subjective and contingent on the child's
individual experience, analysis of which is not always socially accessible. Finally
Vygotsky's stress is on construction of the Complex rather than reference to it, and the
associations between elements are the motor of Complexive growth.
Of course there may be an isomorphism, and one may be tempted to reduce the
difference to one of scale - Family Resemblances being Complexes on the scale of an
unconsciously developing culture. Vygotsky briefly discusses how Complexive
thinking may relate to language change (pl30-133).
2.4.11 Towards holophrastic speech.
The child's Vocables (2.4.8) are profoundly affected by this shift from
Schematic to Complexive cognition. As noted above Vocables were vague congeries
of sound attracted around a nucleus of an initial consonant (see Fig. 2.13 above).
These Vocables would accompany some situation or activity more in a sense of being
a feature of that situation than a conscious effort to communicate by the child. For
instance, they are a vocal corollary of the reach gesture before it becomes a point: it
starts in the child as a simple feature of the situation; it is understood by the Caregivers
as an indication and thenceforth treated as a sign of that situation; the child will later
internalise this special effect of the gesture (i.e. it's own reach can become the reach of
the Social Environment).
So, the Caregivers impute significance to these Vocables. The effect of this, in
general terms, is that outlined in 2.4.9 and 10 above, of a concentration in that area of
the Schema, the formation of a focus of association and the beginning of definition
independent of the Schema. Sound will decompose from Schemata in the same way as
other features of Schemata are doing during this period (around year end).
The special thing about the dissociation of sound from the Schema is that its
dissociation is of a secondary order. Whereas objects, Caregiver and so on are items
in their own right, sound is generally associated by the Social Environment with some
other feature of the situation - either a transaction between child and Caregiver, an
object of play, something the child or the caregiver is doing, etc. So, Vocables do not
become Complexes of their own, they become features of other Complexes.
Two examples from Carter (1979) show this happening. In Figure 2.15 below
(after Carter's figs 1 & 2) David's Vocables graduate from being a vocal component of
gesture to a number of more varied communicative signals at the 'final' stage of 2
years and 10 days. The Attention to Object Schema (Fig. 2.15b) begins with the
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alveolar-initial morpheme accompanying a reaching or pointing gesture. During the
intervening year the concretion of subtly different situations, clarified by commentary
from the Social Environment, has generated vocal corollaries for attracting attention to
immediate, proximal and distal objects.
Figure 2.15: Development of Vocables.
(a): Verbal developments in the Request Object Schema47.
Play sessions
1 (1 ;0;20)









See also Carter (1975).
[m]-initial morpheme + object reach












alveolar ([1] or [d])- initial + point or show
look object [diyz] [dis] [di], [diy] [dat] [da@r]
names these this the that there
Imitation plays a part here, and although the imitation is still very much on the
child's terms, the Social Environment has much more power than before to determine
exactly which associations are made. The subject-oriented Vocables of Figure 2.13 are
based largely on earlier reflexive and effort sounds. The process of Schematic
concretion, however, is based on the sound properties of actual situations, which are
often provided by the Social Environment. This early contribution of the Social
Environment is limited in the sense that salience is very much attracted by initial
consonant (and other phonetic factors are rather poorly noted) and relevance to the
Schema.
As the child moves over to more object oriented Complexive cognition its
sounds associate more strongly with specific items or events within situations.
Primarily this means that the contribution of the Social Environment has a much more
focused effect. The variety of phonetic inputs associated with, for instance a toy doll,
will be much more limited than those inputs associated with the whole situation of
'Attention to Object'; this variety is also more likely to be systematic and easily
internalised - doll, dolly, baby i.e. a small set of synonyms.
48 See also Carter (1978a).
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So a Complex has sound, and this sound is the connection that Complex has
with the Social Environment, and the abstract concepts there (see 2.3).The sound, the
Vocable component, is the route of translation, or mediation, between the child's
cognitive world and that of the Social Environment.
The child's early speech consists of single word or 'holophrastic' utterances
(see 2.2.1.1, p46, n20). The use of these 'Complex morphemes' begins from around
12 months and into the second year.
Holophrastic utterances tend to vocalise the most salient Complex involved in
the situation at hand. Holophrases may be vying for attention in the same way that
Schemata were in competition in Subjective Space-time - the most stimulated being
activated at the expense of the others. Alternatively, Complexes may still be bound
loosely into Schematic patterns until fully object-oriented cognition is strong enough to
take over completely.
In either case the child's utterances vocalise events or items with which the
child is most intimately occupied. The following example (Figure 2.16) shows Allison
Bloom characterising the situation(s) she is involved in with some Complexive
versions of the adult prepositions down and up. More examples of her and others'
verbal behaviours is examined in 2.5 and Ch. 3.
Figure 2.16: Allison Bloom up and down.
%act: <lw> picking doll up
*ALI: baby.
*MOT: oh, where's the baby?
*ALI : up.
%act: <lw> picks up doll, bouncing it
*ALI: up.
%act: <lw> picks up doll, bouncing it
*ALI: up.
%act: <lw> picks up doll, bouncing it
*ALI: up.
%act: <lw> picks up doll, bouncing it
*ALI : down •
%act: <lw> puts doll. down
*ALI: uhoh wideh@c.












%act: <bef> pushes doll on
*ALI: up.
%par: grunting
%act: <lw> gets off chair;
get on it
*ALI: up.




*MOT: want the baby to sit
*MOT: is that what you
*MOT: uhoh.
*MOT: down.





2.5 Syncretic complexes in speech.
2.5.1 Examples of Complexes in speech.
When the child begins to use speech to express its thinking and feeling, the
nature of its thought becomes more accessible to study. Although the child is learning
to see items as existing independently of situations, and is in this sense becoming
more objective, the child's language reveals that the same subjective and syncretic
processes, described above in Vygotsky's block experiments, are still the dominant
mode of thought for the child.
The examples below (Figs 2.17, 2.18, 2.19; citations from Clark 1979 and
Vygotsky 1986) are chronologically ordered lists of the observed referents (or
apparent stimuli) of particular utterances of a single Complexive 'word'. These
Complex names are apparently being used by the children involved to label instances
of a Complex. There is in embryo the naming function of later speech - the instance is
being labelled for the benefit of an interlocutor. To avoid confusion with later forms of
speech, these initial labels will henceforth be described simply as part of the Complex
to which they attatch. In the first example (Fig. 2.17: the Complex "Mooi"), the
roundness and frosty glow of the moon seems to have been taken as the feature to
which other potential tokens of the Complex are compared - rather like the Association
Complexes outlined above (2.4.10).
Clark (1979), from which the example is taken, takes this as an example of
'overextension', meaning that "the child's meaning may overlap with the adult's but
extend beyond the adult category named by the word in one or more directions"
(pi51). Although apparently quite adequate, this definition seems to lack some
subtlety. Clark compares the adult and child words as if they are words of different
languages, with slightly different meanings but conceptually of the same type.
Complexes and concepts are very different however (see 2.3) and crucial here is the




round marks made by blowing on a cold window pane;
writing on windows,
and in books;
round shapes in books;
tooling on leather book covers;
round postmarks on letters;
the letter O;
"Mooi" could plausibly be taken as meaning 'Round thing' in child language,
in the same manner as adult words have some particular extension. In this case "Mooi"
would be a simple 'overextension' of "moon". However, there appears to be a kind of
extensional 'drift': the third use of the Complex ("round marks ...") seems to license
the inclusion of various curly shapes in the extension of the Complex. Richer
examples of Complexive speech show more subtle activity in the child's mind and
reveal the Complex as far more a network of associations than is the adult word.
For the first set of utterances in the example below (Fig.2.18), one could
interpret "Quah" as having extension over bodies of liquid, and thus again showing
the stable extension of adult concepts. That the child is referring back to the concrete
nuclear situation is revealed in the second set of utterances, where the figure of a bird
attracts a new token into the complex ("a coin with an eagle on it"). This addition is
evidently a highly salient one as it shifts the extension of the Complex away from
liquids and toward "round coinlike objects". Thus the Complex forms a primitive
Chain.
Figure 2.18: Quah.
a duck swimming in a pond;
any liquid;
the milk in his bottle;
a coin with an eagle on it;
any round coinlike object;
A more developed Chain Complex is shown in Fig. 2.19 ("Bow-wow")
below. The first two referents seem to have few features in common and perhaps had
some unrecorded contextual association for the child. As use of the Complex
proceeds, the properties ofminiature, furry, and noisy seem to be the most salient
attractors to the complex. But once the shiny glass eyes on the fur piece form a salient
association (on day 331) into the Complex, this too becomes a potential attractor.
Figure 2.19: Bow-wow.
day
251 a china figurine of a girl;
307 a dog barking in the yard;
the pictures of his grandparents;
a toy dog;
a clock:
331 a fur piece with an animal's head
(with glass eyes);
a fur stole without a head;
334 a rubber doll that squeaks when pressed;





These real life examples bear a formal resemblance to the kinds of structure
portrayed in the block experiments above (2.4.10). Complexes are concrete
agglomerations of experiences, as with Schemata, and their composition is by factual
association rather than by the a priori abstract definition of the formal concept. As we
can see, this lack of abstraction of 'definitive' features from the salience of concrete
experience allows the extension of the Complex to drift almost aimlessly. The
development of abstract thinking in the child requires the intervention of the Social
Environment.
There are motives driving the child toward abstract thinking coming from both
the Physical and the Social Environments; and here the Social Environment is the more
significant. This follows the general trend during the child's life from birth, for the
Social Environment to gain in significance, overshadowing the significance of the
Physical Environment.
A tendency toward abstraction may be an effect of the accumulating concretion
inside the complex, much as repeated use of a schema led to foci of association which
became a little abstracted from the rest of the schema. As the Complex is used over an
extended period, it is possible that certain features become strengthened a great deal
more than others, allowing the latter to become part of a 'background'. The analogy
with neural behaviours of sensitisation (see 2.4.1 above) is implicit and the mechanics
of the processes may be similar: associations of features which are regularly repeated -
especially in recent memory - will increase in salience for the child; features which are
less regularly associated will decrease in salience, may fade in the memory, and more
saliently associate with some other Complex. This process, like sensitisation, reflects
objective tendencies in the physical world - accidental properties of objects will occur
less regularly with those objects as a type.
Notably the strength of the influence of the physical environment depends on
its regularity. In this regard one must consider the objective nature of social mediation
of (or commentary on) the physical environment. A culture which technologically
manufactures many of its artefacts will provide a much more regular physical
environment for its young than a culture whose artefacts are contingent on what is at
hand. The more technological artefacts are, as it were, the concrete realisations of pre¬
existing abstract concepts. Thus a designed and manufactured knife is already nearer
to the abstract concept of knife than is an appropriated and adjusted natural object like
the jawbone of an ass or a sharpened bit of rock.
These objective tendencies are perceived subjectively, however, and there is no
guarantee that a subjective internalisation of objective regularities will generate
conceptual structures isomorphic to those of the Social Environment; and even in the
most advanced societies, the physical environment is only limitedly regular. The more
significant role is played by the active and vocal Commentary of the Social
Environment concentrated around the child.
There is firstly the role of regularly giving names to objects, events, etc. The
most obvious effect of this is to strongly associate a sound with a specific group of
objects. We have seen that this effect can initially be somewhat unpredictable, in that
the child is free to interpret the reference of (the salient part of) the caregiver's
utterance in its own way. While the child's cognition is schematic, this interpretation
will associate sounds with schemata (2.4.8 & .11 above); as cognition becomes
dominated by Complexes it is these Complexes which hold associations with
particular, if still vague, sounds. The Complex, although it may not refer (see 2.4.11
on holophrastic speech: the tendency to name the most salient component of the
present situation), might label collections of objects, relations or properties, even if
this collection is done in a fundamentally different manner to that of the concept. The
repeated association of certain of the elements of a Complex and a certain sound
becomes one of the most salient associations in that Complex. The role of the Social
Environment as a source of heightened regularity can be seen as an abstracting
Commentary on the physical environment. The Social Environment also has a more
interventionist role.
Correction by adults can play a large part in influencing the child's meanings.
Chapman et al. (1986) describes a longitudinal study of four mother-child dyads in
play, sessions starting when the child is around 1;1 and finishing around 1;7. It notes
the occasions of inappropriate word use and what kinds of response the caregiver
made. At the end of the study, the authors were able to note how many of the
children's words in production were still "over-extended" and how many had drifted
towards the adult extension; the children's comprehension was tested in the same way,
for whether the child's comprehension of certain terms had drifted toward or away
from the adult extension.
Caregiver responses were categorised into 'acceptance' when the child's
inapropriate use was not challenged; 'correction with joint labelling' for example,
"that's not a car, it's a truck"; and 'correction with explanation' where the correct
word is used along with some kind of demonstration, for example, "It's a truck - see
you can put things in it." The results are shown below in Figure 2.20.
Figure 2.20.
(a) effects on comprehension.
105
% regression unimproved improved
Acc 29 29 43
CJL 20 20 60
CwExp 07 21 71
Mean49 19 23 58
(b) effects on production.
% still "over¬ change without improved
extended" improvement
Acc 64 21 14
CJL 40 27 33
CwExp 36 21 43
Mean 47 23 30
The results appear highly significant (p<=0.01) but their interpretation is not
entirely immediate. The values of the mean indicate that there are also some
background developments irrespective of the caregivers' corrective tactics: specifically
there is a tendency for improved comprehension, while the children's own production
is somewhat more stubbornly "over-extended". The fact that "improvement" is slightly
more likely than "change without improvement" may testify to the attractive power of
the Social Environment as a motive for change, although this difference may not be
statistically significant. Laid over this general trend it appears that a lack of corrective
tactic ("Acceptance") fosters stagnant or even regressive word usage; "Correction with
49 Significant deviantions from the mean (p<0.001) are italicised.
Explanation" acts quite effectively as an attract to the Social Environment; while
"Correction with joint labelling" is, perhaps surprisingly, rather neutral in
developmental terms.
The most startling differences are: (a) those reflecting the efficacy of
'Correction with Explanation' for advancing a child's understanding - there is virtually
no regression of comprehension when the difference between objects is demonstrated
to the child. This same tendency is evident in changes in the children's production,
where 'correction with explanation' provides the greatest attraction towards adult
concepts and away from Complexive word use; and (b) those reflecting the effect of a
lack of any correction (i.e. of any intervention by the Social Environment) on the
development on the child's production - if the caregiver accepts inappropriate words,
almost 2/3 of the children's production at 1;7 is still strongly Complexive.
The importance of the Social Environment is clear, and the importance of a
certain kind of Commentary which simplifies concepts beyond the child's
comprehension (e.g. abstraction) and relates them to the child's practical experience
("No, it's a truck. Let's load it up."). These are the functions of play (see give/take,
hide/seek in 2.4.5, 2.4.9 above): this Commentary activity is essentially the same as
earlier play, but its action is focussed on the child's inchoate linguistic ability.
2.5.2 The Locative.
By around 16 months of age, the child will have a small vocabulary of words
which bear a strong resemblance in sound to adult words, and though their extension
is Complexive, their use bears enough resemblance to that of adult words to be
adequate for a great deal of dialogue. As well as objects, relations and events are being
treated in this Complexive way. Certain features of this are most readily seen
examining the presence in holophrastic speech of what appear to be imitations of adult
prepositions.
The earliest group of prepositions attested in productive vocabularies tend to be
those naming the basic spatial relations: up, down; on, off; in, out; and so on
(Tomasello 1987). These are present in holophrastic speech and through much of early
combinatorial speech they retain their primitive meaning.
Prepositions expressing more abstract relations like with, for, by, and so on,
are not generally attested until slightly later, and are used with much less confidence
(Tomasello p89). These relations remain unexpressed and in early combinatorial
speech the child is more likely to name the participants in such a relation, omitting the
preposition. For example "Coffee Weezer" and "French-fries Grover" (Tomasello)
and "Pour Mommy Juice" (Bloom 1973, Uemlianin 1992) all accompany the child
speaker's actions of giving or pouring something for a recipient.
There are both general cognitive and specifically linguistic reasons for this lag
in acquisition. Linguistically, the more abstract prepositions tend to be much less
stressed, belonging more prototypically to 'functional categories', and consequently
less salient to the child. However, the cognitive hypothesis - that these prepositions
express concepts more difficult for the child and are thus more problematic
acquisitions - should not be overlooked. Tomasello (1987) puts forward two
arguments against this hypothesis.
Firstly, "It is not obvious, for example, that for the child sweeping 'with' a
broom, or giving something 'to' someone involve more complex or abstract concepts
than placing an object 'on' a table or 'in' a cup" (p80, re-iterated on p90).
Secondly, "during the period when the spatial prepositions were first being
used prepositionally, all of the later-learned prepositions designating non-spatial
relations were being omitted from appropriate sentences. These omissions would seem
to indicate that non-spatial concepts were in some sense available to T[ravis, the child
under study] as early as those designated by the spatial oppositions. Indeed, studies of
early two word sentences invariably find attempts to express instrumental, dative,
comitative, and genitive relations at the same developmental period as attempts to
express locatives (Brown 1973)." (p90).
To respond to the second argument first, the implication seems to be that the
child is omitting precisely the correct prepositions from the correct utterances -
instrumental prepositions from utterances apparently expressing an instrumental
relation, and so on - as if the child knew the concepts already, but simply didn't know
the word, or the name of the concept. This is a startling claim in itself, related to
Chomsky's nativist arguments (see 1.3 above), but there is also an implicit step of
interpretation of the child's actions in claiming that the child is "attempt[ing] to express
instrumental, [ ... etc ... ] relations".
This is the interpretation of a Caregiver, not a linguist. With reach gestures a
non-communicative action is treated as significant by the Caregiver and thus becomes
significant for the child. In utterances like "Coffee Weezer" the child is expressing
only a vague, unidentified, correlation of objects perceived together in the same
situation. This expressed correlation, appreciated together with the non-linguistic
context, is interpreted by the Caregiver as some specific relation which has been
licensed by the Social Environment (i.e. by the language). That children use utterances
with 'omitted prepositions' is an expression of the fact that the child has appreciated
that the named items are related in some way. The fact that this relation is not
expressed at all - beyond the concrete relation of their co-occurence - is evidence that
the relation has not been fully internalised50.
With this in mind, let's turn to Tomasello's first argument, on the plausibility
that the relations expressed by some Prepositions are more complex (in the everyday
sense) than those expressed by others. In the concrete sense of involving more entities
in inter-relation with each other, some prepositions are obviously more complex than
others. Prepositions, in a similar way to verbs, have an argument structure which may
involve two (the cup on the saucer) or more (the dog between the cat and the mouse)
objects. Furthermore, as well as the many prepositions representing relations in space
or time, there are prepositions which incorporate senses of agency or volition (e.g.
dative and benefactive prepositions - under Tomasello's definitions (p82)). In many
languages possession can be represented prepositionally. Concepts of agency and
ownership are highly abstract, presupposing an understanding of specific
psychological and social relationships (i.e. that of a 'self' with its actions; that of a
person with certain objects and properties).
So some prepositional relations may be more complex than others both in the
sense of being more concrete (having more to them) and of being more abstract
(further removed from subjective experience). In this case, the 'cognitive hypothesis'
deserves some consideration.
It is necessary in this case to look more closely to the child's actual use of
these Complexive 'Locatives'. This term may be leading, but it is important to
substitute the term 'Locative' for the adult word 'preposition' as this latter is
misleading in two senses.
Firstly, it implies there is already some common element of meaning in the
adult concept and the child's complex, other than the formal similarity of their sharing
the same name (e.g. "up"). This homonymity is presumably significant, but this
significance is not necessarily that of identity. It is more likely that there is some
difference in the child and adult terms comparable in some way to that between the
child and adult notions of 'moon' above. Secondly, the term 'preposition' explicitly
defines the word only as it appears in linguistic relation to other words. 'Adposition'
50 There will be a fuller discussion of how the separate ideas in multi-word utterances relate in
2.5.4 and Ch. 3).
is the same in this regard. In much early speech words apparently imitative of adult
prepositions are produced holophrastically.
The term 'Locative' is not intended to imply that the child's terms express only
locative relations (i.e. relations of proximity in space-time), although that is not
entirely contrary to what is being claimed. Complexive Locatives seem to be
expressing the dissociation of relation or event from the Schema; i.e., the relational
part of a Schema is being given a name.
One thing that Tomasello (1987) notes only in passing, is that "most of the
earliest uses [of child prepositions] were verb-like, that is, they were used to request
or comment on an ACTIVITY not to indicate [a] spatial relationship" (p83). Having
noted this and the problem it causes - whether a particular utterance is being used as a
preposition or as "a verb particle as a verb" - and distinguished the uses, the issue is
dropped. For Tomasello (1987) the problem is merely one of linguistic interpretation
and there is no consideration of what this subtle shift in meaning may represent.
Tomasello's 1992 study of a child's acquisition of verbs shows little
improvement on this. Here verbs seem initially to be defined informally as 'any non-
nominal' (p9-10) and then as "any word that the child uses to predicate a process of
something" (pi 1); and there are two types of "verb-event concepts: change of state and
change of action" (pi3). This defines verb away from the depiction of an action or an
event as a state-of-affairs, as in stative verbs or progressive aspect in adult language.
The state-of-affairs depiction of an event can associate together features of verbs,
prepositions and adjectives - which all in a sense predicate over arguments. And it can
characterise the apparent stimulus for utterances like Allison Bloom's in Fig. 2.16
above.
Interestingly, not only do early Locatives express 'Verb-like' relations, but as
is either un-noticed or left implicit in Tomasello's work, they appear significantly
before (imitations of adult) Verbs in the child's production, and have a remarkably
different function to these early 'verbs' (see 2.2.1.1, p47 for notational conventions).
In the speech of Allison Bloom 'verbs' are only beginning to make an
appearance at l(year);4(months);21(days), when Locatives seem to be already quite
established. In a sample of 466 utterances (virtually all holophrastic), 86 were
Locatives and only 25 were verbal. The most common Locatives were "up" (48
utterances - more than 10% of the total!), "down" (25), "away" (10) and "here" (1):
these were without exception used as an accompaniment to the child's own action. Of
the 25 'verbs' only 3 accompanied action in the way of either the Locatives or of adult
verbs: the majority (22) of these utterances - "stop (2), "gone" (20) - are completion
markers, announcing the termination of an action, for example finishing a glass of
juice or a cookie. Not till the third taped play session, at 1;8;21, does Allison begin to
use 'verbs' in their adult sense, and Locatives continue in their accompaniment sense
till the fourth session (at 1;8;21). This transition is accompanied by a shift in the
frequency of use of verbal and Locative utterances (see Figure 2.21 - in the fifth
(2;4;7) and sixth (2;10;0) files sentences had become the dominant form of utterance
(about half of the total) and purely Locative or verbal utterances were consequently
rarer).
Figure 2.21: Allison's Locative and Verbal utterances.
sample file Locative Verbal
1 (1;4;21) 86 3(+22 comp.)
2 (1;7;14) 66 8
3 (1;8;21) 42 62
4 (1;10;0) 10 75
5 (2;4;7) 21 52
6 (2;10;0) 14 59
2.5.3 Event structure and the Self in holophrastic speech.
If these Locatives are Complexes, what significant features might they have? A
complex is an association of foci within various schemata: foci which because of their
strengthening external associations, begin to dissociate from their original schemata
and coalesce into a new grouping a little independent of the schema and the other
components therein.
This independence implies that the Locative is not a relational term at all, but is
an object name in the same way that "mooi" and "quah" are object names, identifying
an item in perception. The Locative is a name for a state-of-affairs: bearing in mind
(from 2.4c) the problem of describing these Complexes as having a fixed extension,
Allison's Locative "up" (Fig. 2.16) can only be paraphrased as 'there's some
"upping" (going on) around here.' The Item 'upping', from Allison's own utterances
might be herself climbing onto a chair, or trying to stand a toy doll up, mummy lifting
her up, and so on..
These Locative Complexes are not quite as vaguely Syncretic as pre-linguistic
Complexes, as they attract predominantly states-of-affairs which are associated with a
particular name by the Social Environment. However, this abstract base is interpreted
by the child in a concrete way, such that, for example, the Locative "up" may express
any of a group of relationships or events.
Child utterances which involve some imitation of adult verbs are acquired in
use slightly later (see Fig. 2.21 above). They also seem to incorporate from the
beginning, some relation of the speaker with the Item named. The vast majority of
early 'verbs' are completion markers, accompanying the termination of an event. Later
it is exclusively 'verbs' which accompany the child's expressions of desire for some
Item.
'Verbs' in the child's speech (only occurring with any consistency at
(Allison's) 1;8;21) tend to accompany more specific sets of relation/events. For
example, here are some of the utterances accompanying events that may earlier have
been accompanied by "down": "sit", "sit down", "lie down", "tumble", "rest" and
"pat".
This difference in use is obviously not because the two sets are 'prepositions'
and 'verbs'. On the other hand, the assertion that the difference is simply driven by
attraction to the Social Environment is not entirely convincing. Perhaps it is significant
that 'verbs' make their appearance around the same time as the child is making two
word utterances (see 2.5.4 below).
During holophrastic speech it seems that cognition is still very much
schematically organised, and Complexes are only gradually dissociating. The
Complex vocalised in a particular situation will be the one most salient, most
stimulated by what's going on. This may be some object in play, or in the distance, or
it may be some other activity in which the child is involved.
This raises the question of the child's own sense of selfhood and agency
during this period. Around year end the child first responds specifically to its own
name, which for all intents and purposes includes "baby" (Trevarthen 1987, Griffiths
1986 citing Leopold's (1939) diary study). Allison does 'name' herself, but very
rarely, and generally using the term "baby". Self-naming occurs twice at 1 ;4;21
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("baby"); 16 times at 1 ;7; 14 ("baby" *15, "Allison" *1); and 24 times at 1 ;8;21
("baby" *11, "Allison" * 13), by which time two-word utterances are attaining some
consistency (see Figure 2.22 below).
Figure 2.22: Allison Bloom's self-naming.
sample file "baby" "Allison'
1 (1;4;21) 2? 0
2 (1;7;14) 15 1
3 (1;8;21) 11 13
If our hypothesis is right, about vocalised Complexes expressing the most
salient component of a situation, we would expect the above attested utterances to
occur when it is the child's own effort which is causing most sensation, over and
above any objects the child may be interacting with, or any particular activity in which
the child may be involved.
Figure 2.23 shows the least ambiguous of Allison's uses of baby at 1 ;4;21
(taken using the CHILDES database, MacWhinney 1991). The first accompanies the
child apparently getting an itchy nose (perhaps some bubble liquid got up there). The
second is more ambiguous and may be a reference to the doll on the chair. However,
the doll doesn't seem to be part of the situation, in which Allison is having trouble
climbing up onto the chair.
Figure 2.23: Allison's baby.
*ALI: 0.





%act: <bef> puts stick down and puts top on jar;
<aft> takes top off jar.
*MOT: 0.
%act: stirs bubble liquid;
tries to make bubble.
*ALI: baby.
%act: rubbing her nose
*MOT; mm.
*ALI: climb.
%act: <lw> holds onto seat of chair,
pulling herself up
*ALI: up.





%sit: <lw> doll is on chair
*ALI: baby.
%par: <aft> grunting




%act: <lw> kneeling on chair
*ALI: chair.
The most salient component of these situations seems to be some bodily
sensation in the child herself, and not necessarily a sensation of activity on the world,
i.e. of 'agency'.
Vygotsky noted the tendency for more demanding experiments to prompt
vocalisation in children, even when there were no caregivers present (1986, p28f).
This is in his discussion of Piaget's concept of Egocentric speech and for Vygotsky
speech at this point is not entirely social, being more often an accompaniment and later
an aid to the child's own action. Certainly by no means the vast majority of Allison's
utterances are explicitly directed at the interlocutor (her mother), who often seems a
little extraneous to the action.
The decomposition of a Self from Subjective Space-time triggers a sea change
in the organisation of the child's perception, breaking away finally from Schematic
cognition. Initially the change is only quantitative: components of Schemata dissociate
from their Schemata and are re-associated with each other, in the same manner as the
object Complexes outlined above (2.4.11). This particular decomposition seems to be
quite late - as we see above Allison Bloom is only beginning to name herself when she
already has quite a large productive vocabulary. Neither is it in itself any different
from other dissociations from Schemata - the Self becomes an item like any other.
But it is precisely this last that causes the change. Extrapolating from the
(admittedly slim) evidence above, the Self Complex - vocalised as either the child's
own name or some Socially licensed equivalent such as "baby" - is attracted around
such things as bodily effort or physical sensation: stimuli occurring when the child's
action on the world is more salient than the specific actions, relations or objects
present.
This concretion is important as it creates a first specific impression of
causality. In Subjective Space-time there was no causality as such, things just
happened, that is situations were either present or not. Association between Schemata
was not strong enough to provide causal or even chronological links. The same went
for (material) objects, and the child's conception of object permanence was limited to
within the Schema; the search limited to examining the location of disappearance
(Piaget 1953, 1955). But as the Self is not yet a special object, this causality does not
rest solely within it. The association between the child's own effort and a salient
change in the world becomes a generalised chronological association between salient
Complexes. The effect in cognition is the idea that one Complex 'causes' the presence
of another Complex.
In a sense this mode of cognition is more 'objective' - in the sense that objects
have causal relations without the intervention or presence of the child itself - and
Piaget refers to this period (stages 5 and 6 in his developmental chronology) as
constructing an objective space-time (Piaget 1955). Indeed, particularising the Self
away from being some eminence grise, a world in which everything happens, is a step
toward objectivity. However, although a Self is being identified, the child's
perspective on the world is still exclusively its own: Space-time is no longer
Subjective (i.e. a feature of the organism) but is still Egocentric (i.e. reflecting certain
features of the individual's perspective).
An example of this egocentrism is the world-view of many children,
sometimes expressed when older, but still showing an egocentric perspective on
space-time and causality. Piaget cites experiments revealing an 'optical realism' where
the child "substitutes for the physical relations of bodies the visual relations
corresponding to the apparent data of perception" (1955: 358). Later (p 377-8) Piaget
notes an "animism" in the child which endows objects with selves much like the
child's own, such that the movements and effects of inanimate objects are
anthropomorphised. Older children who can communicate their ideas in language
speak of the human rationality behind these anthropomorphised objects - houses are
there to live in, rain to make the grass grow, mountains to climb, and so on. Primitive
societies often seem to have a similar world-view - chariots pulling the Sun across the
sky, the wind 'blowing' clouds, gods hurling thunderbolts at mortals.
The most significant points for our present purpose in this whole movement
are that, in the wake of the Self s dissociation from Schemata: (a) Complexes are able
to become more separately defined, gaining in permanence and integrity; (b) these
Complexes come to be salient in their own right, and thus have a claim on the attention
in their own right, rather than as a part of a situation; (c) 'things happening' is now no
longer a property of Schemata, or situations, but one of Complexes, and situations
will now tend to be built up of Complexes rather than vice-versa; (d) the SelfComplex
is the most salient Complex associated with 'things happening'.
2.5.4 The beginnings of combinatorial speech.
The psycho-linguistic literature attests that the child's holophrastic and 'single-
word' vocabulary grows steadily to a size of about 45-50 words in production before
combinatorial speech begins with any regularity. Three to four times this many words
may be understood by the child but are not familiar enough to be confidently produced
(Papers in Fletcher & Garman 1979, 1986). Some authors describe a slow initial
growth in vocabulary followed by a "spurt" in growth after a dozen or so words have
been acquired (e.g. Garman 1979, Peters 1986). This is apparently interesting and
may relate to some sudden realisation of linguistic significance, but many studies attest
to a steady and gradual acquisition (e.g. Griffiths 1986) and there is a great deal of
cultural and individual variation in rates and even 'routes'51 of development. Wells
(1986: 117) cites a large corpus wherein "at 42 months ... the difference between the
most and least advanced children was equivalent to 30 to 36 months" of development.
The "vocabulary spurt" is of insufficient generality to necessitate maturational
explanations (Radford 1990: 275).
A productive vocabulary of about 45-50 words is characterised in the literature
as having been reached by around 18 months. This is the kind of figure reached by
tacit consensus between researchers rather than between first language learners and
although it serves to 'place' the child's development in our imagination, it is the kind
of figure which can shift from being a tag of convenience, to being an 'average' to
being a majority case. Once these figures are so solidly defined they become
interesting phenomena requiring explanation in themselves (e.g. Radford 1990: p21,
reproduced below as Figure 2.24, and the maturational explanation, p272f.). 'Stages'
are hard to get away from, however, precisely because they break up the concrete and
irregular flow of development up into easily digested thematic units. One of the
difficulties reading Vygotsky is that he generally avoids the use of stages, criticising it
as replacing causality with chronology (1986: 40). Although this thesis has tended to
5 1 In the sense of what kinds of words or phrases are acquired in what order - expressive or
referential words, nominals or phrases, etc.
do the same it has been necessary to acknowledge the existence of developmental
stages - in the literature - in order to draw on the research of other psychologists.
Predominant in this regard so far have been Piaget's developmental stages treating the
child's pre-linguistic cognitive development. The final part of the thesis, on the
establishment of linguistic behaviour proper, will have critical reference to the kind of
consensus language acquisition chronology as formalised in Radford (1990).























I want to have an apple.
Whatever the child's individual pace or direction of growth through this
"vocabulary spurt", once a child is using 30 words or so on a regular basis, there is
some movement toward multi-word utterances. The gap between holophrastic and
combinatorial speech is bridged by a combination of attraction by the Social
Environment and the child's own developing Complexive cognition of the world. The
bridging phenomena seem to fall into three broad categories, which will be outlined
here, and which we'll call 'Phonological Extension', 'Juxtaposition' and 'Rote
Memorisation' (Garman 1979, Peters 1986). As usual, different children may stress
each tactic differently: all three are present in Allison Bloom's transitional speech.
Phonological Extension is akin to babbling, an imitation of the
immediately perceptible properties of adult language. Much of Allison's early speech
(at 1 ;4;21) either comprised or contained babble: for examples, "ehwideh@c
ehwideh@c", "uh uh no no wideh@c"; "mama wideh@c", "more wideh@c" and
"eh@c baby"52. Many of the utterances consisting entirely of babble are quite long
52 'wideh@c' and 'ehwideh@c' seem to be generic markings for babble-type utterances in the
Bloom database on CHILDES.
and seem to express Allison's appreciation of the longer prosodies of adult speech.
Babble utterances incorporating intelligible words can be interpreted as expressing the
same appreciation. Several studies (summarised in Garman 1979: 186) interpret the
babble which co-occurs with adult words as a kind of 'pre-syntactic device', units like
'wide' or 'eh@c' above being 'dummy forms' or 'placeholders' for the syntax to
come. Whatever they come before, Phonological Extension itself does not express an
advance in the child's understanding of the Physical or Social Environments, other
than a gradual realisation that there is something different about the adults' longer
utterances.
Rote Memorisations show essentially the same imitative process by which
the child leams its reference words during single word speech and by which it
develops Phonological Extension. Here, the child's growing comprehensive and
productive abilities allow imitation of larger units. These imitations are again not a
conceptual advance and show the Complexive properties of use of other holophrases.
For example, "gone" or "allgone" (Allison Bloom's most common 'verbal' utterances
at 1 ;4;21) tend to be used as Completion Markers, but they also appear to express
surprise, as with Allison's "gone" exclamations at bubbles suddenly bursting. Also, a
study (DeLemos 1981) of Latin American children shows how they 'appropriate' the
perfective tense marker as an independently usable Completion Marker. This is
identical to Allison's use of "gone" and is not necessarily equivalent to acquisition of
anything like tense or aspect.
When the child starts to use such constructions as "allgone" or "oh dear" they
are unanalysed units and not yet structures with "positional constituency of elements
but no productivity" (Garman 1979). In production, the child may seem to have some
grasp of constituency, producing structures like "all gone", "all clean", "all done" and
so on. However, in a much cited empirical survey (Braine 1976) all such examples
were repetitions of adult expressions and weren't productive in themselves, i.e. each
new "all + X" phrase had to be learned individually. Before the child can be
productive with combinatorial speech, or even use it at all, it must occur to the child
that more than one thing can be said of a single situation.
The third bridging phenomenon, Juxtaposition, occurs where more than one
(generally not more than two) words are uttered "within a unitary context and [are]
interpretable as converging on a single topic in that context" (Garman 1979: 184).
These are the first linguistic expression of a real advance in cognition. A holophrase
can either be interpreted as the 'name' of a schema, or the name of the most salient
Complex within the stimulated schema. The most conservative interpretation of
Juxtapositions (within our model) is that a stimulated schema is providing enough
stimulation for more than one Complex within it; a more advanced interpretation may
be that Complexes are being directly stimulated by the environment and, in occasions
that stimulate a Juxtaposition, the environment itself contains more than one salient
object. The child certainly has more than one thing to say about a particular situation.
In early Juxtapositions the constituent words are separated by a pauses and have
separate intonation contours; with more familiarity of use, pauses diminish and a
united intonation contour can develop (Peters 1986). The child's familiarity with
longer prosodic units through Phonological Extension is obviously apposite to this
latter development. Some examples from Allison Bloom's early speech (at 1;4;21)
may illustrate:






















%act: <lw> holds onto seat of
chair, pulling herself up.
*ALI: up.
%act: <lw> holds onto seat of
chair, pulling herself up.
(d)
*ALI: baby.
%act: <lw> looks around at
empty table; glances at doll
on floor; looks around; then
going back to doll.
*ALI: up.
%act: <lw> picks doll up;
walks to little chair with
doll, pretending to cry.
These juxtapositions are notable in several ways. Firstly, the juxtapositions do
not necessarily reflect relations specifically licensed by the Social Environment.
Studies generally try to taxonomise the relations expressed into 'entity + location',
'agent + action' (Peters 1986: 317) and so on, but the usefulness of this taxonomy is
limited when its composite 'Participant Roles' do not seem to come from some
definite, limited set (see Dowty 1989). The relations which seem to be expressed are
of such variety that they can be defined best by the property that they are both
immediately salient to the child in that concrete situation.
Secondly, it seems that, in Allison's case at least, Complexes are being
stimulated directly rather than through the mediation of a Schema. The fourth example
above is taken from towards the end of the session and yet it appears to display
features of slightly more primitive cognition in terms of juxtaposing holophrases - the
holophrases are separated by activity, they appear in slightly different situations.
Allison's language does become more primitive towards the end of the session; she
seems to tire, being uncomfortable with the set-up (cameras, lights, ...); and her
behaviour becomes a little fractious - she is often "pretending to cry" in the second half
of the sessions.
On noticing the doll Allison utters the holophrastic "baby"; still with the doll in
the foreground (after looking away and coming back) it occurs to her to go over to it
and pick it up; then she utters the holophrastic "up": this at least is the order of
apparent events. The Complexes "baby" and "up" are associated in hindsight, as it
were. It is not implausible that mere utterance of a Complex reinforces that Complex
and makes it more salient in the child's attention: children are attracted by vocal
comment by the Social Environment and imitate corrections (see above 2.5.1); they
talk to themselves when puzzling over or physically challenged by a situation (see
above 2.5.3); a search can be accompanied by repetition of the name of the objective
(see Figure 2.25c) above). In fact, it is apparent from the child's behaviour in these
cases that the name can have precisely the function of holding or clarifying the
Complex in attention. This is a very important development as it indicates the
possibility of the separation of the name of a Complex from the Complex itself: instead
of being a feature of the actual presence of a Complex, the name is becoming an
indication that the Complex is present either actually or in attention.
This change enables others which are worth mentioning. Unfortunately there is
not the space to discuss them at length. Speech remains, for the time being, Egocentric
in Piaget's (1926) sense. But from this period on two functions of speech which are
increasingly differentiated first become evident. Vygotsky (1986: 224-235)
characterises this differentiation as a process of socialisation: on one hand the
increasing internalisation of the Social Environment by the child, and on the other
hand the child's increasing externalisation of its own attitudes (in a form acceptable to
the Social Environment).
On the one hand there is Egocentric speech, which is directed inwards for the
child's own benefit, as an aid to attention and planning (e.g. Figure 2.25 (c) and
possibly (d)). This eventually disappears and is apparently internalised completely to
become a mode of thought (not the whole of thought). On the other hand there now
begins a mode of speech which is specifically targeted at someone else, either to
involve an interlocutor or to express the child's own desires, and which is constantly
reinforced by the Social Environment to become everyday external speech. Although
before this stage all of these functions are apparent on occasion, while speech is a
property of situations Egocentric and socially directed functions of speech cannot
properly be said to exist at all.
To return to the phenomena bridging holophrastic and combinatorial speech, it
seems the interplay of the three tactics allows productive combinatorial speech to
develop, where the child's expression of its inner attitudes meets its imitation of the
Social Environment. As the child becomes fluent with its Juxtapositions, their
prosodic outlines will begin to assimilate with those of the babble-filled Phonological
Extensions. There will also be cases where a single 'word' appears in the child's
vocabulary both as a holophrase, and thence as part of a Juxtaposition, and
independently as part of a rote memorisation - for example, Allison's "more" can
appear holophrastically or as part of a phrase: "more cookie", "more wideh@c". The
realisation that such imitations of the Social Environment are in effect Juxtapositions
reinforces the productivity of the child's own combinations.
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The paralysis of syncretism and the development of 'Subject'
in later child language.
"
... or to isolate i from mymultiple Mes on
the spits of Lumbage Island ..."
(Joyce 1939: 410.12-13).
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3 The paralysis of syncretism and the development of
'Subject' in later child language.
3.1 "Early Child English".
3.1.1 The stabilisation of child language under social pressure.
As the child vocabulary grows, its meanings become more specific and tend
toward the socially licensed meanings. Growth in the size of the child's vocabulary in
itself may seem to encourage a specialisation of the extension of each particular
Complex. Especially if we assume that the child is, in some unconscious habitual way
perhaps, avoiding such sense relations as superordination, synonymy, hyponymy and
so on. This is plausibly the case, and studies have observed not only that "in the
period up to 1;6, the only sense relation in children's vocabularies appears to be
incompatibility, 'if something is an X then it is not a Y or a Z or any of the other terms
in the set of incompatibles'" (Griffiths (1986: 305), citing Griffiths (1976) and Barret
(1978), (1982) in support), but also that this singular sense relation is maintained by a
continuing sensitivity to newly formed (and verbally labelled) Complexes: i.e. that "[a]
particular 'overextension' of a nominal in production usually ceases as soon as the
child's production repertoire includes what adults would deem to be a more
appropriate word" (Griffiths (1986: 301), citing Anglin (1977: Ch.. 4), Barret op.
cit., Rescorla (1981) in support).
This latter observation helps pinpoint the role of the Social Environment in the
growth of the child's vocabulary. Changes in Complexive extensions tend to be in line
with what adults do deem more appropriate; only much later when the child has
internalised some of the authority and attitudes of the Social Environment does the
child begin to define itself against what adults would deem to be more appropriate.
Both Piaget and Vygotsky relate this later intemalisation to formal schooling. They
also relate it to the beginning of formal thought, that is thinking in terms of concepts
rather than Complexes. Conceptual thought requires the internalisation of some
authoritative voice, an abstract definition, which is unassailed by concrete experience.
Thought is conceptual to the extent that the thinker's own experience is subjugated to
these authoritative abstractions. As pointed out in 2.3 everyday thought is rarely
Conceptual in this strong sense, and abstract definitions are apparently only a concrete
feature in the Complexive pseudo-concepts.
Vygotsky (1986) uses the term 'pseudo-concept' to express the fact that these
things act for most intents and purposes as if they were concepts. This seems to be the
case for the child's language at this point (as speech is becoming consistently
combinatorial), and increasingly we can talk of the child's Complexes as words and as
meaning the same things and in the same way as the adults' words. It is most apparent
with the most concrete object and activity names, later with more abstract words like
"more", which in Allison Bloom's early recordings has a cluster of uses related more
or less indirectly to the adult meaning.
Another feature of the child's speech being drawn inexorably toward that of
the Social Environment is the elementary word order of its utterances. In the first
Juxtapositions (2.5.4) there is no constancy of ordering and Complexes are apparently
vocalised in the order they make their salience felt. Similarly the Rote Memorisations
of adult stock phrases are imitated unanalysed and are utterances with no word order
from the child's perspective.
Figure 3.1 below shows all of Allison's multi-word utterances from the first
three play sessions and the situation which prompted each one, i.e. the non-linguistic
context. By the fourth she was speaking in the regular Early Child English stereotyped
in Radford (1990), which is discussed in 3.2.
The earliest session shows already some constancy of word order in the 'more
+ X' utterances, long before 'more' is showing a stable extension as a quantifier. The
notion that a child notices syntax before comprehending it (DeLemos 1981), or that a
child internalises syntax before semantics (Vygotsky (1986), who talks about how
grammar generally precedes logic (p220)), seems to be borne out by these 'more + X'
utterances - Allison has accurately internalised the socially licensed word order but the
semantic relation between the words seems only just to be stabilising.
The remaining utterance and the two from 'ali 2' provide not enough evidence
in themselves to be particularly suggestive. Most immediately they suggest the
semantic relations licensed by word order in the Social Environment, given a very
loose reading of the terms Subject Verb Object. Given the non-linguistic context, on
the other hand, they also suggest an ordering by salience. These two interpretations
are not necessarily isomorphic - i.e. it is not necessarily the case that the 'actor' is the
most salient component of situations, followed by the 'action', followed by the 'acted
upon'. This is apparent from the fact that holophrastic utterances do not most often
express 'actor' Complexes. Indeed if anything there is the opposite tendency -
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Complexes relating to objects acted upon tend to be the most lexicalised, followed by
'actions' followed by the 'actor' (generally Allison herself). As there is no 'natural'
relation between the ordering of Complexes in child language and word order in the
Social Environment, one must assume that the former's attraction to the latter is
imitative.
Figure 3.1: Allison Bloom's early two-word utterances.
session age utterance





ali 2 1 ;7; 14 down mommy
ba[by] down













after playing with car, sees doll.
pulling toy animals from bag.
pulling cookies from bag.
putting toy cow on table/ looking for toy
bull.
pushing the toy car around.
jumping down onto Mommy's lap.







reaching for more juice,





53 As this is the only pronoun attested before 'ali 5' (i.e. 2;4;7), I am assuming this instance
was rather an articulatory product of the high-front vowel ending of 'mommy' running into the initial










Locative: putting coat on chair.





By 'ali 3' Allison's utterances are more definitely reflecting the socially
licensed word order. Many of these may be direct imitations: the compounds, "dirty
diaper", "lie down" and "sit down" in particular are cliched enough in content and use
to be so. The single more phrase is in keeping with social license both in its ordering
and its use. The two non-Locative mommy phrases both mirror the salience ordering
of before - in both situations both the mother and the activity described loomed rather
large, in the first negatively (Allison did not want to take off her coat) in the second
positively (mother and child sharing a joke).
What is most interesting about this set of utterances is the disjunction between
the use of 'prepositions' and the expression of Locatives. Locatives are here expressed
largely by the collocation of two Complexes. This is not a case of 'implicit' or
'omitted' prepositions, rather an expression of a vague unspecified relation of two
elements. The Complexive nature of these elements is still apparent in the way that
'nouns' + 'nouns' can be related in the same way as are 'verbs' + 'nouns', i.e. words
have not separated into distinct classes. It should be stressed that the 'expansions' of
the Locatives are given with reference to the non-linguistic context and act merely as a
guide to the variety of objective relations which are subsumed under the Complexive
relation of Locativity. The 'expansions' are not 'translations' and they are not an
indication of the child's mental processes.
Interestingly, the only two Locatives which are lexicalised may be evidence of
a new development. Figure 3.2 below shows the full context of "coat on" and "mike
on". In 'ali 3' and earlier sessions, the Complex "on" is invariably used as a 'verbal'
Locative - sometimes stative, sometimes active - and here it seems to have a similar
function. However, in each case, a pair of utterances seem to be approaching one
another in the same way as did early Juxtapositions (2.5.4): in 1 "chair" and "coat
on"; and in 2 "mommy" and "mike on" are being somewhat awkwardly associated.
Figure 3.2: explicit Locatives in 'ali 3'.
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*ALI: chair.






%act: <lw-2w> putting coat on chair
*ALI: chair.
%act: <lw> putting coat on chair
*MOT: coat on chair.




%act: pointing to overhead microphone
*MOT: microphone.
*ALI: Mommy.
%gpx: <lw> points to Mother's
microphone, comes over to Mother
*ALI: Mommy.
%gpx: <lw> points to Mother's
microphone, comes over to Mother
*ALI: mike on.
%gpx: <lw> pointing to Mother's microphone




The advance from two to three words is as significant as that from holophrases
to two words. In holophrastic speech the situation is not consciously divided into
components - holophrastic utterances comprise either the name of a Schema or the
most salient Complex within it. Two word speech breaks down the situation into the
two most salient Complexes, but these are related in an unspecified way: Verbs,
Nouns and Prepositions are not distinct as classes of words, and what regular word
order there is, is merely an Accommodation to the Social Environment. However, the
only relation apparent in two word speech is that of precedence - there is evidence for
no further grammatical structure. The before-after relation seems to be tied to salience
and social licensing rather than to any specific relations between objects in the world.
And it only seems to be able to relate two words.
The Juxtapositions we saw at the end of 3.1.1 are apparently challenging this
limit, or at least expressing the limit as such. Figure 3.3 shows the types of
Juxtaposition attested in 'ali 3'. There are occasionally intervening Caregiver
utterances but these are generally prompting repetitions and add no new information to
the dialogue. There are two important processes at work here. Firstly, the association
of a pair of words together as a unit: 'dirty diaper', 'baby doll', Tie down' have a
cliched enough use in 'ali 3' to be almost treated as a single unit of meaning. In these
Juxtapositions the relation between units is still primitive. In the second group of
Juxtapositions there is an inchoate relation between three distinct units. As yet there
seems to be no further meaning behind the orderings than immediate salience - a
salience which is often a product of dialogue (i.e. social activity) rather than of
physical activity. There is no impression of a systematic predication of units by a more
foregrounded unit.
Figure 3.3: Juxtapositions in 'ali 3'.
"dirty ... away ... dirty diaper ... away"
"baby doll ... cookie"
"baby doll ... lie down"
"buy store ... pin"
"mommy floor ... down ... sit down"
"children rain ... walk ... rain"
"walk ... rain ... walk school"
In 'ali 4' much of Allison's speech is in Early Child English, but coexisting
with this is a great deal of one and two word speech, and some slightly more advanced
multi-word Juxtapositions (see Figure 3.4). Some of these Juxtapositions show a
similar primitive relation of three items as in 'ali 3'. The first two in particular
(respectively accompanying Allison wiping the chair, and Allison dumping cookies
onto a diaper) do this. Most of these utterances however show an Accommodation to
the socially licensed word order.
Figure 3.4: Juxtapositions in 'ali 4'.
"wiping ... Baby Allison ... chair"
"dump ... baby diaper"
"baby eat... cookies"
"mommy open ... box"
"mommy ... skirt on"
"baby doll... get toys"
"mommy ... comb hair"
The most important consideration at this point, however, is to go beyond the
immediate word order and investigate the growing impression that there is some
structure to the child's utterances, of predication. Especially as in 'ali 4' Allison is
becoming fluent in Early Child English, which is described in Radford (1990) as
having a primitive but specific Xbar structure. The increasing length of Allison's
utterances is of only tangential relevance to this development: most significant is the
early strength of two word Locatives. These early word collocations remain strong
through later developments. Although particular collocations are reinforced or
weakened by the Social Environment, the two word Locative as a type has been
internalised as a singular unit of meaning. While an utterance consists of two units,
each 'unit' may be a single word, a compound (e.g. "Baby Allison") or a Locative
(e.g. "skirt on", "baby diaper", "mommy down", "baby eat"). This is still not
predication, as there is no evidence of asymmetry between the two related elements,
i.e. no objective basis on which to name one of the elements as the argument rather
than the predicate. In other words, the child's utterance structure seems to be along the
lines of Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Utterance structure.
Utt --> A B
A, B —> Locative (two Complexes Schematically related)
Compound (two Complexes acting as single item name)
Complex (item name)
Much of Allison Bloom's speech at 1; 10 ('ali 4') has this structure. This is a
contradiction of Radford's (1990) Xbar analysis of Early Child English (supposedly
extant around 1;6 - 2), and is approached by Deuchar's (e.g. 1993) flatter structures.
However, Deuchar offers no evidence to support her interpretation of an utterance's
internal relations as predicate-argument, "where the predicate can be seen as a proto-
head, and the argument seen as a proto-specifier or proto-complement" (p8). The
words which do predicate, e.g. "more", seem to be the exception rather than the rule,
and to be particularly direct borrowings from the adult language: Locatives are a more
general relation (in Allison Bloom's speech at least). Like Trevarthen's rich
interpretations (2.4) and Tomasello's "omitted prepositions" (2.5), Deuchar's 'proto-
Xbar' structure is an academic version of the creative interpretation characteristic of the
Caregiver.
Xbar relations are specific meaningful relations between different parts of an
utterance. They are more about how words relate to each other than how the words
relate to the world. Although internalisation of socially licensed word ordering and
word clustering is in progress, structures similar to Xbar only develop with the
tendency for one particular unit of an utterance to be noticeably separable, or different,
in some way from the rest of the utterance. Such a unit makes its first appearance in
'ali 4' (1;10;0), namely the explicit lexicalisation of the child herself as the actor in the
stated situation.
3.1.3 The 'subject' in Early Child English.
Radford (1990) describes Early Child English as simply being Adult English
without the Functional categories and the accompanying Xbar branches. The Xbar
facility as a whole is fully intact, with its Specifier, Head and Complement relations,
as are the Nominal, Verbal, Adjectival and Prepositional systems. This analysis
elegantly captures much of the difference between child and adult language: the lack of
Tense (no INFL system), Case (no Determiner system, through which sentence
internal semantic relations are carried, in much post-Abney (1987) Government-
Binding theory), Pronouns (ditto) and other similar syntactical properties. Early Child
English (ECE) is said to have the structure given in Figure 3.6(i), with the following
examples (ii-iv). In chapter 5 Radford draws attention to the similarity between such
structures and non-finite adult 'small clauses' (e.g. Figure 3.6(v) - (vii)). Once the
lack of case marking and so on has been dealt with, Radford goes on almost without
comment to name the 'specifier' of ECE Small Clauses as the same 'subject' we find
in adult English (Figure 3.6: (vii) & (viii) below).
Figure 3.6: syntactic structure in ECE.
(i) [x» specifier [x> adjunct [x. [x head] complement(s)]]]. (p78)
(ii) [v- [NP Baby] [v [v> [v eat] [NP cookies] ]]]. (p72)
(iii) [P- [NP Mouse] [F [P. [pin] [NP window] ]]]. (p74)
(iv) L" U Sausage] [A. [NP bltl U' Uhot] ]]]• (p77)
(v) I don't want [ your feet on my table]. (pi 13)
(vi) [P- U your feet] [P- [P. [Pon] [DP my table] ]]].
(vii) [x" [dp subject] [x. adjunct [x- [x head] complement(s)]]]. (pi 13)
(viii) [X" [NP subject] [x-adjunct [x- [x head] complement(s)]]]. (pi 14)
It is only after this model has been well grounded in the reader that Radford
introduces the fact that Small Clause Specifiers are often "omitted" from children's
utterances (Ch 8, pp 198-239). The effect of Radford's method of presentation is that
"missing arguments" are treated as an exception to the rule, to be described by
adjustment of the above basic structures. In fact only just over 10% of Allison
Bloom's utterances ('ali 4' at 1;10;0) have an explicit Specifier. The majority of
Allison's longer utterances would be better described as Verb Phrases (VPs) - with
implicit Specifiers and often other arguments implicit also. It should be pointed out
that even these VP utterances only constitute around 20% of the 1;10;0 corpus, most
of which is still Complexive holophrastic or two-word speech. This situation
emphasises the way different formal structures can coexist in Early Child English. By
'ali 5' (2;4;7) Allison is using the pronouns and Case marking indicative of 'Late
Child English'.
In developing his position, Radford criticises Hyams' analysis of missing
arguments as instances of the empty category [pro]54 (e.g. Hyams (1986), (1989):
Radford also cites papers showing the development of Hyams' argument in between).
Radford's argument draws on elements of Hyams' case work and specific features of
[pro] which shall not concern us here (for example, its nature as a variable over DPs
and thus not available in DP-less ECE). Most appositely, Radford notes that (a) there
are missing arguments in 'objective' positions (pp. 213-218); (b) that there are
utterances with more than one missing argument (pp. 220-223); and (c) that there are
utterances with "verbless transitive structures" (i.e. with missing elements which are
not arguments but predicates, pp.224). Radford's examples are shown in Figure 3.7
below.
Figure 3.7: Missing arguments.
(a) [v- [NP mommy] [v> [v> [v open] [NP<7]]]].
(b) [y» [NP ei ] [v> [v. [v want] Up ej ]]]]•
(c) [y» Up Wayne] [v. [v> [v et ] [NP sweetie]]]].
Radford posits two analyses of these features of ECE, The first is that most
immediately suggested by the above examples (a) and (b): i.e. that the missing
arguments are "null NPs - i.e. NPs which are phonologically null". The lack of
"syntactic licensing or identification conditions" in the absence of Functional
Categories would allow the reference of the NPs to be settled purely by pragmatic
factors. The slightly more radical alternative to this is the suggestion that missing
arguments "are literally 'missing' from the syntax." Under this analysis utterances
such as Fig 3.7(b) above would have the structure in Figure 3.8 below. This
"subjectless and objectless" structure is supposed to express the idea that each
participant role of the predicate has been "lexically saturated, [and] remains implicit, in
the sense that it is a part of the lexical entry for the predicate concerned which is not
projected into the syntax" (pp. 229-30).
Figure 3.8
[v tv' tv tvwant] ]]]•
When these alternative analyses are placed in some kind of genetic relation
with each other then they are a plausible model of syntactic growth. Radford (pp. 234-
238) suggests that structures like Figure 3.8 may be more representative of one-word
speech. An interpretation of this implication that Figure 3.8 develops into Figure
3.7(b) and beyond will be elucidated in 3.2. The suggestivity of these forms for future
development notwithstanding, and skipping over the inability of either analysis to
adequately account for 'missing predicates' (e.g. Figure 3.7(c)), Radford's
interpretation of the child's holophrastic and two word utterances does seem to be a
little rich in comparison with the rather more concrete interpretations given in 2.5.
Specifically: (a) Radford has interpreted the 'vague, unspecified' relations expressed
by two-word Locatives (e.g. 'mommy open', 'Wayne sweetie': Figure 3.7(a) & (c)
above) as particular syntactic relations. This is a formal analogue of Tomasello's
interpretation of these Locatives as "omitted prepositions" (see 2.5.2); (b) the
structural difference between Figure 3.7(b) and Figure 3.8 is more apparent than real
(Figure 3.7(b) has merely expanded two of the nodes explicit in Figure 3.8), and to
impart such an extended structure to a holophrastic utterance like "want" is to make an
implicit claim about the presence of predication in the child's thought: a presence
which is not yet directly indicated by the child's speech. This latter interpretation is
apparently an instantiation of the Fodorean claim that strong logics (i.e. grammars)
cannot in principle develop out of weak ones (see Fodor's contributions to Piatelli-
Palmarini 1980; also comments in Chi above): the whole of the future syntactic
development is here already, as part of the "lexical entry for the predicate". "In such a
case there is virtual or implicit predication; but the language form is rudimentary" (De
Laguna (1927), cited by Radford (op. cit., p234)): in Radford 'implicit' seems to
mean 'elided' rather than virtual and the predication is real, just not pronounced (i.e. is
phonologically null).
But the final failure of Radford's 'missing arguments' analysis is that it
studiously avoids the fact that it is the part of the utterance most apparently similar to
the Subject in adult speech (syntactically and semantically) that is most
overwhelmingly often virtual in the child's utterances. Radford makes the point that
arguments (and 'predicates') remain implicit if their reference is recoverable from the
(non)linguistic context. This is similar to the point made earlier that it is the most
salient, stimulating or disturbing components of a situation which are vocalised (2.5).
In other words, newer experiences and data tend to be vocalised; background (i.e.
context) tends to be left virtual. In all of Allison Bloom's speech up to & including 'ali
4' (i.e. all of her speech before the onset of functional grammatical devices) the
component of situations most often left implicit in utterances is the child herself as
originator or actor in situations. Of the 75 VP-type utterances in 'ali 4', over 3/4
accompany situations in which Allison is the actor and explicitly comment on her own
activity (e.gs "eating", "open box", "walking around"). Most of the remainder
functioned as requests or expressions of Allison's desires (and may have been 'proto-
imperatives'). Of the smaller number (40) of utterances with explicit Specifiers
(hereafter referred to as Specified utterances), only 14 (about 1/3) of the Specifiers are
self-referential ("baby", or "baby Allison"). Some of the rest function as requests, but
most comment on the behaviours of the toys as objective events (e.gs "baby doll ride
truck", "cow out" (Allison pulling a cow off the truck), "hurt truck" (on the truck
hitting the pig)). The virtual nature of self-reference is a special case of the implicit
nature of contextual reference in the child's speech. Indeed, it is perhaps an expression
of the virtual nature of the child's Self at this stage.
Beyond its semantic nature, though plausibly a result of it, the Specifier is
structurally a kind of 'optional extra' in ECE. The following utterances are all attested
in 'ali 4'.
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Figure 3.9: Optional Specifiers in Allison's speech (at 1;10;0).
baby eat
no eat
eating eat... cookies eat mommy cookie
eat cookie(s) eating mommy cookie
baby eat cookie(s) eat apple juice
mommy eat cookie
The 'Subject-Verb-Object' word order of these utterances can adequately be
explained as an accommodation to the Social Environment. It is more interesting that
there is an asymmetry between the coherence as units of the Verb Phrases ("eat
(mommy) cookie") and the apparently secondary nature of the Specification. There are
also a number of Juxtapositional utterances in which the Specification is tentatively
linked to the Locative or Verb Phrase.
Figure 3.10: Juxtapositions in Allison's speech (at 1;10;0).
This practical asymmetry is the first objective evidence in Allison Bloom's
speech of a structural asymmetry between parts of an utterance. And if we continue
our model of external practice (e.g. the reach) being a precursor of internalised thought
(e.g. the point), then this asymmetric treatment of components of situations can be an
external precursor of the internalised practice of predication. From this point on, it is
possible to talk of one unit of meaning predicating over another - for example a
Locative or a Verb Phrase. And it is only after this initial step in predication has taken
place that syntactic structure along the Xbar model, which rests on the principle of








truck (urging the truck to wait for the cow)
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3.2 "Late Child English".
3.2.1 The paralysis of syncretism and the generalisation of
predication.
The following grammar can be descriptively adequate for Allison Bloom's
speech for 'ali4':
Figure 3.11:
Utterance —> (Specifier) Predicate.
Specifier --> Word / Compound (group of words referring to one item).
Predicate —> Word / Compound.
Locative.





This grammar allows primitive modes of speech to coexist with the more
advanced forms which are just emerging. For example, the primitive item-name
Locatives tend not to appear accompanied by a Specifier. The grammar also shows the
transitional, unstable nature of Allison's language at this point. Predication is only
explicit (i.e. actual) in the initial disjunction of Specifier and Predicate: any predication
inside Locatives is implicit (i.e. virtual). However, the accommodations to Socially
licensed word order, which have already been noted, are becoming increasingly
regular, such that Locatives generally consist of some Word or Compound preceded
by a word corresponding to an adult verb, preposition or adjective. 'Pivot grammar'
(e.g. Braine 1976) is essentially a description of this early predication, where a small
and well-defined closed group of words (pivots) apparently qualifies a larger and more
unrestricted group of words.
If the objective asymmetry between preposition (verb, adjective: for now I'll
refer to these three parts of speech as 'pivots') and the following phrase can be
internalised, then it would seem to be a short step to generalise the Specifier-Predicate
relation from the gross shape of utterances to a basic relation between words. This
intemalisation and generalisation is the kind of psychological process modelled in 2.3-
2.5 and has accompanied the child's cognitive growth from birth. The imitation of
initial pivots in adult speech is an expression that this superficial feature of adult
speech has indeed been internalised. Generalisation is an effect of associative thinking
- one item with certain features is associated with a second item with some similar
features; features which may be absent or only implicit in the second item may then be
strengthened and become a more salient feature of both items. The Syncretic thinking
of the child by which this kind of association and generalisation is carried out has been
becoming gradually more abstract from the onset of language at around the end of the
first year (2.5). This abstraction comes in several forms: (a) the increasing attention to
the Social Environment's commentary on the Physical Environment, rather than to the
physical environment itself - for instance in the internalisation of only socially licensed
associations between objects, and the building of conceptual rather than Complexive
items; (b) the tendency to reduce associating features to a singularity, for example
'green', 'Allison', 'on' each tend towards having a single deciding feature which is
abstracted from experience and associated with the name itself rather than with (a set
of) particular objects. These tendencies are further encouraged by play in the Social
Environment, both in terms of settling word meanings, and in regularising the
relations between words. Caregivers' differential repetition of children's primitive
utterances (see 1.1) is only the latest and most abstract example of play and
commentary as an attracting influence on the developing child.
The Specifier-Predicate relation then, can be generalised through the whole
system of Early Child English - at least as a tendential point towards which the child's
performance seems to be moving.
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As the table suggests, there seems to be little structural difference in the
treatment of those Parts of Speech which would operate within the Noun Phrase, and
those which would act upon it externally. In a post-Abney (1987) Government-
Binding framework of the kind used by Radford (1990), 'Determiner Phrases' are
'Modifiers' of Prepositional or Verb Phrases; and Adjectives and modifying Nouns
(e.g. in the genitive) all have positions within the 'Determiner Phrase'. Figure 3.13
illustrates, with examples of comparable utterances from Allison Bloom. Evidence of a
structural difference is first apparent when adjective-noun and noun-noun Locatives
begin to appear in Utterance-Specifier positions (e.g. "baby Allison comb hair") as
well as in Locative-Predicate positions (e.g. "there baby cup"). The tendency for
prepositions and Verbs is to remain only in Locative initial position.
Fig 3.13: the Determiner phrase in adult English.
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However, this analysis is purely formal and though the form of the child's
utterances is approaching the sentential form of the adult language, the content - that is
the types of word meaning available - is still quite dissimilar to that of the adults'. In
adult English the Sentential Specifier is the Subject and its semantic properties are less
central than its syntactic properties. That is, the Subject's relation to the speaker and
the non-linguistic environment is less important to the word's Subjecthood than its
relation to the other words in the sentence. In children's English the Utterance
Specifier is still closely tied to a Complexive semantic role: its most defining features
are those in which the word is related to the non-linguistic environment.
Certain properties of Allison Bloom's 'Subjects' are mentioned in 2.2. As was
pointed out, both implicit Specifiers in Allison's Locative utterances and explicit
Specifiers in her Specified utterances referred to objects demonstrating some kind of
intentional activity. First Allison's Locatives accompanied her own effortful activity,
later her mother's and other objects which seemed (to Allison) to be behaving in a
similar way. Evidence for this step of interpretation is that Allison would accompany
these two types of event with similar utterances. The events being described in
Allison's Specified utterances in 'ali 4' are of the same highly effortful, highly
effective, in other words highly transitive, kind as are accompanied by Locative
utterances: that is, eating, driving, movement.
The move to Specified utterances is apparently a move away from talking
about oneself. Self-referring unSpecified utterances are present in 'ali 5' and even 'ali
6', where they formally co-exist with adult-style imperatives, but Specified utterances
very soon become the dominant mode of linguistic expression: from 40/307 utterances
in 'ali 4' (12;10;0) to 125/297 utterances in 'ali 5' (2;4;7) and 242/419 in 'ali 6'
(2;10;0). Allison is a frequent referent of these phrases, even the dominant one (almost
half in 'ali 6'), but the involvement of the self does not over-ride in salience the notion
of directed activity and events which do not involve the self. These features of
utterance Specifiers are attested not only in the Allison Bloom corpus (Bloom 1973,
MacWhinney 1991) but have been noted in several studies of comparable children
from various cultures (Berman 1986 on Hebrew, DeLemos 1981 on Brasilian
Portuguese, Schieffelin 1981 on Kaluli55, Slobin 1966 on Russian). The early
Utterance Specifier seems to express an 'Active Self, tending towards expressing a
variety of 'Agent' as the 'Self component is weakened.
Other parts of Early Child English are not yet differentiated into Parts of
Speech. The difference between Prepositions and Verbs has yet to be made firm in
Allison's language. Utterances such as "baby down chair" and "cow out" (in 'ali 4')
indicate that prepositional Locatives still have a verbal aspect. Similarly, there is no
syntactic differentiation - and little evidence for a semantic one - between genitive-
Locatives ('baby cup', 'mommy cookie') and genuinely 'locative'-Locatives
('mommy shower') or between adjective-Locatives ('apple juice', 'green cup') and
compound noun-Locatives ('baby Allison'). The same simple before-after relation
characterises them all. There is a marked difference in use however as the former pair
draw a relation between two objects named, the latter pair name a single object. A
notable development is that while at first Locative phrases are only attested in
Utterance-Predicate positions and all Specifier positions are short one word phrases;
later (a little in 'ali 4', primitive speech in 'ali 5') 'adjective-noun' and 'noun-noun'
Locatives may also appear in Utterance-Specifier positions.
5 5 Ergative-absolutive languages like Kaluli seem to present problems only at this stage in
development. Early Utterance Specifiers in these languages do seem to fall into the general pattern
outlined in this thesis. See Matthei (1987) for further references.
3.2.2 The transition into "Late Child English".
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For Radford (1990) the development of Early Child English into the more
adult Late Child English is adequately described as the acquisition of the Functional
categories - Determiner, Complementiser and Inflection - and their corresponding
phrase structure. By way of explanation Radford cites "the maturational theory of
acquisition proposed by Borer and Wexler (1987). The essence of the maturational
theory is that different principles of Universal Grammar are genetically programmed to
come into operation at different biologically determined stages ofmaturation."56 The
maturational theory seems to be a special case of the nativist perspective of Formal
Linguistics: the innateness hypothesis discussed in Chapter 1 is expanded to
incorporate "biologically predetermined" development after birth. As such, the
criticisms of the innateness hypothesis in Chapter 1 hold against the maturational
theory and shall not be reproduced here. Suffice it to say that not only is the prenatal
presence of a Universal Grammar presupposed, but this UG is supplemented with a
schedule for linguistic development. In the maturational theory the psychological
development outlined above is an irrelevant epiphenomenon of the biological
maturation of the linguistic organ.
Radford's claim is that the transition into LCE primarily involves the
acquisition of new structural apparatus: that the change is both relatively unintentional
and relatively sudden. Both of these claims are challenged by observational studies of
this period of linguistic development. It appears in fact that the transition is
accompanied by similar bridging phenomena to those evident in the transition from
holophrastic to two-word, and from two-word to multi-word speech; namely: Rote
Memorisation, Phonological Extension and Juxtaposition (see 2.5).
The Rote Memorisation of more advanced forms of speech as unanalysed
wholes is a constant practice of the child. Imitated phrases tend to be prosodically
similar to the utterances the child is producing independently and they tend to be the
more cliched phrases of the child-directed adult language. The song 'Mary had a little
lamb' is a regular component of the play sessions with Allison Bloom and Mommy,
and Allison often breaks into snatches of it. However, in early files these snatches are
limited to single word or mumbled phrases (e.g. 'mm Mary', 'lamb' in 'Ali 2'); in 'ali
5' there is the following relatively confident outburst (Figure 3.14). Although
Radford (1990: 274).
Allison's syntax is developing already by 'ali 5', no utterances are quite as confidently
pronounced as the "Mary had a little lamb" clauses reproduced below: in particular,
non-personal pronouns are virtually unattested.
Figure 3.14: Mary had a little lamb.
*ALI: Mary had a little lamb fleece white as snow.




%act: <lw> reaching in box, taking out lamb
*ALI: little lamb.
*ALI: Mary had a little lamb.
*ALI: little lamb.
*ALI: little lamb.
Phonological Extension is an expression of the child's appreciation of the
longer prosodic contours of adult speech. In earlier transitions the appreciation was
expressed by incorporation of babble elements into the child's utterances, in 'ali 5' this
option is far less common - the child's potential speech seems to be more limited to
socially licensed forms. More often Allison uses adult words as prosodic
placeholders. Figure 3.15 shows a list of some examples of this.
Figure 3.15: Phonological Extensions in 'ali 5'.
a big cow and daddy cow and mommy xxx cow




and have your snack
and jump down
maybe could play exercises with them
now take this cow out
oh spilled it again
As we can see, these prosodic placeholders ('a', 'and', 'maybe', 'now', 'oh')
invariably occur utterance initially, and most often where one would expect the Adult
English Subject. It should be noted that 'a' and 'and' are exceedingly rare in 'ali 5'
(and are not attested in earlier files) and they occur more often utterance initially than
as indefinite articles or conjunctions.
Perhaps the position of Utterance-Specifier is already somewhat identified in
the child as a potential place for a word. Phonological Extension in other places within
the utterance tends to take the form of either babble or syntactic confusion of the kind
shown below (Figure 3.16). These utterances have been listed in an informal order of
interpretability: the first describes a column of toy animals; the second seems to
express something like 'these animals don't want (a drink)'; in the third the relation
between the chair, the cows and mommy is vague even from non-linguistic context.
Figure 3.16: Allison's syntactic confusion in 'ali 5'.
may xxx could they marching in a parade
and don't these animals
in a chair ... playing these cows and mommy
Juxtapositions as before link two components of the presented situation. At
this stage of development however, the child's innovation of structure is limited to the
grammar she has developed for herself. Juxtaposed elements are each grammatical in
terms of the above grammar; the relation between them, being vague and unSpecified,
can be characterised as Locative. These Juxtapositions can be separated into three
groups (see Figure 3.17): in the first and most primitive, separate statements about the
situation are placed in succession. This is most often a simple temporal succession as
in 1 & 2 (and this seems the most common use of 'and'), sometimes as in 3 the
succession is one of internal reasoning.
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Figure 3.17: Juxtapositions in 'ali 5'.
1
*ALI: lie down here.
*ALI: and get up.
*ALI: and way tall.
*ALI: and jump down.
3
*ALI: too much traffic at
airport.
*ALI: I have carry her.
2
*ALI: that big cow.
*ALI: and that daddy cow.
*MOT: where-'is the
daddy cow?
*ALI: right there xxx cow.
*ALI: and baby cow.
*MOT: what are they
again?
*MOT: tell me again.
*MOT: what-'is this?
%gpx: <lw> points
*ALI: a big cow and daddy
cow and mommy &k xxx cow and
baby &n small cow.
4
*ALI: Clementine.
*ALI: want go to airport.
5




*ALI: sheep gonna march.
%act: <aft> marches around
animals
*MOT: where are they
marching?
*ALI: to a home.
7
*ALI: what-'is in here.
*ALI: it-'is a pig!
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The second group of Juxtapositions (4 & 5) involves the relation of
components of a single statement, referring to a single act or event. These are slightly
more interesting than the first set as there is more of a relation of modification rather
than mere succession between the two utterances. Certainly the two utterances of 4 are
in a Spec-Pred relation, as has been described; also the second utterance of 5 seems to
be a modification of the first. The interpretation of 5 as Spec-Pred would seem to be
controversial, however, unless the grammar allows nested Spec-Pred pairs, in which
case 'it' would be the predicate of the phrase 'drink it', and the Locative 'out cup'
would function as the most deeply embedded Predicate in the utterance, Specified by
'it', as in Figure 3.18 below.








I don't want drink it ... out cup.
A structure like this has two interesting properties. The first is that any
P(redicate) node can stand as a grammatical Utterance in its own right - utterances of
the form 'out cup' and 'it out cup' are already common in Allison's speech (if we
ignore for the moment the pronoun's neologism). Secondly, the modifying utterance
'out cup' is able to marry neatly into the main utterance, creating its own 'space'
almost as if one had been reserved for it. This second feature of the relation between
utterances may perhaps illustrate the growing predominance of structured Predication
as a default relation between units, replacing the more primitive Locative relation.
This brings us to the third group of Juxtapositions (6 & 7 in Figure 3.17).
These question-answer games57 apparently demonstrate that Allison is in fact already
quite developed syntactically - aware that a Prepositional phrase and a Noun Phrase
are required as answers to the respective questions. Whether Allison is aware of the
entire stmcture of the question utterances, or whether she is responding to a perceived
'space' at the end of the question utterance is debatable. For example, the presence of
an utterance final 'space' may be signalled prosodically: rising, question-shaped
intonation is used by Caregivers from well within the first year, to invite a response
from the child; this is in contrast to the falling, declarative-shaped intonation of the
Caregiver's response or game-final utterances - "It appears as if she uses falling-rising
(U-shaped) prosody to invite infant response, and falling tone to acknowledge or
'sympathise with' an infant utterance."58
These Juxtapositions are certainly more than Locatives however: this is evident
from the use of such words as to and it- 'is. Words like these are neological in two
senses: firstly they are first encountered in 'ali 5' and even here they are not yet
occurring frequently or regularly; secondly, they are words which operate in a
distinctly new fashion in the child's speech. These words (like 'and' above)
predominantly function as linking words between utterances. Thus the relation
between the utterances no longer need be "vague, unspecified", but the relation itself is
being made particular, i.e. is being Specified by the linking word. In a sense these
linking words become a socially licensed name for the relation, and the relation itself is
then much more open to social influence - in the same way that object complexes drift
more rapidly toward a socially licensed extension once they have a socially licensed
name (see 2.5).
Accompanying the spread of formal Specification there are changes in the
meanings of certain words. The newly acquired Prepositions (like 'to' above) which
Specify relations have a function approaching that of the adult language; other lately
' I use the word 'games' to recall the contribution of play to the child's development. The self-
directed question-answer couplet in (7) suggests that the game is a familiar one to the child - possibly
accompanying physical play or looking through picture-books.
Trevarthen (1987: 187).
acquired prepositions (e.g. 'on', 'in') also have an adult relational function. This shift
in function is evident both semantically, in that prepositions are now more regularly
used to relate objects within an event rather than to name the event itself, and
structurally, in that they will now only appear in predicates Specified by a verb
(prepositions replacing Locatives inside Noun Phrases seems to be a slightly later
development). Prepositions are apparently beginning to form into a class - although
earlier acquisitions (e.g. 'out', 'up') may still occasionally show their more verbal
aspect. This simultaneity of shifts in function and form, such that they may be looked
on as a single event, is significant and has relevance for other developments.
A comparable shift in meaning seems to occur in children's forms of self-
reference. Budwig (1989) follows six children (age 1;8 - 2;8, MLU59 1.7 -3.9 at
onset of study) over a four month period; videotapes were taken twice a month of the
children playing with either a caregiver or a familiar peer. The study is similar in
method to the study of Allison Bloom and the window of development is similar to
that of Allison up to the period of 'ali 5'. The six children of the Budwig study fall
quite neatly into two groups of slightly more primitive and slightly more advanced
speakers. The first group, whom Budwig calls "Ego-anchored" are a little younger,
have a lower MLU and have a high reference to Self in 'subject position' of their
utterances; the second group tended to be older with a higher MLU and a greater
variety of referents in 'subject position'. The forms self-reference took also varied:
details are given in Figure 3.19.
Figure 3.19.
Table 1: broad differences (Budwig's Table 1).
Group Age MLU
Self
Ego-anchored 2;0 2.2 82





59 Mean Length of Utterance - generally stated in terms of words or morphemes.
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Table 2: Distribution (%) of Self reference forms (Budwig's Table 2).
Group I My Me 'Other' 'Name'
Ego-anchored 33 37 13 4
Non-ego-anchored 60 8 2 23
14
7
The Ego-anchored children were so-called because the Self was the
predominant 'subject'. In other words the Utterance-Specifier is a variation of the
'Active Self' referred to above (2.2, 2.5). They also have a range of applicable Self-
reference terms. In contrast the language of the Non-ego-anchored children is much
more isomorphic with adult language: 'Subjecthood' is not limited to the Self; Subject
Self-reference is more limited to "I". Budwig does not explicitly place these two
groups in any developmental relationship with each other, nor does the study track the
development of the children's speech over the four month period. 'Ego-anchoring' is
presented as a state rather than an activity during a period of transition. However, the
interpretation is there to be made, that the move away from 'ego-anchored' speech
toward more adult (i.e. socially licensed) forms is part of the child's linguistic
development.
The spaces between the samples of the Allison Bloom data means that this
whole transition is overlooked. In one step Allison jumps from speaking largely in
unspecified, Locative utterances in 'ali 4' (1;10;0) to the virtually adult speech of 'ali
5' (2;4;7). Self-reference in 'ali 4' is by way of names ('Allison', 'baby') and this
includes Self-reference in 'subject' (i.e. Utterance-Specifier) position, like "baby
Allison comb hair". Without claiming that all individuals follow the same rigid path for
language acquisition, I think it is necessary to assume a certain amount of generality,
where the evidence is not against it. Thus I intend to assume that the course of the
Budwig children's language development has been grossly similar to that of Allison
Bloom: specifically, that early 'subjects' would first have been implicit and later
'subject position' Self-reference would have been by name. This does not appear to be
contradicted by the data.
The body of Budwig's paper consists of an examination of the different
semantic properties of the different Self forms in 'subject position' in the speech of the
Ego-anchored children. The contrast between "I" and "my" is treated in most detail as
it seems statistically the most significant, and "me" and nominal reference are treated
separately. Nominal reference was predominant in more primitive utterances, in games
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and in "reference to depicted action": in other words "in acts of naming, identifying
and describing"60 rather than as part of speech as a corollary to action. The Self may
be part of some event or action (e.g. "Grice ride bicycle"), but is being depicted as an
object.
Pronominal Self-reference was found to have relation to a complex semantic
definition of Agentivity (outlined below in Figure 3.20a; Budwig's Table 3, p272) and
to the pragmatic function of the utterance. "My" tended to be used with Utterance-
Specifiers of high agentivity, in particular "in conjunction with highly kinetic verbs
referring to telic actions", and in utterances "in which the child attempts to use
language to bring about a change in the environment" (i.e. utterances functioning
pragmatically as acts of control). "I" was associated with low agentivity "in utterances
expressing the children's internal states and intentions" and in more assertive or
declarative utterances where "control is not at issue"61. These correlations were
pronounced and cumulative - see Figure 3.20b (Budwig's Table 6, p278). The
somewhat rarer (13%) pronominal Self-reference form "me" is associated with events
when "the child acts as instigator of actions that are directed back onto the Self' and
thus is said to label the Self as "affected Agent" (p279).
Figure 3.20.
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The fact that the 'non-ego-anchored' children use only I in Utterance-Specifier
position implies that this increasing differentiation of Self reference function (which is
not present in the earlier speech of Allison Bloom) has a structural correlate, similar to
the structural changes that Prepositions undergo in this period (see above). Social
licensing will provide the necessary guidelines for locating I, my, me, and nominal
terms within an utterance, and the child's own structural appreciation is sufficient to
translate this linear location into location within an embedded Spec-Pred structure.
The acquisition of the rest of the system of 'Functional Categories' seems to
occur in the same piecemeal fashion. For example, O' Grady et al. (1989) follows the
acquisition of certain functions associated with INFL and the Subject in the linguistic
development of three children62. The children's utterances in transcripts of play
sessions of the children over the appropriate age/MLU range were examined for (a)
utterances containing tokens of 'Subject Taking' verbs, i.e. copulas, inflected verbs,
auxiliaries, 'semi-auxiliaries' like hafta ('have to') and gonna (going to), and modal
verbs, all of which require subjects in adult English; and (b) the actual presence of a
'subject' in these utterances: 'omitted subjects' and intelligible material in Subject
position were ignored. The study's results for one of the children (Eve) are
reproduced in Figure 3.21 (O' Grady's table 2, p521).
62 Two of whom are incidentally from the Brown (1973) study - Adam and Eve.
Figure 3.21: Tokens of Subject Taking verbs with/without subjects: Eve.
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Age MLU Modal Semi-aux. Aux. Inflected Copula
main verb
1;9 2.55 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/5 2/4
l;9l/2 0/1 3/0 2/1 3/6 3/0
1; 10 2.8 3/0 1/3 4/1 9/4 0/0
1; 101/2 3/0 3/2 0/2 9/8 2/1
1;11 3.2 2/0 1/5 4/0 9/6 1/0
1;111/2 8/0 10/4 3/2 11/6 3/0
2;0 3.0 0/0 11/0 6/0 13/2 15/0
2;0l/2 11/0 49/0 5/0 25/0 3/0
2;1 3.4 28/2 22/3 5/0 11/2 19/0
2; ll/2 8/1 34/3 12/0 10/1 11/0
Horizontal lines indicate acquisition points.
In each column figures before the slash represent tokens of that category that
appeared with subjects, figures after the slash represent those without. As we can see
there is a growth over the period both in absolute number of appearances of each
form, and in the relative proportion which appeared with Subjects, i.e. which were
Specified by an appropriate Noun Phrase. Acquisition points were located where
Subjects occurred over 90% of the time and with evidence of productivity rather than
of rote memorisation. Notably the acquisition of the forms can be studied separately,
indicating that the notion of a maturation of a single INFL category might be ideal
rather than abstract. More specifically, their separate development at different rates
implies the development may be part of a concrete process like that of the shift in
properties of Prepositions or of terms for Self reference. This implication is
strengthened when we consider the individual differences in rates and orders of
development of the verb forms across the three children in O' Grady (1989), as in
Figure 3.22 (after O' Grady's table 8, p527). The children take from just one month to
over five months (at the end of the study Seth's Modals and semi-auxiliaries are still
not regular) to acquire these linguistic functions, and the acquisition occurs at widely
different ages.
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Figure 3.22: Orders of development for ST verb classes.
Child Modal Semi- Aux. Inflected Copula Time span (months)
aux. main verb
Eve 1 2 2 3 2 1 (1;111/2 _ 2;0l/2)
Adam 5 4 3 2 1 3 (2;9 - 2; 11)
Seth 3 3 2 4 1 5+ (2;0 - 2;5)
This period, characterised as Late Child English, consists of a cluster of
changes which seem to be consequent on the development and spread of predication.
As particular advances are piecemeal and concrete, their course is plausibly facilitated
by Social licensing. By the end of this period - whenever it occurs and however long it
lasts in each particular child - the child's language is grossly comparable with the
Language of its Social Environment - as with Allison Bloom's language in 'Ali 6'. An
important feature of the child's language at this point, and possibly that in which it
most resembles adult language, is the extent to which an utterance obtains meaning as
a sentence in its own right, without recourse to the non-linguistic environment for
semantic supplementation. The child's language becomes abstract in two ways.
Firstly, it is separated from its non-linguistic context and independent of it for
resolutions of meaning: this is especially the case after the Tense, and Case systems
have been refined.
Secondly, the child's vocal expression of concrete relations (e.g. in Locative
utterances) gives way to a communicative representation of these relations in linguistic
structure. The structural correlate ofmeaning shift has been demonstrated above in the
Specification of Locative utterances by the later acquired Prepositions and in the
differentiation of Self reference terms. That this structure ceases to be merely a
correlate and comes to guide linguistic thinking is implied by the power of the
generalisation of Predication, and is evident in such experimental studies as Matthei
(1987), in which the transition from Utterance-Specifier to Subject in developing
grammars is portrayed as a shift from a meaningful Agentive definition to the Socially
licensed definition - primarily syntactical, and semantically empty or at least vague.
Interestingly with respect to Piaget's and Vygotsky's work on the development of
formal thinking as a social skill, this latest linguistic development often occurs during
the years of formal education - Matthei cites for examples Hakes (1980) and Strauss
(1982).
3.2.3 Generalised Predication.
It remains to summarise in a more explicitly formal fashion this development
of Predication in the child's language. This last section is intended to be taken as
programmatic and suggestive rather than definitive of the ideas expressed in the thesis.
The definitive portrait is to be found in the concrete descriptions in Chapter 2 and the
rest of Chapter 3.
The linguistic development may be presented as a chronology of grammars, as
in Figure 3.23 (c.f. 2.5.4, Fig. 2.24). These will be summarised in turn.



















the cow is coming out
of the truck.
Complexive speech is described in the latter part of 2.4 which is concerned
with the vocal expression of subjectively developed cognitive forms. Holophrastic
speech (2.5) differs from this in that utterances tend to be limited to Complexes with a
Socially licensed phonetic form. This influence of the Social Environment encourages
a move toward abstraction and the beginnings of more formal thought - the child
comes to rely on Social licensing as much as on subjective experience for the content
of its forms.
Locative speech (Chapters 2.5 & 3.1) involves the collocation of Complexes
into 'vague, unspecified' relationships. It is meaningless to describe Location as
Predication both formally, as there are invariably only two terms in an utterance, and
semantically, as qualification of a content word by a 'pivot' seems to be the exception
rather than the rule (and often limited to rote memorisations - e.g. 'more cookie').
Thus the structure of these utterances is a simple binary partnership as shown below
(Figure 3.24).
Figure 3.24. The structure of Locative utterances.
Loc.
out truck
i.e. Loc. —> Comp Comp.
The development of Predicative or Specified utterances (Chapters 3.1-3.2) is
consequent on the appearance of 'optional' Specifiers. For example, the Locative
utterance 'out truck' may coexist in the child's grammar with the utterance 'cow out
truck'. 'Cow' seems to relate to the Locative 'out truck' as a unit: both structurally and
semantically as it seems to qualify the event or state referred to in the Locative. Thus
Predicative speech would have structure as in Figure 3.25.








i.e. Utterance = Predicate.
Pred —> Spec Pred.
—> Loc.
Spec —> Comp
Loc. --> Comp Comp
It is noteworthy that primitive and advanced forms are compatible not only
within the grammar as a whole, but also within particular utterances. Note also that
although presentation is formal the grammar is very concrete in that it relates only to
the 'surface' or attested form - any two word utterance is still a Locative and all
Predicates are two word Locatives with an outside Specifier.
The Spec-Pred relation is generalised throughout the child's grammar as the
size of its utterances grows and larger units need to be related. The child seems to
imitate the adult surface forms and only secondarily develop its formal apparatus to
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encapsulate the larger structures that ensue. There are many examples in the Allison
Bloom data of utterances where the Spec-Pred relation seems only to have been
partially generalised: from Juxtaposed utterances like "Don't want drink it... out cup"
(see 3.2.2 Fig. 3.18) to later utterances wherein structure embedded furthest inside the
sentence seems to become confused. For examples, "no I'm gonna sitting", "when me
comes on" and "this will carry it the airplane" said with one intonation contour and
where the airplane is apparently the carrier referred to. The important development
however is that all conceptual relations come to be linguistically represented as
Specified Predicates, as in 3.2.2 Fig. 3.18 and as in Figure 3.26 below.
Figure 3.26: The structure of utterances with Generalised Predication.
Utt.
s p
w63 w w w w w w w
the cow is coming out of the truck
"3 By now the child's vocal Complexes are sufficiently abstract and isomorphic with the Social
Environment to be called words.
The generality of Predication has consequences throughout this system.
Firstly, the Locative relation becomes increasingly rare such that even two place
phrasal elements can be interpreted as Specified Predicates. Also, a substantial aspect
of a word's meaning comes to be structural, i.e. the contribution a word makes to the
meaning of an utterance is derived partly from the structural relation it bears with other
words of the utterance, rather than purely from the non-linguistic context. Thus words
develop into 'parts of speech' and the homogeneous Spec-Pred phrasal structure can
be differentiated into particular phrasal categories. Figure 3.26 can be rewritten as
Figure 3.27.
Figure 3.27: Differentiated Predication.
Sentence
Det. N Aux. Verb Prep. Prep. Det. N
the cow is coming out of the truck
This Differentiated Predicate structure seems sufficiently similar to the
structures of mainstream formal linguistics (e.g. Haegeman (1991)) to be able to
describe some of the more abstract properties of adult language - for example,
relations between discontinuous constituents; between active and passive voice;
between declarative, imperative and interrogatives; and the nature of the so-called
'empty categories' (see Haegeman p393-438). However, as pointed out above, it has
not been the intention to define a fully developed syntactic formalism in this last
section. The explication of the implications of this 'Differentiated Predication
hypothesis' is a matter for further research. The intention here has been to arrive at
formal syntactic structures via analysis of developing behaviour, and to explain the
abstract entities therein in terms of more primitive and more concrete entities. The
development of the abstract and formal concept of Subject from concrete notions of the
active Self has been the focus, rather than the limit of this investigation.
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Conclusion.
The dialectical synthesis of Chomskyan Formal Linguistics (CFL) and
experimental psychology has produced a rich and coherent picture of the emergence of
abstract linguistic forms from the more concrete behaviour of the pre-linguistic infant.
The formal psychology put forward in Chapter 2 was based on an application and
development of Vygotsky's ideas. It embraces methods and structures from both
linguistics and psychology in a principled rather than eclectic way, to produce an
account of first language acquisition apparently more empirically accurate and more
generatively powerful than either field alone.
Development of the Subject has been the focus of this study, though not to the
exclusion of other logically or historically related phenomena. Thus the development
of the Subject can be seen as a portrait in little of the development of language as a
whole. This is hinted at in the final section, and there are specific proposals for
expanding the hypotheses of Generalised and Differentiated Predication to the
description of various structures of adult English syntax .
The thesis is rich in implication, and points to many areas of potentially fruitful
research in both linguistics and psychology. There seem to be three main projects in
psychology:
(i) It will be challenging to establish more concretely the nature of the
postulated phenomenological environments, namely: the time-spaces; Subjective
Space-time; and the Social Environment. These structures seemed to be licensed by
behavioural evidence, but this evidence was sufficient only to generate a vague and
abstract notion of the phenomenological environment.
(ii) There are no claims made about the relative conservatism of the child's
cognitive development; in other words of the continuity of 'primitive' forms like
Schemata and Complexes in more advanced (i.e. adult) cognition. There seems to be a
case for such continuity in the less socialised activities (e.g. dreams, subjective
experience of time passing) and in habitual or expert activity (e.g. an accomplished
dancer may experience the dance holistically, rather than as a co-ordination of separate
actions).
(iii) There is an interesting parallel between Vygotsky's Complexes, and their
potential to describe cognitive development, and the emotional Complexes of Freud. A
materialist critique of psycho-analysis and psycho-therapy along the lines of
Vygotsky's critique of Piaget and the preceding critique of CFL, would seem to be a
promising avenue of study.
In linguistics the potential for further research consists in generalising the ideas
from the development of the Subject to more expansive investigations into language:
(iv) The empirical data used to license Generalised Predication were almost
exclusively from the acquisition of English. This immediately raises the question of
the applicability of both the initial development of Subject and the generalisation of
Predication to the study of other languages. This is in effect a call for separate studies
on the acquisition of other languages as a first language (i.e. LI acquisition), informed
by the methods proposed in this thesis. As a first approximation, the critical approach
described here could be applied to detailed descriptive studies of LI acquisition, such
as Ochs (1988) on Samoan, or Gvosdev's studies of Russian (e.g. Gvosdev (1961);
see also Slobin (1966)). It would of course be against the spirit of this thesis to base a
description of LI acquisition on an account of the adult syntax, no matter how
concrete or descriptive.
(v) A special case of the above study would be to test the application of my
ideas to acquisition of Ergative languages. These are languages which do not seem to
have syntactic Subjects, in the sense of external arguments of intransitive predicates -
i.e. in these languages the sole argument of an intransitive predicate is the 'Object' or
'Patient'. Samoan is an example of this kind of language. This is a direct challenge in
that the development of Active Self into Subject seems to be entirely negated in these
languages. As with (iv) above, addressing this challenge would involve concrete study
of a particular language. However, the theoretical status of Ergativity itself is under
debate from within linguistics and the approach to an 'Ergative' language would also
have to engage critically with the notion of Ergativity.
(vi) Finally, it seems that whichever formalism is used to describe linguistic
structure - in the adult speaker/listener, in the 'linguistic community', in the text even -
must be constantly open to development and change. This thesis is as critical of the
notion of the 'Steady State' as it is that of the 'Language Acquisition Device'. And
criticising language acquisition as 'identification in the limit' is equivalent to criticising
the notion that language acquisition has an 'end'.
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